Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Cadre recruitment and corruption: what goes wrong?

  • Published:
Crime, Law and Social Change Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Why do so many corrupt officials rise up in the Chinese official hierarchy in the first place? This paper addresses this question by looking at corruption in the cadre recruitment system as a source of the problem. It attempts to show that despite meaningful reforms to improve cadre recruitment, especially through greater input and supervision from below, these reforms have not succeeded in fundamentally reshaping cadre incentives in the direction of accountability towards the below. Rather, the reforms have in many ways exacerbated incentives for opportunism and maneuvering on the part of individual officials. In explaining the new problems and failures in personnel matters, the paper places blame on incentive and structural distortions in the recruitment while also taking into consideration the realities of China’s vast local variance that combine to affect enforcement and incentives for compliance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Yang, D. (2004). Breaking the Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Pei, M. (2006). China’s Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Sun, Y. (2004). Corruption and Market in Contemporary China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Sheng, Q.Y. (2001). Promotion despite Corruption: A Problem not to Be Ignored. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 1, 21–22.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Tian, Y. (2004). Incremental Reform of the System for Recruiting Key Party and State Officials. In X. Xiangling (Ed.), The Party, Government and Society in China’s Incremental Political Reform (pp. 108-124). Beijing: CITIC Publishing House.

    Google Scholar 

  6. The CCPDIC General Office and Research Office (Eds.) (2004). Strengthening Deterrence against Corruption, the Construction of Better Party Ethics and Governance, and the Struggle against Corruption. Beijing: Zhongguo Fangzheng Press.

  7. Hu, J., et al., (Ed.) (2005). Strengthening the Building of the Party’s Governing Capacity. Beijing: Party History Publishing House

  8. Xu, H.B., & Guo, X.D. (2004). The Institutional Sources of Corruption in Personnel Matters and Strategies to Deal with It Originally in Zhong Zhou Xue Kan, abridged in Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 11, 23–26.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Yang, L. (2005). Latest Violations in Personnel Matters. Liao Wang, 22, 34–35 (Outlook Weekly).

    Google Scholar 

  10. Wen, S.T. (2004). New Developments in Corruption, excerpted from: 2004: An Analysis and Forecast of China’s Social Situations. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 9, 13–15 Sept.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Hou, Z.X. (2005). Four New Trends in the Buying and Selling of Official Posts. Fazhi Zaobao, Aug. 7.

  12. Song, Y. (2004). From the Phenomenon of Transportation Department Chiefs to the Phenomenon of Personnel Department Chiefs. Feng Huang Zhou Kan, 9.

  13. Nian, X.G. (2005). Political Showcase Projects and Their Remedies. Zhongguo Gongchandang, 10, 74–78.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Hou, Y.C. (2005). Remedying Mistaken Approaches to Political Achievements. Zhongguo Gongchandang, 12, 98–100.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Sheng, X.P. (2003). Deficit Spending for Political Achievements: An Alternative Form of Corruption. Shidai Chao, 8.

  16. Sale of Office Hidden in ‘Normal Procedures’. (2003, April 29) Zuojia Wenzhai.

  17. (2001). The key to fighting corruption is to stop it at the source. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 1, 13–15.

  18. Chu, Z. (2001). Reflections on major corruption cases. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 10, 17–19.

    Google Scholar 

  19. He, S.N. (2003). Methods to End Corruption in Personnel Matters. Abridged from: Da Chao, reprinted in Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 3, 18–20 March.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Bribe Giving in Jingyu, Liaoning: No Exceptions in Any County Agency. (March 2003). Zuojia Wenzhai, p. 7

  21. (2003). Over One Hundred ke- and ju-ranked Officials Pay Bribes to the County Party Secretary. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 5, 21–22.

  22. (2001). Statistics from the “Marriage Law” Draft Group Show that 95% of Corrupt Officials Kept Concubines. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 8, 29.

