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Throwing the rascals out? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981–2011

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Abstract

Corrupt politicians have to a surprisingly great extent been found to go unpunished by the electorate. These findings are, however, drawn from case studies on a limited number of countries. This study, on the contrary, is based on a unique dataset from 215 parliamentary election campaigns in 32 European countries between 1981 and 2011, from which the electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals are analyzed. Information about the extent to which corruption allegations and scandals have occurred is gathered from election reports in several political science journals, and the electoral effects are measured in terms of the electoral performances—the difference in the share of votes between two elections—of all parties in government, as well as the main incumbent party, and the extent to which the governments survive the election. The control variables are GDP growth and unemployment rate the year preceding the election, the effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties, and the level of corruption. The results show that both corruption allegation and corruption scandals are significantly correlated with governmental performances on a bivariate basis; however, not with governmental change. When controlling for other factors, only corruption allegation has an independent effect on government performances. The study thus concludes—in line with previous research—that voters actually punish corrupt politicians, but to a quite limited extent.

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Notes

  1. The only exception is Switzerland, where the so-called magic formula prescribes that the government will be made up by the four main parties, and which in effect precludes governmental turnover. I have also omitted the first free elections in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, as there were by definition no democratically elected governments to hold accountable in those elections. In contrast, the first free elections in Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia are included, since the preceding elections are considered sufficiently free and competitive. Moreover, both the Czech and Slovak Republics’ first elections are compared to the results in the last Czechoslovak election in 1992. Finally, the 2006 Ukrainian election is excluded as the government for most of the preceding election period was formed under the previous presidential system.

  2. Countries scoring between 8 and 10 are coded as low for corruption, countries scoring between 5 and 7.9 as medium corrupt and countries scoring below 5 as highly corrupt. The first CPI was published in 1995, which means that the figures for the first 15 years are estimated on the basis of the last 15 years. As corruption is considered to be a sticky phenomenon, which changes quite modestly during a short term period, this strategy should not distort the facts in this respect.

  3. www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/

  4. A country is considered democratic when it is rated as Free by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) [12]. Years missing indicate that the countries were already considered Free from the starting point of the period under study, i.e. in 1981.

  5. The first democratic elections in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are omitted since there was no democratic government to hold accountable in those elections.

  6. The first election in the Czech Republic is compared to the last Czechoslovak election in 1992.

  7. In 2002, Yugoslavia was still in existence. It consisted of two federal subjects, Serbia and Montenegro. Between 2003 and 2005, the federation had loosened and the country was called Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, Montenegro became independent and was rated Free in 2008.

  8. Slovakia was rated Partly free in 1996 and 1997 and Free again in 1998, when the elections were held. Slovakia has been rated as Free since then. The first election in Slovakia is compared to the last Czechoslovak election in 1992.

  9. The 2006 election is omitted since the government for most of the preceding election period was appointed under the previous presidential system.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Quality of Government Institute & Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, PO Box 711, 405 30, Göteborg, Sweden

    Andreas Bågenholm

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  1. Andreas Bågenholm
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Correspondence to Andreas Bågenholm.

Appendix

Appendix

Country

DemocraticFootnote 4

No. of electionsFootnote 5

Austria

 

9 (1983–2008)

Belgium

 

9 (1981–2010)

Bulgaria

1991

6 (1991–2009)

Croatia

2000

4 (2000–2011)

Czech RepublicFootnote 6

1990

5 (1996–2010)

Denmark

 

11 (1981–2011)

Estonia

1991

5 (1995–2011)

Finland

 

8 (1983–2011)

France

 

7 (1981–2007)

Germany

 

8 (1983–2009)

Greece

 

11 (1981–2009)

Hungary

1990

5 (1994–2010)

Iceland

 

8 (1983–2009)

Ireland

 

10 (1981–2011)

Italy

 

8 (1983–2010)

Latvia

1991

6 (1995–2011)

Lithuania

1991

4 (1996–2008)

Luxemburg

 

6 (1984–2009)

Malta

1987

6 (1987–2008)

Montenegro

2008

1 (2009)

Netherlands

 

10 (1981–2010)

Norway

 

8 (1981–2009)

Poland

1990

7 (1993–2011)

Portugal

 

10 (1983–2011)

Romania

1996

4 (1996–2008)

SerbiaFootnote 7

2002

3 (2003–2008)

SlovakiaFootnote 8

1993

5 (1994–2010)

Slovenia

1991

6 (1992–2011)

Spain

 

9 (1982–2011)

Sweden

 

9 (1982–2010)

UkraineFootnote 9

2005

1 (2007)

United Kingdom

 

7 (1983–2010)

Total

215

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Bågenholm, A. Throwing the rascals out? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981–2011. Crime Law Soc Change 60, 595–609 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9482-6

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