Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
SLX-Digitalkonferenz: Zukunftswerkstatt 2024

Mehr Umsatz mit Top-Kontakten

Am 7. Mai erfahren Sie, wie Vertriebsteams Leadgenerierung, Leadnurturing und Leadstrategien effizient steuern können.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Electronic Commerce Research
Erschienen in: Electronic Commerce Research 3/2012

01.09.2012

Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects

verfasst von: Patrick Maillé, Evangelos Markakis, Maurizio Naldi, George D. Stamoulis, Bruno Tuffin

Erschienen in: Electronic Commerce Research | Ausgabe 3/2012

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

We provide a broad overview of the research that has been conducted until recently on the design of sponsored search auctions. We mainly focus on game theoretic and mechanism design aspects of these auctions, and we analyze the issues associated with each of the three participating entities, i.e., the search engine, the advertisers, and the users of the search engine, as well as their resulting behavior. Regarding the search engine, we overview the various mechanisms that have been proposed including the currently used GSP mechanism. The issues that are addressed include analysis of Nash equilibria and their performance, design of alternative mechanisms and aspects of competition among search engines. We then move on to the advertisers and discuss the problem of choosing a bidding strategy, given the mechanism of the search engine. Following this, we consider the end users and we examine how user behavior may create externalities and influence the performance of the advertisers. Finally, we also overview statistical methods for estimating modeling parameters that are of interest to the three entities. In each section, we point out interesting open problems and directions for future research.
Vorheriger Artikel Adoption and use of e-commerce in SMEs
Nächster Artikel Textual factors in online product reviews: a foundation for a more influential approach to opinion mining

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Fußnoten
1
The exact value of ϵ is provided by every search engine for every currency. It usually equals ϵ=0.01.
 