  23. Zhong, W., & Sun, F. (2003). The Mistresses of Corrupt Officials in the Eyes of a Female Prosecutor. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 4, 35–36.

    Google Scholar 

  24. (2003). Corrupt Officials have Secret Passages for Flowing Black Money Overseas, Rich Kids Study Overseas and Buy Expensive Cars and Houses. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 1, 16.

  25. Chen, F. (2001). Casinos in Macau: Graveyards for Corrupt Officials. Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 6, 39–40.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Pomfret, J. (2002). China’s High Rollers Find a Seat at Table-in Vegas-Wealthy Aren’t Afraid to Blow Millions, Especially When the Money Isn’t Theirs. Washington Post, March 26, 2002.

  27. Shengtang, W. (2004). New Developments in Corruption. Excerpted from: 2004: Analysis and Forecasts about China’s Social Developments, in Dang Feng Lian Zheng, 9, 13–15.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Four Characteristics of Violations by Young Officials. From Liao Wang,Aug., 2003, cited in Shidai Wenzhai, Aug. 6, 2003.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Queens and the Graduate Center, City Univerity of New York, Flushing, NY, 11367, USA

    Yan Sun

Authors
  1. Yan Sun
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yan Sun.

Additional information

Paper prepared for Workshop on Building Clean Government in China, City University of Hong Kong, May 17-18, 2007.

Appendix

Appendix

Major Personnel Reform Decrees since 1995

  1. [1] 1995/02/09

    CCP Central Committee, “Temporary Regulations for the Selection and Appointment of Key Officials for Party and State Organs;” lays out six principles and four procedures for key cadre recruitment. The latter includes democratic nomination, scrutinizing, deliberation, and decision.

  2. [2] 1999/03/03

    CCP Central Committee Personnel Department, “Notification on Further Improving the Work of Open Selection of Key Officials;” lays out procedures for the open selection of party and state cadre.

  3. [3] 2000/06/22

    CCP Central Committee, “Program for Deepening the Reform of the Personnel System;” lays out ten-year targets for reforming the personnel system, with emphasis on mechanisms that allow cadres to “move up and down, move in and out.”

  4. [4] 2000, 12/14

    CCP Central Committee Personnel Department, “Opinions on Promoting the Public Announcement of Finalists for Key Party and State Offices before Formal Appointment;” suggests that finalists for key offices be publicly announced within a certain administrative scope and time frame, so that the rank and file have an opportunity to make comments and objections.

  5. [5] 2002/07/09

    CCP Central Committee, “Working Guidelines s for the Selection and Appointment of Key Officials for Party and State Organs;” lays out procedures for the open selection and competition for key party and government posts at sub-national levels, including the public announcement of open positions, candidate application and verification of credentials, administration of exams and opinion polls, discussion and recommendation of finalists by organizational departments, and discussion and decision y the party committee.

  6. [6] 2004/02

    CCP Discipline Inspection Commission and CCP Central Committee Personnel Department, “Notification on the Exit of Party and State Cadre from Concurrently Held Posts in Commercial Firms.”

  7. [7] 2004/03

    CCP Politburo:

  1. a.

    “Temporary Regulations for the Open Selection of Key Party and State Cadre;”

  2. b.

    “Temporary Regulations for the Appointment of Key Party and State Cadre through Open Competition;”

  3. c.

    “Procedures for Voting on the Proposed Candidates and Recommended Candidates for the Chief Executive Positions of the Immediate Lower-level Party Committees and State Administrations, by the Plenary Session of Higher-level Party Committees;”

  4. d.

    “Temporary Regulations for the Resignation of Party and State Officials;”

  5. e.

    “Opinions on Participation in Commercial Activities by Key Party and State Cadre after Resignation.”

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Sun, Y. Cadre recruitment and corruption: what goes wrong?. Crime Law Soc Change 49, 61–79 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-007-9091-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-007-9091-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation