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Journal of Business Ethics

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04.07.2017 | Original Paper

CEO Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility

verfasst von: Yuan Yuan, Gaoliang Tian, Louise Yi Lu, Yangxin Yu

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics | Ausgabe 2/2019

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Abstract

This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) ability on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We find that firms’ CSR performance increases with CEO ability. Specifically, firms with more able CEOs are associated with more socially responsible activities and fewer socially irresponsible activities, and are associated with more stakeholder CSR rather than third-party CSR. We further find that the positive relation between CEO ability and CSR is weakened for CEO who is also the chair of the board and for CEO who is close to retirement; and is weakened when the CSR emphasis exerted by a firm’s external environment is high. Our results are robust after controlling for firm fixed effects and to the use of multiple measures of CSR performance and CEO ability. Overall, our evidence is consistent with our conjecture that more able CEOs have less career concerns so that these CEOs are more willing to undertake long-term investments in socially beneficial activities, leading to better CSR performance.

Vorheriger Artikel Do Contracts Make Them Care? The Impact of CEO Compensation Design on Corporate Social Performance

Nächster Artikel What Makes CSR Communication Lead to CSR Participation? Testing the Mediating Effects of CSR Associations, CSR Credibility, and Organization–Public Relationships

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See 2014 Report on Sustainable and Responsible Investing Trends in the United States. http://www.ussif.org/trends.

The measure of CEO ability that we use differs slightly from that of Demerjian et al. (2012). See details in “Research Method” section.

MSCI STATS is the successor to Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD), Innovest, and IRRC. MSCI STATS categorizes CSR items as qualitative issues or controversial business issues.

The untabulated test shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of corporate governance dimension in calculating CSR scores. Some studies (e.g., Choi and Wang 2009; Tang et al. 2015) exclude human rights issues from their CSR calculations. Our results are also robust to the exclusion of human rights dimension in calculating CSR scores.

Demerjian et al. (2012)’s managerial ability is widely used in the literature. This includes Andreou et al. (2016), Bonsall IV et al. (2016), Chen et al. (2015), Jiraporn et al. (2016), Koester et al. (2016) and Krishnan and Wang (2014).

Following Demerjian et al. (2012), we estimate Model (1) by Fama and French (1997) industry for our sample period from 2003 to 2012. Untabulated results show that, except for the CSR SCORE variable, our estimations are qualitatively similar to those of Demerjian et al. (2012). As part of our robustness check, we also exclude CSR SCORE in Model (1) and obtain qualitatively similar results for our main tests.

Besides these control variables, we included the Kaplan–Zingales index (Hong et al. 2012), slack (Tang et al. 2015), firm age, advertising expenses, and CEO’s compensation in the main regressions. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively unchanged.

When we measure MABILITY as a continuous variable, we find qualitatively similar results.

Prior studies suggest that CEOs typically retire between the ages of 64 and 66 (Murphy 1999) and often use the years preceding a CEO’s retirement as a proxy for horizon problems (Dechow and Sloan 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993).

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Titel: CEO Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility
verfasst von: Yuan Yuan
Gaoliang Tian
Louise Yi Lu
Yangxin Yu
Publikationsdatum: 04.07.2017
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Ethics / Ausgabe 2/2019
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3622-3

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