Abstract
Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one. Some players behave as leaders, others as followers. Such games are named after Stackelberg. In the current paper, a special type of these games is considered, known in the literature as inverse Stackelberg games. In such games, the leader (or: leaders) announces his strategy as a mapping from the follower (or: followers) decision space into his own decision space. Arguments for studying such problems are given. The routine way of analysis, leading to a study of composed functions, is not very fruitful. Other approaches are given, mainly by studying specific examples. Phenomena in problems with more than one leader and/or follower are studied within the context of the inverse Stackelberg concept. As a side issue, expressions like “two captains on a ship” and “divide and conquer” are given a mathematical foundation.
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Communicated by Y.-C. Ho.
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Olsder, G.J. Phenomena in Inverse Stackelberg Games, Part 1: Static Problems. J Optim Theory Appl 143, 589–600 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-009-9573-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-009-9573-9