Emotions as Objects of Argumentative Constructions

Aristotle, On Rhetoric, translated by George Kennedy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

The beliefs and judgments justify the emotion in the eyes of the person who feels it. They are, however, open to criticism when speakers engage in argumentation—and that is what concerns me here.

This can be illustrated by a short example of contemporary political discourse. During the last French presidential debate (May 2, 2007), Nicolas Sarkozy was opposed to Ségolène Royal. A particular episode of the debate was largely commented by the media in the following days. During a discussion concerning the social integration of handicapped children, Sarkozy promised that he would do everything in his power to “give each of these children a place in the schools”. Royal then vehemently denounced her opponent’s “political immorality”, because, she argued, Sarkozy himself had suppressed a series of measures destined to help handicapped children at the time he was serving as Minister of the Interior. Royal asserted that she was “very angry”, while Sarkozy suggested that his opponent’s “anger” was groundless and did not rest on good reasons: “I don’t know why Mrs. Royal is getting angry”, “I don’t understand why Mrs. Royal, who’s usually calm, has lost her temper” («Je ne sais pas pourquoi Madame Royal s’énerve», «Je ne comprends pas pourquoi Madame Royal, d’habitude calme, a perdu ses nerfs»). Royal then seeked to justify her emotion and to show that is was indeed grounded in reason: “Some angers are healthy, because they correspond to people’s suffering” («Il y a des colères saines, parce qu’elles correspondent à la souffrance des gens»). She even went as far as to claim a disposition toward anger, thus highlighting the fact that this particular emotion is at the heart of political action: “There will be times when I’ll be angry, even when I am President of the Republic” («Il y a des colères que j’aurai, même quand je serai Présidente de la République»).

It should be noticed that normative argumentation theorists are often very close to rhetoricians when it comes to describing the cognitive impact of emotional appeals. The essential difference is praxeological: while the latter often recommend to take advantage of it in order to maximize persuasion, the former discourage it in the name of an ideal of reasonable argumentation.

The following examples are taken from the corpus of my doctoral thesis: La construction argumentative des emotions dans les débats parlementaires français sur l’abolition de la peine de mort (1791–1981), University of Lausanne, 2008.