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Erschienen in: Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making 3/2016

11.11.2015

A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games

verfasst von: Satoshi Masuya, Masahiro Inuiguchi

Erschienen in: Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making | Ausgabe 3/2016

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Abstract

The payoff of each coalition has been assumed to be known precisely in the conventional cooperative games. However, we may come across situations where some coalitional values remain unknown. This paper treats cooperative games whose coalitional values are not known completely. In the cooperative games it is assumed that some of coalitional values are known precisely but others remain unknown. Some complete games associated with such incomplete games are proposed. Solution concepts are studied in a special case where only values of the grand coalition and singleton coalitions are known. Through the investigations of solutions of complete games associated with the given incomplete game, we show a focal point solution suggested commonly from different viewpoints.

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Metadaten
Titel
A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games
verfasst von
Satoshi Masuya
Masahiro Inuiguchi
Publikationsdatum
11.11.2015
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making / Ausgabe 3/2016
Print ISSN: 1568-4539
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-2908
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10700-015-9229-1

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