Literatur
1.
2.
Aggarwal, G., Feldman, J., Muthukrishnan, S., & Pál, M. (2008). Sponsored search auctions with Markovian users. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 621–628). CrossRef
3.
Aggarwal, G., Goel, A., & Motwani, R. (2006). Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC) (pp. 1–7).
4.
5.
Ashkan, A., & Clarke, C. L. A. (2009). Characterizing commercial intent. In Conference on information and knowledge management (CIKM) (pp. 67–76).
6.
Ashkan, A., Clarke, C. L. A., Agichtein, E., & Guo, Q. (2009). Classifying and characterizing query intent. In European conference on information retrieval research (ECIR) (pp. 578–586).
7.
Ashlagi, I., Braverman, M., Hassidim, A., Lavi, R., & Tennenholtz, M. (2010). Position auctions with budgets: existence and uniqueness. B.E. J. Theor. Econ. Adv., 10(1). doi:10.​2202/​1935-1704.​1648
8.
Ashlagi, I., Monderer, D., & Tennenholtz, M. (2011). Simultaneous ad auctions. Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(1), 1–13. CrossRef
9.
Athey, S., & Ellison, G. (2011). Position auctions with consumer search. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(3), 1213–1270. CrossRef
10.
Babaioff, M., & Roughgarden, T. (2010). Equilibrium efficiency and price complexity in sponsored search auctions. In Proc. of 6th workshop on ad auctions, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 2010.
11.
Bhawalkar, K., & Roughgarden, T. (2011). Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding. In ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms (SODA) (pp. 700–709).
12.
Borgs, C., Chayes, J., Etesami, O., Immorlica, N., Jain, K., & Mahdian, M. (2007). Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions. In International conference on world wide web (WWW) (pp. 531–540). CrossRef
13.
Borgs, C., Chayes, J., Immorlica, N., Mahdian, M., & Saberi, A. (2005). Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC) (pp. 44–51).
14.
Brandt, F., & Weiß, G. (2001). Antisocial agents and Vickrey auctions. In 8th international workshop on agent theories, architectures and languages (ATAL) (pp. 335–347).
15.
Bu, T., Deng, X., & Qi, Q. (2008). Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction. Information Processing Letters, 105(2), 41–46. CrossRef
16.
Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., & Kyropoulou, M. (2011). On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC) (pp. 81–90).
17.
Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, K., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M., Lucier, B., Leme, R. P., & Tardos, E. (2012). On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions. arXiv:​1201.​6429.
18.
Cary, M., Das, A., Edelman, B., Giotis, I., Heimerl, K., Karlin, A., Mathieu, C., & Schwarz, M. (2007). Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC), San Diego, California, USA.
19.
Cesa-Bianchi, N., & Lugosi, G. (2006). Prediction, learning and games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
20.
Chakrabarty, D., Zhou, Y., & Lukose, R. (2008). Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 566–576).
21.
Chung, C., & Pyrga, E. (2009). Stochastic stability in Internet router congestion games. In Symposium on algorithmic game theory (SAGT) (pp. 183–195). CrossRef
22.
Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11, 17–33. CrossRef
23.
Constantin, F., Rao, M., Huang, C.-C., & Parkes, D. (2011). On expressing value externalities in position auctions. In AAAI.
24.
Craswell, N., Zoeter, O., Taylor, M., & Ramsey, B. (2008). An experimental comparison of click position-bias models. In ACM international conference on web search and data mining (WSDM) (pp. 87–94). CrossRef
25.
Demange, G., Gale, D., & Sotomayor, M. (1986). Multi-item auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 863–872. CrossRef
26.
Dembczyński, K., Kotlowski, W., & Weiss, D. (2008). Predicting ads’ click-through-rate with decision rules. In Proc. 17th international conference on world wide web (WWW).
27.
Deng, X., & Yu, J. (2009). A new ranking scheme of the GSP mechanism with Markovian users. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 583–590). CrossRef
28.
29.
Drosos, D., Markakis, E., & Stamoulis, G. D. (2012). Budget constrained bidding in sponsored search auctions. Working paper.
30.
Easley, D., & Kleinberg, J. (2010). Networks, crowds and markets: reasoning about a highly connected world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
31.
Edelman, B., & Ostrovsky, M. (2007). Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions. Decision Support Systems, 43, 192–198. CrossRef
32.
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007). Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review, 97(1), 242–259. CrossRef
33.
Feldman, J., Muthukrishnan, S., Pal, M., & Stein, C. (2007). Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC) (pp. 40–49).
34.
Feng, J., Bhargava, H. K., & Pennock, D. M. (2007). Implementing sponsored search in web search engines: computational evaluation of alternative mechanisms. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 19(1), 137–148. CrossRef
35.
Fotakis, D., Krysta, P., & Telelis, O. (2011). Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search. In Symposium on algorithmic game theory (SAGT) (pp. 105–116). CrossRef
