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Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

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Abstract

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Agricultural Economics & Rural Development, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Seoul National University, San 56-1 Sillim-dong, Gwanak-gu, Seoul, 151-742, Korea

    Oh Sang Kwon

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  1. Oh Sang Kwon
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Correspondence to Oh Sang Kwon.

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Kwon, O.S. Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War. Environ Resource Econ 33, 463–483 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-4994-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-4994-x

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