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“Not Gods But Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood

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Abstract

Drawing on earlier work on the conceptual structure of dignity, this paper will suggest a particular type of connectedness between vulnerability and human dignity; namely, that the “organizing idea” of human dignity is the idea of a particular sort of ethical response to universal human vulnerability. It is common ground among many, if not all, approaches to ethics that vulnerability requires us to respond ethically. Here, I argue that human dignity is distinctive among ethical values in that it values us because of, rather than in spite of, or regardless of, our universal vulnerability. The term “dignity” is used synonymously with “human dignity” here, since an investigation of the dignity of non-human entities forms no part of the present examination.

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Notes

  1. Mattson and Clark (2011).

  2. Ibid.

  3. Ibid.

  4. Knoepffler and O’Malley (2010).

  5. See, e.g., Bagaric and Allen (2006); Macklin (2003); Pinker (May 2008) http://www.tnr.com/article/the-stupidity-dignity.

  6. Byk (2010) (‘la dignité reste intrinsèquement une notion ambiguë’).

  7. Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellung GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609 paragraph 90.

  8. Omega: paragraph 74.

  9. Mattson and Clark (2011).

  10. Ibid.

  11. Rendtorff (2002).

  12. Nordenfeld (2004).

  13. Ibid.

  14. Riley (2010).

  15. Nordenfeld (2004).

  16. Rendtorff (2002).

  17. See Nordenfeld (2004).

  18. Mattson and Clark (2011).

  19. Riley (2010).

  20. Nordenfeld (2004).

  21. Thiel (2010).

  22. Mattson and Clark (2011).

  23. Nordenfeld (2004).

  24. Mattson and Clark (2011).

  25. Nordenfeld (2004).

  26. Rendtorff (2002).

  27. See Bagaric and Allen (2006); Macklin (2003); Pinker (May 2008).

  28. Mattson and Clark (2011).

  29. Neal (2012).

  30. Ibid.

  31. Gallie (1956).

  32. See, e.g., McCrudden (2008).

  33. Riley (2010).

  34. McCrudden (2008).

  35. Riley (2010).

  36. Ibid.

  37. Neal (2012).

  38. Rütsche (2010).

  39. Ibid.

  40. Andorno (2010) (“[La dignité] exprime une exigence de non-instrumentalisation de l’être humain, en rappelant que chaque homme doit être traité comme une fin en soi et jamais simplement comme un moyen, pour employer la célèbre expression kantienne”).

  41. Knoepffler and O’Malley (2010).

  42. Ibid.

  43. Feldman (1999).

  44. See, e.g., Naffine (2004).

  45. Descartes in ed. M. Moriarty (2008).

  46. Locke in ed. P. Phemister (2008). Grear observes that “the body does play a role, even in such an approach, through its perceptual mechanisms. But these bodily perceptual mechanisms merely serve rationality” Grear (2010).

  47. Locke (2008).

  48. See, e.g., Rawls (1999).

  49. See, e.g., Williams (1985).

  50. For suggestions regarding the cognitive capacities relevant to personhood, see e.g., Dennett (1997); Perring (1997); and Locke (1990). For examples of ethical theories that ascribe full moral status (“personhood”) on the basis of the possession of cognitive capacities, see e.g., Singer (1993) (“persons” as beings who possess the capacity to hold preferences) and Harris (1985) (“persons” as beings capable of valuing their own lives).

  51. Haugen (2010).

  52. Hale (2009), citing Dworkin, Is democracy possible here?: principles for a new political debate (Princeton University Press, 2006).

  53. Nordenfelt describes Menschenwürde in this way.

  54. Nordenfelt’s account of the dignity of “Menschenwürde”, discussed briefly above, describes an attempt to posit a universal dignity, and to justify it by reference to non-universal properties: we are supposed to have this kind of dignity, Nordenfelt says, “just because we are humans”, and we have it “to the same degree, i.e. we are equal with respect to this kind of dignity”. Nevertheless, Nordenfelt observes that “the common modern answer” to the question of the source of Menschenwürde is to ground it in “capacities crucial to humans” such as self-consciousness; the ability to reason; and the freedom to decide on one’s own way of life.

  55. Mattson and Clark (2011).

  56. Macklin (2003).

  57. Pinker (2008).

  58. Rendtorff (2002).

  59. Luna (2009).

  60. Levine et al. (2004).

  61. Brown (2011).

  62. Luna (2009), quoting Levine et al. (2004).

  63. See, e.g., the essays collected in Mégret et al. (2009).

  64. See, e.g., Fineman (2011).

  65. Rendtorff (2002).

  66. Grear (2010).

  67. Ibid.

  68. Ibid.

  69. Ibid.

  70. Ibid.

  71. Solbakk (2011) (emphasis in original).

  72. Shildrick (2002).

  73. Nussbaum (1998).

  74. Ibid.

  75. Ibid.

  76. Rendtorff and Kemp (2000).

  77. Brownsword (2010).

  78. Harris (1997).

  79. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001).

  80. See, e.g., Rendtorff (2002).

  81. Harris (1997).

  82. Cunningham (2000).

  83. Harris (1997).

  84. Ibid.

  85. Ibid., emphasis added.

  86. Cunningham (2000).

  87. Badhwar (2001).

  88. Harris (1997).

  89. Card (1998).

  90. Cf. Grear’s discussion of vulnerability as a positive openness, supra 11–12.

  91. Harris (1997).

  92. Ibid., emphasis added.

  93. Ibid.

  94. Ibid.

  95. Ibid.

  96. Ibid.

  97. Ibid.

  98. Ibid., emphasis added.

  99. Although he stops short of defining precisely what he means by “dignity” (see below).

  100. Harris (1997).

  101. Ibid.

  102. Ibid.

  103. See, e.g., Nussbaum (1986), (1994).

  104. Nussbaum (2001).

  105. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001), quoting Fromm The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (Jonathan Cape, 1974) at 225–256.

  106. Nussbaum (1998).

  107. Rendtorff (2002).

  108. Ibid.

  109. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001).

  110. Harris (1997).

  111. Ibid.

  112. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001).

  113. Harris (1997).

  114. Ibid.; notwithstanding that Harris does not explain adequately why these traits are fundamental to dignity.

  115. I hope to assess the respective merits of dignity and sanctity in describing universal intrinsic worth in future work; here, it suffices simply to raise the possibility that, despite its status in human rights discourse, and the extent to which it has captured the imagination of human rights commentators, “dignity” may not in fact be best suited for this purpose.

  116. Discussed supra.

  117. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001).

  118. Nussbaum (1998).

  119. Ibid.

  120. Harris (1997).

  121. Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001).

  122. Ibid.

  123. Fineman (2011).

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to my colleagues Kenneth Norrie and Donald Nicolson for their feedback on an earlier version of this paper.

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  1. School of Law, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK

    Mary Neal

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Neal, M. “Not Gods But Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood. Liverpool Law Rev 33, 177–200 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-012-9124-6

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