Abstract
In this paper, we extend the classical Holmström and Milgrom contracting problem, by adding uncertainty on the volatility of the output for both the Agent and the Principal. We study more precisely the impact of the “Nature” playing against the Agent and the Principal, by choosing the worst possible volatility of the output. We solve the first-best and the second-best problems in this framework, and we show that optimal contracts are in a class of contracts linear with respect to the output and its quadratic variation. We also present a general modus operandi to apply our method.
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Notes
We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting this interpretation.
We insist on the fact that if one does not want to assume such an axiom, this is not a problem for this part of our work, and one just has to keep working with the family \((W^{\mathbb {P}})_{{\mathbb {P}}\in {{\mathcal {P}}}_S}\). However, when defining the set of admissible contracts \({\mathfrak {C}}^{\mathrm{SB}}\) later in the paper, we will need it in order to define aggregated versions of stochastic integrals. If one does not want to use it, then it means that we have to restrict the control processes Z in \({\mathfrak {C}}^{\mathrm{SB}}\) to ones having sufficiently regular trajectories to apply the pathwise integration theory of Karandikar [38], for instance. By standard density results, it should, however, not change the value function of the Principal. Notice also that the continuum hypothesis is one among many axioms that can be used; see [36, Footnote 4] for the weakest known ones.
Obviously, an extension of the present framework to model incorporating adverse selection, that is to say that the Principal does not actually know perfectly all the characteristics of the Agent, is not only interesting mathematically, but also from the point of view of applications. However, we believe that this would lead to a much more difficult problem and leave it for future research.
This is why we call this model “adaptative”. Notice nonetheless that a higher degree of generality would require to consider a learning model, without assuming that (5) holds. In this case, as mentioned before, one would have to use a filtering procedure to update the estimates of the volatility model.
Actually, our approach would also work in non-Markovian case, provided that one uses the recently developed theory of viscosity solutions for path-dependent PDEs, in a series of papers by Ekren, Keller, Ren, Touzi and Zhang [49,50,51]. We preferred to present our arguments in the Markovian case to avoid additional technicalities. See, however, Sect. 5 for a specific non-Markovian case.
If the minimiser is not unique, then we assume as usual that the Principal has sufficient bargaining power to make the Agent choose the best minimiser for him. This means that one has also to take the supremum over all minimisers in the Hamiltonian above.
One could argue that it suffices to use the same arguments as in [19] to obtain this result; however, their argument does not go through in this case, as we already explained earlier.
Well-posedness is clear here, since we have easily that \({{\mathcal {Y}}}^{{\mathbb {P}},a}_t=-\frac{1}{R_A}\log \left( -{\mathbb {E}}^{{\mathbb {P}}}\left[ {\mathcal {U}}_A\left. \left( \xi -\int _t^Tk(a_s)\mathrm{d}s\right) \right| {\mathcal {F}}_t\right] \right) ,\ {\mathbb {P}}-a.s.\)
In this result, \(\xi \) and \(Y^a\) are assumed to be bounded, but the proof generalises easily to our setting where \(Y^a\) satisfies (44).
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Acknowledgements
Both authors would like to thank an anonymous referee and the associate editor for their help in improving an earlier version of this paper. Thibaut Mastrolia gratefully acknowledges the Chair Financial Risks (Risk Foundation, sponsored by Société Générale) for financial support, and both authors acknowledge support from the ANR project PACMAN, ANR-16-CE05-0027. Part of this work was carried out while both authors were employed by Université Paris Dauphine, whose support is kindly acknowledged.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Our fist step is to look at the dynamic version of the value function of the Agent. Fix some \(a\in {\mathcal {A}}\). We refer to the papers [44, 63] for the proofs that, for any \({{\mathcal {F}}}_T\)-measurable contract \(\xi \in {\mathcal {C}}\), one can define a process, which we denote by \(u_t^A(\xi ,a)\) (denoted by \(Y_t\) in [63]), which is càdlàg, \({\mathbb {G}}^{{{\mathcal {P}}}_A,+}\)-adapted (recall that for any \(a\in {\mathcal {A}}\), \({\mathbb {G}}^{{{\mathcal {P}}}^a_A}={\mathbb {G}}^{{{\mathcal {P}}}_A}\), since the polar sets of \({{\mathcal {P}}}^a_A\) are the same as the polar sets of \({{\mathcal {P}}}_A\)) and such that
Notice that since \(\xi \in {\mathcal {C}}\), it has exponential moments of any order, so that since in addition the effort process a is bounded, we have that \(u^A(\xi ,a)\) has moments of any order, in the sense that
where we have used the generalised Doob inequality for sub-linear expectations given in Proposition A.1 in [64].