36.
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
37.
Fukuda, E., Kamijo, Y., Takeuchi, A., Masui, M., & Funaki, Y. (2010). Theoretical and experimental investigation of performance of keyword auction mechanisms. In Proc. of 6th workshop on ad auctions, Cambridge, MA, USA.
38.
Ghosh, A., & Mahdian, M. (2008). Externalities in online advertising. In Proc. 17th international world wide web conference (WWW) (pp. 161–168). CrossRef
39.
Ghosh, A., & Sayedi, A. (2010). Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising. In Proc. 19th international conference on world wide web (WWW), Raleigh, NC, USA, April 2010 (pp. 371–380). CrossRef
40.
Giotis, I., & Karlin, A. (2008). On the equilibria and efficiency of the GSP mechanism in keyword auctions with externalities. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 629–638). CrossRef
41.
Goel, A., & Munagala, K. (2009). Hybrid keyword search auctions. In Proc. 18th international conference on world wide web (WWW) (pp. 221–230). CrossRef
42.
Goel, S., Lahaie, S., & Vassilvitskii, S. (2009). Contract auctions for sponsored search. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE), Rome, Italy (pp. 196–207). CrossRef
43.
Goemans, M. X., Mirrokni, V. S., & Vetta, A. (2005). Sink equilibria and convergence. In Symposium on foundations of computer science (FOCS) (pp. 142–154). CrossRef
44.
Gomes, R., Immorlica, N., & Markakis, E. (2009). Externalities in keyword auctions: an empirical and theoretical assessment. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 172–183). CrossRef
45.
Gonen, R. (2009). Characterizing optimal syndicated sponsored search market design. In Proc. of the 5th workshop on ad auctions, Stanford, CA, USA, July 2009.
46.
Green, D. (2003). Search engine marketing: why it benefits us all. Business Information Review, 20(4), 195–202. CrossRef
47.
Grillo, A., Lentini, A., Naldi, M., & Italiano, G. F. (2010). Penalized second price: a new pricing algorithm for advertising in search engines. In 8th annual conference on communication networks and services research (CNSR 2010), Montreal, 11–14 May 2010 (pp. 207–214). CrossRef
48.
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41(3), 617–631. CrossRef
49.
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q. (2000). Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica, 68(3), 525–574. CrossRef
50.
Immorlica, N., Jain, K., Mahdian, M., & Talwar, K. (2005). Click fraud resistant methods for learning click-through rates. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 34–45). CrossRef
51.
52.
Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., & Stacchetti, E. (1996). How (not) to sell nuclear weapons. American Economic Review, 86(4), 814–829.
53.
Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., & Stacchetti, E. (1999). Multi-dimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities. Journal of Economic Theory, 85(2), 258–294. CrossRef
54.
Jeziorski, P., & Segal, I. (2009). What makes them click: empirical analysis of consumer demand for Internet search advertising. Working paper.
55.
Joachims, T., Granka, L., Pan, B., Hembrooke, H., & Gay, G. (2005). Accurately predicting clickthrough data as implicit feedback. In ACM SIGIR (pp. 154–161).
56.
Kempe, D., & Mahdian, M. (2008). A cascade model for externalities in sponsored search. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 585–596). CrossRef
57.
Koutsoupias, E., & Papadimitriou, C. H. (1999). Worst-case equilibria. In STACS (pp. 404–413). CrossRef
58.
Kuminov, D., & Tennenholtz, M. (2009). User modeling in position auctions: Re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms. In International conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems (AAMAS) (pp. 273–280).
59.
Lahaie, S. (2006). An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search. In Proc. seventh ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC), Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA (pp. 218–227). CrossRef
60.
Lahaie, S., & Pennock, D. (2007). Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions. In Proc. ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC), San Diego, California, USA, June 2007 (pp. 50–56).
61.
Lahaie, S., Pennock, D., Saberi, A., & Vohra, R. (2007). Sponsored search auctions. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, & V. Vazirani (Eds.), Algorithmic game theory (pp. 699–716). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chap. 28. CrossRef
62.
Leonard, H. (1983). Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions. Journal of Political Economy, 91, 461–478. CrossRef
63.
Li, S.-M., Mahdian, M., & McAfee, R. P. (2010). Value of learning in sponsored search auctions. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 294–305). CrossRef
64.
Liang, L., & Qi, Q. (2007). Cooperative or vindictive: bidding strategies in sponsored search auction. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 167–178). CrossRef
65.
Linden, G., Meek, C., & Chickering, M. (2009). The pollution effect: optimizing keyword auctions by favoring relevant advertising. In Proc. of the 5th workshop on ad auctions, Stanford, CA, USA.
