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Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention?

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why consensus was reached on a legally binding approach given the opposition of powerful actors. Why did the United States and key emerging economies change their positions? We apply tools from the regime formation literature—classical perspectives on power, interests and knowledge—and the use of different leadership tools to shed light on the issue. Knowledge-based intellectual leadership was exercised by the UNEP Secretariat, providing new information on the seriousness and scope of the problem. Power-based leadership through unilateral action was provided by the United States. When the United States changed position after change in domestic leadership, political costs increased for other opponents. Finally, interest-based instrumental leadership was provided by many proponents, with UNEP and among others the EU in the lead. Still, conflicts remain on control measures and the form of financial mechanism.

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Notes

  1. For a discussion of regime formation from the perspective of the power-based/realist school, see, e.g., Keohane (1984), Miles et al. (2002) and Falkner (2005). An account of the institutional and knowledge-based schools can be found in, e.g., Hasenclever et al. (1996) and Haas (1992), respectively.

  2. The distinctions between definition of structural and instrumental leadership have been subject to some debate. A structural leader may also employ entrepreneurial (instrumental) skills, while the opposite transformation is hardly open to manipulation. But as Malnes (1995) argues, the use of any type of force (sticks and carrots) associated with structural power does not fall within the proper definition of leadership.

  3. Interviews with Matthias Kern, Basel Convention, Geneva, January 4, 2011, and Per Bakken, UNEP Chemicals, Geneva, January 5, 2011.

  4. UNEP decision GC 25/5, § 23 and § 27.

  5. Interview with Per Bakken, UNEP Chemicals, Geneva, January 5, 2011.

  6. The national submissions to the INC1 discussions from India. UNEP (2012c).

  7. Interviews with Henrik Eriksen and Atle Fretheim, Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, November 17, 2010.

  8. Our interviewees agree on this point.

  9. Our interviewees agree on this point.

  10. This goes for UNEP Chemicals, not UNEP in general. It is pointed out that despite continued pressure from Switzerland and Norway, UNEP’s Executive Director Achim Steiner did not believe in the viability of an LBA for mercury until the US revised its position. Interviews with Henrik Eriksen and Atle Fretheim, Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, November 17, 2010.

  11. Interview with Per Bakken, UNEP Chemicals, Geneva, January 5, 2011.

  12. Interviews with Matthew Gubb, SAICM, Geneva, January 5, 2011, and Per Bakken, UNEP Chemicals, Geneva, January 5, 2011.

  13. Interview with Per Bakken, UNEP Chemicals, Geneva, January 5, 2011.

  14. Interview with Matthew Gubb, SAICM, Geneva, January 5, 2011.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Postbox 326, 1326, Lysaker, Norway

    Steinar Andresen, Kristin Rosendal & Jon Birger Skjærseth

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  1. Steinar Andresen
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  2. Kristin Rosendal
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  3. Jon Birger Skjærseth
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Correspondence to Kristin Rosendal.

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Andresen, S., Rosendal, K. & Skjærseth, J.B. Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention?. Int Environ Agreements 13, 425–440 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-012-9198-6

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