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The small core of the German corporate board network

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Abstract

We consider the bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. The board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies appear to be the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany’s corporate network.

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Correspondence to Mishael Milaković.

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Milaković, M., Alfarano, S. & Lux, T. The small core of the German corporate board network. Comput Math Organ Theory 16, 201–215 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-010-9072-4

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