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How Did Things Get So Bad So Quickly? An Assessment of the Initial Conditions of the War Against Organized Crime in Mexico

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Abstract

Objectives: This study explores the initial conditions of the current war against organized crime in Mexico. The theoretical framework is institutional anomie theory (IAT). Composite measures were used to summarize local initial conditions for the occurrence of organized crime deaths by gang execution, confrontation, and aggressions to authority. Spatial and temporal elements were included to assess the validity of the initial conditions approach. Evidence presented here suggests that Mexican states significantly differed in their initial conditions for organized crime deaths to have occurred. Also, although trends in gang executions and confrontations have been slowing down, aggressions to authority are speeding up considerably. The evidence presented corroborates IAT. However, the significance and direction of the relationships among institutional anomie correlates and initial conditions of the war against organized crime depended upon the type of death.

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Notes

  1. At the subnational level, Mexico is composed of 32 states with a wide range of crime rates.

  2. Federal police interrogation to Edgar Valdez Villarreal (aka La Barbie). Date 8/30/2010. Video available in: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJbH0fIV83U.

  3. Here I mention the cartels states of leadership residence or principal activity. However, most cartels operate across different states.

  4. The objectives of the strategy were already mentioned in the introduction.

  5. Organized crimes are more efficient and profitable than others.

  6. See methodological document at: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/?DNA=119.

  7. In Spanish: Ejecuciones, Enfrentamientos and Agresiones contra la autoridad.

  8. As they serve as drug entry points.

  9. Data is normally distributed.

  10. SAR stands for spatial autoregressive model.

  11. See appendix.

  12. See appendix.

  13. It has reallocated approximately 152 miles towards the northwest, from Zacatecas in 2007 into the state of Durango in 2010.

  14. The weighted mean centre for deaths by confrontation has reallocated approximately 142 miles towards the east, in this case from Durango (near the border with Zacatecas) in 2007 into the state of Zacatecas in 2010.

  15. Ceteris paribus, deaths of these two types should reach a peak in the near future.

  16. Difference tests were also applied on acceleration rates (b2) and results were also statistically significant, suggesting that not only initial conditions but trends are also different among states. See Vilalta (2013).

  17. This was assessed via Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample normality tests.

  18. I want to thank two reviewers for their suggestions regarding the anomie factors.

  19. This is precisely happening as this paper is being revised. Federal police are being systematically ambushed by organized crime gangs while patrolling the state of Michoacan.

  20. Although they prefer to use a Student´s t distribution to test for differences between slopes.

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Appendix

Appendix

The Global Moran I autocorrelation coefficient is given by the following formula (Holt, 2007):

$$ I=\left(\frac{1}{s^2}\right)\frac{{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{i=1}^n{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{j=1}^n{w}_{ij}\left({x}_i-\overline{x}\right)\left({x}_j-\overline{x}\right)}{{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{i=1}^n{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{j=1}^n{w}_{ij}}, $$

where N is the number of states (N = 32), xi and xj are the values of the dependent variables, deaths by execution, confrontation and aggression towards authority (Ln) in the states i and j. s2 is the sample variance. And Wij is the neighbouring matrix. The element x[i,j] of the resulting weight matrix X is 1 if polygon j is adjacent to polygon i, and is 0 otherwise.

The local Moran I autocorrelation coefficient is given by the following formula (Holt, 2007):

$$ {I}_i=\left({x}_i-\overline{x}\right){\displaystyle \sum}_{j=1}^n{w}_{ij}\left({x}_j-\overline{x}\right). $$

Same notation as above.

The baseline growth-curve model applied was the following (Kubrin and Herting, 2003):

$$ (ln){Y}_{it}={a}_i+{b}_{1i}(Time)+{b}_{2i}{(Time)}^2+{\mathrm{e}}_{it}, $$

where (Ln)Y it is the logged count of the number of organized crime deaths in state i at time t, ai is the estimated mean constant, b1 is the mean effect of time on deaths, b2 is the mean effect of time squared, and eit is each observation error. The constant reflects the initial levels of organized crime deaths at the beginning of the time series, b1 reflects the main linear trend in deaths levels, and b2 reflects the extent to which the trend accelerates or decelerates over time.

I applied the following test (Paternoster et al. 1998; Kubrin and Weitzer; 2003):Footnote 20

$$ Z=\frac{a_i-{a}_j}{\sqrt{ SE{a}_i^2+ SE{a}_j^2}}, $$

where a i and a j the intercepts and SE the standard errors.

The weighted mean centres (WMC) are calculated in the following form (Vilalta, 2011):

$$ WMC=\left({\overline{x}}_{cmp},{\overline{y}}_{cmp}\right)=\left(\frac{{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{i=1}^n{w}_i{x}_i}{{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{i=1}^n{w}_i},\frac{{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{i=1}^n{w}_i{y}_i}{{{\displaystyle \sum}}_{i=1}^n{w}_i}\right), $$

where xcm y ycm are the coordinates of the centre mean, xi y yi are each centroid coordinates for polygon i,n is the sample size, and Wi is each polygon´s weighted variable.

The spatial spatial autoregressive (SAR) model takes the form (Lesage, 1998):

$$ Y=\uprho \mathrm{Wy}+\mathrm{x}\upbeta +\mathrm{e}, $$

where y contains an nx1 vector of dependent variables, X represents the usual nxk data matrix containing explanatory variables and W is a known spatial weight matrix, in this case a first-order or strict contiguity matrix. Rho (p) is the coefficient on the spatially lagged dependent variable (Wy-). Maximum likelihood estimation of this model is based on a concentrated likelihood function.

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Vilalta, C. How Did Things Get So Bad So Quickly? An Assessment of the Initial Conditions of the War Against Organized Crime in Mexico. Eur J Crim Policy Res 20, 137–161 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-013-9218-2

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