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Group Agents and Their Responsibility

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Abstract

Group agents are able to act but are not literally agents. Some group agents, e.g., we-mode groups and corporations, can, however, be regarded as functional group agents that do not have “intrinsic” mental states and phenomenal features comparable to what their individual members on biological and psychological grounds have. But they can have “extrinsic” mental states, states collectively attributed to them—primarily by their members. In this paper, we discuss the responsibility of such group agents. We defend the view that if the group members have accepted the group agent’s (attributed) attitudes and are committed to them, we can favorably compare the situation with the case of individual human agents and a group agent can be regarded as morally responsible for its intentional activities.

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Notes

  1. See Tuomela (2007) and especially Tuomela (2013) for detailed accounts of we-mode attitudes and actions; and see the remarks below in Section II on the three central conditions for we-mode states and actions.

  2. Note that individualistic reductions of group attitudes and actions as well as of responsibility seem not to hold true in the group case (see below and Tuomela 2015).

  3. A we-mode group has a special social status. At least for its members it is an irreducible “our group” qua being based on a non-distributive “we.”

  4. Cases to be analyzed with regard to group action and responsibility attributions from inside and from outside:

    1. 1.

      A member/members acting in accordance with the ethos of the group and within the limits of their individual authority.

    2. 2.

      A member/members acting in accordance with the ethos of the group but by mistake not within the limits of their individual authority.

    3. 3.

      A member/members acting in accordance with the ethos of the group but intentionally not within the limits of their individual authority.

    4. 4.

      A member/members acting and being mistaken about the ethos of the group and within the limits of their individual authority.

    5. 5.

      A member/members acting intentionally against the ethos of the group and going beyond the limits of their individual authority.

  5. In general, intentions can be taken to entail commitments, and similarly joint intentions entail collective commitments and are thus the main source for the coming about of the latter.

  6. For non-autonomous we-mode groups involving external power, see Tuomela (2013: Chap. 2, Appendix).

  7. Note that List and Pettit characterize group responsibility without discussing directly individual group members. According to them, “a group agent is fit to be held responsible for doing something to the extent it satisfies the following requirements:

    First requirement The group agent faces a normatively significant choice, involving the possibility of doing something good or bad, right or wrong.

    Second requirement The group agent has the understanding and access to evidence required for making normative judgments about the options.

    Third requirement The group agent has the control required for choosing between the options” (List and Pettit 2011).

    We find these requirements plausible but in need of elucidation—which is what List and Pettit do give in their book.

  8. See Tuomela (2007) for a detailed account and elucidation what acting as a group member involves.

  9. In all, the responsibility for performing an action X as a member of a we-mode group is different from the responsibility for performing X as a private person: Private responsibility, of course, as such does not entail responsibility as a group member, and responsibility as a group member does not entail at least full responsibility for X as a private person, i.e., as one who does not act as a member of the we-mode group or, for that matter, any other group (although in this case the person is “privately” responsible at least for being a member of the group).

  10. See Tuomela (2007) for the notion of ethos. Another example of more or less the present kind of causation is this: Consider a vase on a table. The table prevents the vase from falling on the floor. So the table’s being there is a kind of static, non-event cause of the fact of the vase staying on the table.

  11. A we-mode group is at least mainly constituted by its ethos and its positions for members such that the members may change and that thus the group’s identity in general does not primarily hang on its members’ identity.

  12. See also Cooper (1972: 90–91) for conditions of collective blame or responsibility:

    1. 1.

      Members of a group perform undesirable acts.

    2. 2.

      Their performing these acts is partly explained by their acting in accordance with the “way of life” of the group (i.e., the rules, mores, customs, etc. of the group).

    3. 3.

      These characteristics of the group’s way of life are below standards we might reasonably expect the group to meet.

    4. 4.

      It is not necessarily the case that members of the group, in performing the acts, are falling below the standards we can reasonably expect individuals to meet.

  13. For David Copp’s somewhat different formulations and terminology but at bottom a very similar idea, see Copp (2007).

  14. See Tuomela (2013: Chap. 6) for more details.

  15. See Tuomela (2007: Chap. 7).

  16. The simple hierarchical structure discussed, while traditional and employed in many corporations still today, is regarded as old-fashioned and it is in some cases replaced by independent teams that might well operate as we-mode ones. This modern approach, called corporate entrepeneurship, functions with less strict normative relationships (a “flat” organization). This is supposed to enhance motivation and make room for creativity and flexibility.

