Skip to main content
Log in

Virtue in Argument

  • Published:
Argumentation Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Virtue theories have become influential in ethics and epistemology. This paper argues for a similar approach to argumentation. Several potential obstacles to virtue theories in general, and to this new application in particular, are considered and rejected. A first attempt is made at a survey of argumentational virtues, and finally it is argued that the dialectical nature of argumentation makes it particularly suited for virtue theoretic analysis.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Battaly, H.D. 2000. What is virtue epistemology? In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuBatt.htm.

  • Brinton, A. 1995. The ad hominem. In Fallacies: Classical and contemporary readings, ed. H.V. Hansen and R.C. Pinto, 213–222. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Code, L. 1984. Toward a ‘responsibilist’ epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45: 29–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, D. 2005. Arguments that backfire. In The uses of argument, ed. D. Hitchcock and D. Farr, 58–65. Hamilton, ON: OSSA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, D. 2007. Virtue epistemology and critical inquiry: Open-mindedness and a sense of proportion as critical virtues. Presented at the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, APA Central Division Meetings, Chicago, IL.

  • Cook, R. 2002. Speech by Robin Cook MP, Leader of the House of Commons, at Press Gallery lunch, Wednesday 12 June 2002. http://www.commonsleader.gov.uk/print/page156.asp.

  • Falmagne, R.J., and M. Hass. ed. 2002. Representing reason: Feminist theory and formal logic. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foot, P. 1978. Virtues and vices. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foot, P. 2001. Natural goodness. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gabbay, D.M., and J. Woods. 2009. Fallacies as cognitive virtues. In Games: Unifying logic, language, and philosophy, ed. O. Majer, A.-V. Pietarinen, and T. Tulenheimo, 57–98. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hitchcock, D. 2006. The pragma-dialectical analysis of the ad hominem fallacy. In Considering pragma-dialectics: A festschrift for F. H. Van Eemeren on the occasion of his 60th birthday, ed. P. Houtlosser and A. van Rees, 109–119. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hitchcock, D. 2007. Is there an argumentum ad hominem fallacy? In Reason reclaimed: Essays in honor of J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnston, ed. H.V. Hansen and R.C. Pinto, 187–199. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mortimer, J. 1984. Clinging to the wreckage. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, J.J., and R.A. Katula 1995. A synoptic history of classical rhetoric. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, M.C. 1988. Non-relative virtues: An Aristotelian approach. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13: 32–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul, R. 2000. Critical thinking, moral integrity and citizenship: Teaching for the intellectual virtues. In Knowledge, belief and character: Readings in virtue epistemology, ed. G. Axtell, 163–175. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Powers, L.H. 1998. Ad hominem arguments. In Argumentation and rhetoric, ed. H.V. Hansen, C.W. Tindale, and A.V. Colman. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sherry, D. 2006. Formal logic for informal logicians. Informal Logic 26 (1): 199–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solum, L.B. 2003. Virtue jurisprudence: A virtue-centered theory of judging. In Moral and epistemic virtues, ed. M. Brady and D. Pritchard, 163–198. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. 1980. The raft and the pyramid: Coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 3–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. 1991. Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Statman, D. ed. 1997. Virtue ethics: A critical reader. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Eemeren, F.H., and R. Grootendorst. 1992. Argumentation, communication, and fallacies: A pragma-dialectical perspective. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Eemeren, F.H., and R. Grootendorst. 1995. Argumentum ad hominem: A pragma-dialectical case in point. In Fallacies: Classical and contemporary readings, ed. H.V. Hansen and R.C. Pinto, 223–228. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, D. 1999. Ethotic arguments and fallacies: The credibility function in multi-agent dialogue systems. Pragmatics and Cognition 7: 177–203.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, D. 2006. Poisoning the well. Argumentation 20: 273–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • West, T.G., and G.S. West. 1984. Four texts on Socrates. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whately, R. 1850. Logic. London: Griffin (first published in 1826).

  • Woods, J. 2007. Lightening up on the ad hominem. Informal Logic 27 (1): 109–134.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

My first engagement with this topic was a reply I gave at the 2005 Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation Conference to Cohen (2005). I am grateful to the organizers for their invitation, and to Daniel Cohen for discussion and encouragement then and since. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for a thorough and helpful critique, and to audiences in Amsterdam and Bristol. An earlier version of this article appeared in the Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrew Aberdein.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Aberdein, A. Virtue in Argument. Argumentation 24, 165–179 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-009-9160-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-009-9160-0

Keywords

Navigation