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Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth

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Abstract

Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science’s sense of “verification” and “validation”); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science’s sense of “proxy”) and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory’s sense of “commutation”); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science’s technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained.

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Notes

  1. For an updated overview and guide to the literature see Floridi (2004a).

  2. For example, Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953) and Devlin (1991)argued against the veridical nature of semantic information, whereas Dretske (1981) and Grice (1989) argued in its favour.

  3. See for example the discussion in Fetzer (2004), with a reply in Floridi (2005); or the objections moved by Colburn (2000a, b) and Dodig-Crnkovic (2005).

  4. Floridi (2007) and Sequoiah-Grayson (2007).

  5. On the analysis of data see Floridi (2008a).

  6. The distinction is standard in linguistics, where one speaks of passive verbal forms or states as “statal” (e.g. “the door was shut (state) when I last checked it”) or “actional” (e.g. “but I don't know when the door was shut (act)”). In this paper, I deal only with the statal sense of “is informed”. This is related to cognitive issues and to the logical analysis of an agent’s “possession” of a belief or some knowledge.

  7. The interested reader is referred to Floridi (forthcoming), the “twin article” where I develop and defend a full answer to question (b).

  8. In this paper, I have relied especially on Lynch (2001), Engel (2002) and Künne (2003), among the many introductions and anthologies available on the major theories of truth, as particularly helpful.

  9. See for example Popper (1935), Dretske (1981), Fox (1983), Israel and Perry (1990), Barwise and Seligman (1997) and Bremer and Cohnitz (2004).

  10. A query is to be understood as a request for data sent (e.g., an illocutionary act performed) by a sender to a receiver, in the form of a message. Thus, it might have the format of a question (“where is the beer?”) as well as of an imperative (“tell me where the beer is”), or a string of symbols in a search engine. A result is also to be understood as a message, the requested data, sent by the receiver to the querying sender.

  11. Alternatively: every p can be transformed into a request of whether p plus a result, but more on this in the next section.

  12. This is a rather standard approach, see Groenendijk and Stokhof (1994) and Szabolcsi (1997).

  13. See Floridi (2010a) for a more detailed but still introductory presentation.

  14. The occurrence of the term “system” here is unfortunate but inevitable (it is dictated by standard terminology in model analysis). Luckily, it should not generate any confusion, since it clearly refers to the whole blueprint described by Fig. 3.

  15. Young (2002) has shown that even in the case of a correspondence theory of truth it is at least controversial whether the slingshot argument undermines it.

  16. Redundancy is often useful, but in this case it is pointless redundancy that is in question.

  17. For the attribution to Smullyan see Landini (2007).

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Acknowledgments

A first version of the paper was presented at the I International Meeting of Experts in Information Theories (Leon, Spain, 6–7 November, 2008) and I am very grateful to Francisco Salto for his kind invitation, and to the audience for the lively and valuable discussion. Several revised versions were then presented at the following meetings: Formal Philosophy Seminar, University of Leuven, February 2009 (thanks to Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson); Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, March 2009 (thanks to Hilmi Demir); Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Padova, March 2009 (thanks to Massimiliano Carrara and Francesca Menegoni); North-American Computing And Philosophy (NACAP) Conference, Indiana University, June 2009 (thanks to Anthony Beavers); Akademie der Wissenschaften and Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, July 2009 (thanks to Robert Schaback); Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Genova, October 2009 (thanks to Carlo Penco); The Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge University, October 2009 (thanks to Jane Heal and Steven Methven). I would also like to acknowledge the help, useful comments and criticisms by Patrick Allo, Mark Jago, Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson, and Matteo Turilli. I remain deeply indebted to Michael Dummett and Susan Haack for their clarifications and feedback, which date to almost 20 years ago. I am afraid this paper has been a work in progress for quite some time. Joanna Gillies kindly copyedited the last version. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the feedback provided by the two anonymous referees, who offered many constructive suggestions on how to improve the paper and saved me from more than a couple of blunders. All the aforementioned people helped me to develop the paper substantially, but they are not responsible for any remaining mistakes.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, AL10 9AB, UK

    Luciano Floridi

  2. Faculty of Philosophy and IEG, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Luciano Floridi

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Floridi, L. Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth. Erkenn 74, 147–175 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9249-8

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