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Conditionals Right and Left: Probabilities for the Whole Family

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Abstract

The fact that the standard probabilistic calculus does not define probabilities for sentences with embedded conditionals is a fundamental problem for the probabilistic theory of conditionals. Several authors have explored ways to assign probabilities to such sentences, but those proposals have come under criticism for making counterintuitive predictions. This paper examines the source of the problematic predictions and proposes an amendment which corrects them in a principled way. The account brings intuitions about counterfactual conditionals to bear on the interpretation of indicatives and relies on the notion of causal (in)dependence.

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  1. Department of Linguistics, Northwestern University, 2016 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208-4090, USA

    Stefan Kaufmann

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Kaufmann, S. Conditionals Right and Left: Probabilities for the Whole Family. J Philos Logic 38, 1–53 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-008-9088-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-008-9088-0

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