Moreover, by [63, step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2.3], \(e^{R_A\int _0^tk(a_s)\mathrm{d}s}u_t^A(\xi ,a)\) is a \(({\mathbb {P}}, {\mathbb {G}}^{{{\mathcal {P}}}_A,+})\)-sub-martingale for every \({\mathbb {P}}\in {\mathcal {P}}^a_A\), and by [63, step 3 in the proof of Theorem 2.3], there is a \({\mathbb {G}}^{{{\mathcal {P}}}_A}\)-predictable process \({\widetilde{Z}}\), and a family of non-decreasing and \({\mathbb {F}}^{\mathbb {P}}\)-predictable processes \(({\widetilde{K}}^{\mathbb {P}})_{{\mathbb {P}}\in {\mathcal {P}}^a_A}\), such that, \(\text {for all }{\mathbb {P}}\in {\mathcal {P}}^a_A\)
Notice also that since every probability measure in \({\mathcal {P}}_A\) is equivalent, by definition, to a probability measure in \({{\mathcal {P}}}^a_A\) (and conversely), the above also holds \({\mathbb {P}}-a.s.\), for any \({\mathbb {P}}\in {\mathcal {P}}_A\), with the convention that we will still denote by \({\widetilde{K}}^{\mathbb {P}}\) the non-decreasing process associated with \({\mathbb {P}}\in {{\mathcal {P}}}^a_A\) or \({{\mathcal {P}}}_A\). Moreover, using the aggregation result of [40], we can actually aggregate the family \({\widetilde{K}}^{\mathbb {P}}\) into a universal process, which is \({\mathbb {G}}^{{{\mathcal {P}}}_A}\)-predictable, and which we denote by \({\widetilde{K}}\).
Define
We have, after some computations, for all \({\mathbb {P}}\in {\mathcal {P}}_A\)
Now notice that by (44), we immediately have
Moreover, remember that by (43), we also have for every \({\mathbb {P}}\in {\mathcal {P}}^a_A\), by the exact same arguments as above applied under any fixed measure \({\mathbb {P}}\in {{\mathcal {P}}}_A\), that
where for any \({\mathbb {P}}\in {{\mathcal {P}}}_A^a\), \(({{\mathcal {Y}}}^{{\mathbb {P}},a}, {{\mathcal {Z}}}^{{\mathbb {P}},a})\) is the uniqueFootnote 10 solution to the following BSDE defined under \({\mathbb {P}}\)
Then, using (44), we can follow the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [65]Footnote 11 to obtain that \(Z^a\) actually belongs to the BMO space defined in [65] (see Section 2.3.2). Then, we can follow exactly the proof of Theorem 6.1 in [65] to obtain with (45) that for any \({\mathbb {P}}\in {{\mathcal {P}}}_A^a\)
Therefore, \((Y_t^a,Z^a_t)\) is the unique solution to the (quadratic linear) 2BSDE with terminal condition \(\xi \) and generator \(R_A/2z^2{{\widehat{\alpha }}}_s+k(a_s)-a_sz\) (see, for instance, Definition 2.3 of [65]).
The final step of the proof is now to relate the family \((Y^a)_{a\in {{\mathcal {A}}}}\) to the solution of the 2BSDE (18). Before proceeding, let us explain why the 2BSDE (18) does indeed admit a maximal solution. First of all, the corresponding quadratic BSDEs admit a maximal solution, because, since the infimum in the generator is over a compact set, the generator of the BSDE is bounded from above by a function with linear growth in z. The existence of a maximal solution is then direct from Proposition 4 of [66]. Furthermore, since this maximal solution is obtained as a monotone approximation of Lipschitz BSDEs, it satisfies a comparison theorem. Hence, we can apply first Proposition 2.1 of [36] to obtain the existence of a maximal solution of the 2BSDE, in the sense of Definition 4.1 of [36], and then use Remark 4.1 of [36] to aggregate the family of non-decreasing processes into K. (We remind the reader that all the measures in \({{\mathcal {P}}}_A\) satisfy the predictable martingale representation property.)
