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Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment

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Abstract

This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences with our 18 independent observations per treatment. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economics, The University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom

    Klaus Abbink

  2. Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, Bonn University, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113, Bonn, Germany

    Heike Hennig-Schmidt

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  1. Klaus Abbink
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Correspondence to Klaus Abbink.

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JEL Classification C91 · D62 · D72 · D73 · K42

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Abbink, K., Hennig-Schmidt, H. Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. Exp Econ 9, 103–121 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z

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