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Journal of Management and Governance

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01.08.2014

“Good” corporate governance and the quality of internal auditing departments in Italian listed firms. An exploratory investigation in Italian listed firms

verfasst von: Carlo Regoliosi, Alessandro d’Eri

Erschienen in: Journal of Management and Governance | Ausgabe 3/2014

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Abstract

One of the most important issue relating to corporate governance reports refers to their ability to provide users with a complete set of information regarding the effective ability of an entity to achieve oversight objectives by the compliance to corporate governance practices required by a specific law or industry code. In addition, other features, such as the quality of the internal auditing function or the sensitivity of top management to issues relating to corporate internal controls and risk management, can also be taken into account when formulating a judgment on the quality of corporate governance practices. Is there an association between the compliance to codes and internal controls effectiveness? We propose to assess the quality of corporate governance through a proxy that considers several characteristics of internal audit departments and combines them to determine an Internal Audit Departments global quality index—IAD Index. To define IAD global quality we consider the effectiveness of an internal audit function analysing its operational aspects. The IAD Index is based on several signalling elements that previous literature assumed as proxies for quality of IADs which are grouped into four pillars: a formal quality index; a static quality index; an activity-related quality index; and a performance-linked quality index. We then test the IAD index on a sample of Italian listed firms and conclude that there are significant associations (positive and negative) between the degree of compliance to some corporate governance regulations for listed firms and the IAD Index for the sample being considered.

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The increasing practice of outsourcing IA activities to external contractors does not contradict this qualification, in this respect, see Rittenberg et al. 1999.

Internal auditing is defined as: “an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organisation's operations. It helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes.”

We note that for the majority of Italian listed companies—and without considering those not listed—the compliance with the recommendation to set up the IA is generally misinterpreted and misapplied.

The application of the “risk assessment” methodology—including “self risk assessment”—which remains limited to the risks of non-compliance with legal and regulatory requirements has often reinforced and, in some instances, also introduced a “risk-based” culture of control where the selection of the control mechanisms is a direct consequence of the risk profiles of corporate objectives and the related strategies.

The authors clarify in the abstracts that they “are far from convinced that the results they obtained—in terms of numbers and percentages of responses—have provided them with a solid basis for the textured and nuanced overview they were aiming at” (Paape et al. 2003, p. 1).

In several conversations regarding the quality of IADs with IA professionals, a difficulty has arisen over sharing a single concept of the quality of IADs.

The expression “compliance with Italian Legislative Decree 231/2001” refers to the contribution mainly to compliance oversight activities of the body known as “Organismo di Vigilanza—OdV” which is set up in accordance with a national legislative act, the Legislative Decree 231/2001 whlich focuses on the administrative responsibility of corporate enterprises. “Support for law 262/2005” refers to the support to the corporate structure that normally reports to the Chief Financial Officer—who is referred to in Law 262/2005 as the “Dirigente Preposto” or “DP”—and is in charge of verifying the effectiveness of accounting and financial statements-related procedures in helping the CFO and his staff to take responsibility for the conclusions and the figures presented in the financial statements.

In other words, the parameter that identifies the contribution of IA in an hypothetical production function relating to the creation of value for the shareholder cannot be easily identified since it would require precise knowledge of the cause-effect relationship between: (1) the IA function and its activities (at all levels); (2) the improvement of corporate processes; (3) the decision making process and lastly (4) the marginal change in the value for the shareholder as a consequence of the interaction between (1), (2) and (4).

It is worth mentioning that the IIA standards—from no. 1000 to no. 1340—do not indicate the characteristics mentioned above, but refer to some of the requisites that audit activities need to comply with in order to be considered professionally qualified.

The list is also in IIA (2012, p. 2).

The fact that normative compliance activity (Legislative Decree 231/2001, Law 262/2005, etc.) is excluded from the value added activities is a very controversial issue: “in organisations where regulatory requirements are stringent, compliance audits arguably are more value-adding than the consulting emphasis of internal audit” (Mihret and Woldeyohannis 2008, p. 569). On the contrary, some authors argue that in a post-SOA financial environment, IA activities have moved to a better paid and better recognised, although less professional, role (Moeller 2004; Gray 2004; Nagy and Cenker 2007). Similar results are expected for Italian IADs post-decree 231 and Law 262.

A list of the companies surveyed follows (in alphabetical order): A2A, Acea, Acegas APS, Aeffe, Amplifon, Ansaldo STS, AsRoma, Astaldi, Atlantia, Autogrill, Benetton, Beni Stabili, Biesse, Brembo, Bulgari, Buongiorno, Buzzi, Campari, Cdc Point, Cembre, Cementir Holding, CIR, Damiani, Danieli, Edison, Emak Enel, Enel Green Power, Eni, Erg, Fiat, Finmeccanica, Geox, Hera, IgD, IMA, Impregilo, Indesit, Interpump, Iren, Italcementi, Landi Renzo, Lottomatica, Luxottica Group, Maire Tecnimont, Mediaset, Mondadori Editoriale, Nice, Parmalat, Piaggio, Pirelli, Prysmian, Rcs, Recordati, Saipem, Saras, SAVE, Seat Pagine Gialle, Snam Rete Gas, SOL, Stefanel, Telecom, Terna, Tiscali, Tod'S, Zucchi.

Two examples of potential reasons why companies decided not to take the questionnaire are given below:

A listed company had just acquired a foreign group and the CAE of the acquirer did not have complete control of the IA activities for the newly acquired group. Therefore, the feedback to the questionnaire would have only provided a partial representation of the situation;

One listed company used to have its auditing activities performed by a dedicated subsidiary. However, shortly before the questionnaire was submitted, the IA activities had been re-assigned to the parent and therefore there were too many “moving parts” which made it difficult for the parent to provide the relevant feedback.

The significant percentage of capital available to a handful of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and the fact that most companies are controlled by families show how the need for a high-quality IA is not merely connected to traditional agency theory issues (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Kalbers and Fogarty 1998) where there is a conflict between top managers and shareholders, but refers to issues of transparency and the protection of minorities. This aspect also highlights the need to assess IA quality in order to understand the degree of sensibility of Italian companies in seriously tackling—not only for a mere need for formal compliance—issues relating to controls and corporate governance that involve the relationship between minorities and the company owners-top managers.

This element is based on the agency theory which has often represented the basis for justifying the existence of an IA function within companies (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Adams 1994; Carey et al. 2000; Goodwin Stewart and Kent 2004; Cohen et al. 2002; Carcello et al. 2005). It is important to highlight that this theory, in the Italian context, should take into account the specific characteristics of control systems in family-controlled companies (Bianchi and Bianco 2008, Table 3).

Total assets have been reformulated in logarithmic terms, “to reduce skewness before regression were run” (Bradbury 1990, p. 28, footnote 12, Menon and Williams 1994). See also Carey et al. 2000; Chow 1982; Goodwin Stewart and Kent 2006; Gronewold and Heerlein 2009; Sarens and Abdolmohammadi 2011).

The presence of a relatively high degree of trade receivables and inventories increases the fraud risk and the risk of errors in the financial statements (Goodwin Stewart and Kent 2006, p. 84).

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Titel: “Good” corporate governance and the quality of internal auditing departments in Italian listed firms. An exploratory investigation in Italian listed firms
verfasst von: Carlo Regoliosi
Alessandro d’Eri
Publikationsdatum: 01.08.2014
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Journal of Management and Governance / Ausgabe 3/2014
Print ISSN: 1385-3457
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-963X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-012-9254-1

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