66.
Ling, M. C., & Lawler, K. (2001). Internet advertising, game theory and consumer welfare. Electronic Commerce Research, 1(1/2), 169–181. CrossRef
67.
Liu, D., Chen, J., & Whinston, A. (2008). Competing keyword auctions. In Proc. of 4th workshop on ad auctions, Chicago, IL, USA, July 2008.
68.
Lucier, B., & Leme, R. P. (2011). GSP auctions with correlated types. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC) (pp. 71–80).
69.
Markakis, E., & Telelis, O. (2010). Discrete bidding strategies and their social inefficiency for locally aware bidders. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 523–530). CrossRef
70.
Marmer, V., & Shneyerov, A. (2009). Quantile-based nonparametric inference for first-price auctions. SSRN eLibrary.
71.
McAfee, R., & McMillan, J. (1987). Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 25(2), 699–738.
72.
Mehta, A., Saberi, A., Vazirani, U., & Vazirani, V. (2007). Adwords and generalized online matching. Journal of the ACM, 54(5).
73.
Muthukrishnan, S., Pal, M., & Svitkina, Z. (2007). Stochastic models for budget optimization in search-based advertising. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 131–142). CrossRef
74.
Myerson, R. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 58–73. CrossRef
75.
Naldi, M., D’Acquisto, G., & Italiano, G. F. (2010). The value of location in keyword auctions. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 9(2), 160–170. CrossRef
76.
Naldi, M., Pavignani, A., Grillo, A., Lentini, A., & Italiano, G. F. (2011). The competitor busting strategy in keyword auctions: who’s worst hit? In Proceedings of the ninth annual conference on communication networks and services research (CNSR 2011), Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 2–5 May 2011 (pp. 153–160). CrossRef
77.
Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2010). Reserve prices in Internet advertising auctions: a field experiment. In Proc. of 6th workshop on ad auctions, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 2010.
78.
Leme, R. P., & Tardos, E. (2010). Pure and Bayes-Nash price of anarchy for generalized second price auction. In Foundations of computer science (FOCS) (pp. 735–744).
79.
Pardoe, D., Stone, P., Saar-Tsechansky, M., & Tomak, K. (2006). Adaptive mechanism design: a metalearning approach. In Eighth international conference on electronic commerce (ICEC), August 2006 (pp. 92–102).
80.
Ravi, R., Hafalir, I., & Sayedi, A. (2009). Sort-cut: a pareto-optimal and semi-truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. In Proc. of the fifth workshop on ad auctions, July 2009.
81.
Richardson, M., Dominowska, E., & Ragno, R. (2007). Predicting clicks: estimating the click-through rate for new ads. In International conference on world wide web (WWW) (pp. 521–530). CrossRef
82.
Riley, J., & Samuelson, R. (1981). Optimal auctions. American Economic Review, 71(3), 381–392.
83.
Shapley, L., & Shubik, M. (1972). The assignment game. I. The core. International Journal of Game Theory, 1, 111–130. CrossRef
84.
Silverman, B. (1986). Density estimation for statistics and data analysis. London/Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall/CRC Press.
85.
Spiekermann, S., & Paraschiv, C. (2002). Motivating human-agent interaction: transferring insights from behavioral marketing to interface design. Electronic Commerce Research, 2, 255–285. CrossRef
86.
Thompson, D. R. M., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2009). Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions. In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC) (pp. 51–60). CrossRef
87.
Varian, H. (2005). Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25, 1163–1178. CrossRef
88.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8–37. CrossRef
89.
Vorobeychik, Y., & Reeves, D. M. (2007). Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (WINE) (pp. 155–166). CrossRef
90.
Yen, B. P.-C., & Ng, E. O. (2002). Migrating procurement onto the Internet. Electronic Commerce Research, 2, 113–134. CrossRef
91.
Young, H. P. (2004). Strategic learning and its limits. London: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
92.
Zhou, Y., & Lukose, R. M. (2007). Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions. In International conference on electronic commerce (ICEC) (pp. 141–146).
Metadaten
Titel
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
verfasst von
Patrick Maillé
Evangelos Markakis
Maurizio Naldi
George D. Stamoulis
Bruno Tuffin
Publikationsdatum
01.09.2012
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Electronic Commerce Research / Ausgabe 3/2012
Print ISSN: 1389-5753
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9362
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-012-9094-8

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3/2012

Electronic Commerce Research 3/2012 Zur Ausgabe

OriginalPaper

Critical review of the e-loyalty literature: a purchase-centred framework

OriginalPaper

Adoption and use of e-commerce in SMEs

OriginalPaper

Textual factors in online product reviews: a foundation for a more influential approach to opinion mining

OriginalPaper

E-commerce transactions in a virtual environment: virtual transactions