  17. Consider this example of an external leader: An army unit or a school class may be ordered by a leader (respectively an officer or teacher) to act as a group and they may do it, perhaps based on a group reason different from the whole group’s ethos. They might be told that only the whole group’s rather than single individuals’ achievements will be rewarded (or, in some cases, negatively sanctioned). These kinds of situations may motivate a group to act as a group (team) even under external authority. Those who are skilled and good at the task involved will help the weakest, and such help is collectively rational. This is how we-mode groups in general act and exhibit strong solidarity.

  18. As stated, at bottom this authorization can be regarded as internal. But in real life it may look very much like external authorization in part due to the control mechanisms (sanctioned laws, the police and army, prisons, etc.) of the state.

  19. Of course, the professor can resign from his job if he cannot agree to take orders from his immediate supervisors. He has retained this kind of freedom to exit from the group.

  20. The present point about corporate responsibility seems to hold true independently of whether or not the corporation is “we-mode driven” (Tuomela 2013: Chap. 3).

References

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Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Dr. Soc. Sci. Maj Tuomela, Dr. Sonja Amadae, and M. Soc. Sci. Kaarlo Miller for important comments.

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Correspondence to Raimo Tuomela.

Appendix

Appendix

A detailed account of the responsibility of a group agent in the blameworthiness case.

Let us assume that there is a normative standard, S, which is deontically relevant to Y and that the group understands this and is “deontically sensitive” to this fact. In general, S can be taken to specify whether Y is required (namely, in terms of stit, (O(stit(g, Y))), permitted (P(stit(g, Y))), or forbidden (F(stit(g, Y))) or whether some other kind of deontic relationship obtains. Whatever task g adopts for itself, it will be regarded as prospectively responsible for it relative to S.

Based on the collectivity condition and the collective commitment requirement, a we-mode group is at least to an extent responsible for its members' actions as group, and each member of a we-mode group is prima facie responsible to an extent for any other member’s actions as a group member.

Here is an account from Tuomela (2007: Chap. 10), of retrospective normative group responsibility in the blameworthiness sense in the case of a we-mode group or a related kind of organized group (cf. Mäkelä and Tuomela 2002, for an earlier version):

(NRGB) Group g is normatively retrospectively responsible in the blameworthiness sense for a blameworthy action X relative to a deontically relevant normative standard S, where X is a group action performed by g [see (IGA) of Tuomela 2007: Chap. 10] or an individual group member’s (or members’) action as a member of g or an outcome of either kind of action, and S is the normative moral part of g’s ethos if and only if (or to the extent that)

  1. 0.

    it was the case prior to action that, compatibly with the normative standard S, group g ought to have seen to it that Y or brought about Y, where Y is an action or outcome of action that is incompatible with X and is to be performed in the group context in which the members are acting in as members of g (in a sense allowing dissidents); and they knew that or, because of the rationality or reasonability standards related to S, they ought to have known that, and

  2. 1.

    g intentionally brought about X, or saw to it that X, or intentionally let X happen; or

  3. 2.

    g intentionally omitted preventing X (outcome) from coming about or from obtaining or continuing to obtain; or

  4. 3.

    g brought about X (or let it happen) as a foreseen but perhaps not an intended consequence of its intentional action (in contrast to (1)); or

  5. 4.

    g brought about X as a consequence of its intentional action, or it let X happen while it did not foresee X happening but reasonably ought to have foreseen it; or

  6. 5.

    g brought about X, or let it happen, by mistake when intentionally trying to bring about Y as a group, and there was either recklessness or negligence involved in its so acting; or

  7. 6.

    (6)(a) when intentionally trying to bring about Y, g ended up bringing about X, or it ended up letting X happen, because of its (dissident) members’ action that it ought to have prevented but did not, although it was capable of it or it reasonably ought to have been capable of it, or (b) the group members had by their attitudes violating S and favoring actions of kind X (perhaps indirectly) facilitated the dissidents’ action that served to bring about X.

In this account, the first clause (0) is thus assumed to hold true no matter which of the disjuncts (1)–(6) are satisfied.

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Tuomela, R., Mäkelä, P. Group Agents and Their Responsibility. J Ethics 20, 299–316 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-016-9236-7

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