Skip to main content
Log in

A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments

  • Published:
Experimental Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player’s income. The data show that contributions increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment opportunities reduce welfare. The results suggest that the experimenter’s choice of the punishment effectiveness is of great importance for the experimental outcome.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Anderson, C., & Putterman, L. (2006). Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(1), 1–24

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bochet, O., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006). Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60(1), 11–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, J. (2007a, in press). Punishing free-riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods. Games and Economic Behavior

  • Carpenter, J. (2007b). The demand for punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62, 522–542

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Casari, M. (2005). On the design of peer punishment experiments. Experimental Economics, 8(2), 107–115

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006). Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment? Experimental Economics, 9, 265–279

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Denant-Boemont, L., Masclet, D., & Noussair, C. (2007, in press). Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment. Economic Theory

  • Egas, M., & Riedl, A. (2005). The economics of altruistic punishment and the demise of cooperation. Tinbergen institute discussion Papers 05-065/1

  • Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005). Driving forces behind informal sanctions. Econometrica, 73(6), 2017–2030

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980–994

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and co-operation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gürerk, O., Irlendbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006). The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science, 312, 108–111

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hollander, M., & Wolfe, D. A. (1999). Nonparametric statistical methods. New York: Wiley

    Google Scholar 

  • Keser, C., & van Winden, F. (2000). Partners contribute more than strangers: conditional cooperation. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(1), 23–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., & Villeval, M. C. (2003). Monetary and non-monetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. American Economic Review, 93, 366–380

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2006). Punishment, inequality and emotions. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2119

  • Nikiforakis, N. (2007, in press). Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games—can we really govern ourselves? Journal of Public Economics

  • Nikiforakis, N., & Normann, H. T. (2005). A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Royal Holloway Discussion Papers Series, dpe05/7

  • Nikiforakis, N., Normann, H. T., & Wallace, B. (2007). Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma. University of Melbourne Economics Working Paper No. 982

  • Noussair, C., & Tucker, S. (2005). Combining monetary and social sanctions to promote cooperation. Economic Inquiry, 43(3), 649–660

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a sword: self governance is possible. American Political Science Review, 86, 404–417

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Page, T., Putterman, L., & Unel, B. (2005). Voluntary association in public goods experiments: reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency. The Economic Journal, 115(506), 1032–1053

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sefton, M., Shupp, R., & Walker, J. (2005). The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods. Ball State University, Department of Economics, Working Paper 200504

  • Varian, H. R. (1999). Intermediate microeconomics (5th ed.). New York: Norton

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nikos Nikiforakis.

Electronic Supplementary Material

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Nikiforakis, N., Normann, HT. A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Exper Econ 11, 358–369 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3

Keywords

JEL

Navigation