In particular, we have the following representation for any \({\mathbb {P}}\in {{\mathcal {P}}}_A\),
where for any \({\mathbb {P}}\in {{\mathcal {P}}}_A^a\), \(({{\mathcal {Y}}}^{{\mathbb {P}}}, {{\mathcal {Z}}}^{{\mathbb {P}}})\) is the maximal solution of the quadratic BSDE
Now it is a classical result dating back to [67,68,69] (see also [70] for a similar result using 2BSDEs) that, using the comparison theorem satisfied by the maximal solution of the 2BSDEs (which is automatically inherited from the one satisfied by the BSDEs)
so that \(U_0^A(\xi )=-\exp (-R_AY_0).\) Furthermore, it is then clear, since the function k is strictly convex that there is some \(a^\star (Z_\cdot )\in {{\mathcal {A}}}\) such that
This implies that \(Y_0=\underset{{\mathbb {P}}\in {\mathcal {P}}_A^{a^\star (Z_\cdot )}}{\inf }\ {{\mathcal {Y}}}^{{\mathbb {P}},a^\star (Z_\cdot )}_0.\) \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 4.1
We recall Definition (42) for any \(\alpha \ge 0\)
We begin with the proof of (i). Assume that \( {\underline{\alpha }}^A\le {{\overline{\alpha }}}^P\le {\overline{\alpha }}^A\), then
Then we have for any \(\alpha \ge 0\)
Hence,
Therefore, \({\underline{U}}^P_0\ge -e^{R_P R_0}e^{-R_P\int _0^TH({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P, z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P), 0)\mathrm{d}s}.\) Indeed, \(z^\star ({{\widehat{\alpha }}}_s)\) is bounded so that the stochastic exponential is trivially a true martingale. We now turn to the converse inequality; we have
According to Lemma 4.2(i), we obtain \({\underline{U}}_0^P\le -e^{R_P R_0} e^{-R_PTH({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P, z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P), 0)}.\) Hence, if \({{\underline{\alpha }}}^A\le {{\overline{\alpha }}}^P\le {{\overline{\alpha }}}^A \), then \({\underline{U}}_0^P= -e^{R_PR_0}e^{-R_P\int _0^TH({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P, z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P), 0)\mathrm{d}s}.\) We now prove that the contract \(\xi ^{R_0,z^\star ({{{\overline{\alpha }}}^P}), 0}\in {\mathfrak {C}}^{\mathrm{SB}}\) is indeed optimal. We have
since by definition (40) of H, \(\alpha \longmapsto H(\alpha , z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P),0)\) is decreasing, so that the above infimum is attained for the measure \({\mathbb {P}}^{{{\overline{\alpha }}}^P}_{a^\star (z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^P))}\).
We now turn to the proof of (ii). Assume that \({{\underline{\alpha }}}^P \le {{\overline{\alpha }}}^A\le {{\overline{\alpha }}}^P\). On the one hand,
where \(\gamma ^\star := -R_A (z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A))^2 -R_P(1-z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A))^2.\) Thus, using Relation (41), we have
On the other hand, since \({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A\in [{{\underline{\alpha }}}^P, {{\overline{\alpha }}}^P]\)
By using Lemma 4.2(i), we obtain \({\underline{U}}_0^P\le -e^{R_P R_0}e^{-R_PTH({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A,z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A),0)}.\)
We consider now a contract \(\xi ^{R_0,z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A), \gamma ^\star }\) and we show that \({\underline{U}}_0^P(\xi ^{R_0,z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A), \gamma ^\star } )={\underline{U}}_0^P\). We have
since \(H(\alpha , z^\star ({{\overline{\alpha }}}^A),\gamma ^\star )\) is actually independent of \(\alpha \). The last two results are immediate consequences of Proposition 4.2. \(\square \)
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Mastrolia, T., Possamaï, D. Moral Hazard Under Ambiguity. J Optim Theory Appl 179, 452–500 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1230-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1230-8
Keywords
- Risk sharing
- Moral hazard
- Principal–Agent
- Second-order BSDEs
- Volatility uncertainty
- Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs PDEs