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Erschienen in: Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 8/2007

01.10.2007 | Original Paper

The interaction between emissions trading and renewable electricity support schemes. An overview of the literature

verfasst von: Pablo del Río González

Erschienen in: Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change | Ausgabe 8/2007

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Abstract

The public promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources coexists in many countries with the recent implementation of emissions trading schemes. As shown by several papers, this coexistence may lead to significant interactions between both instruments, in the form of synergies and conflicts. This paper provides an overview and analysis of the literature on such coexistence and interactions. A major conclusion is that policy measures aiming at exploiting the synergies between both instruments should be implemented. The greatest synergy effects from the use of both instruments take place through appropriate coordination of their targets. Another key finding is that, although some stylised facts can be inferred from the studies, some results from those complex interactions are context-specific since they depend on the design of the instruments in particular countries. In spite of the significant policy implications of such interactions for the effective and cost-effective functioning of both instruments, this is a surprisingly under searched field. It is so concerning, both, theoretical and empirical analysis.
Fußnoten
1
Apart from these economic barriers, there are other obstacles to RES-E deployment, including the availability of the resource, the appropriateness of the technology, lead times and delays caused by institutional and regulatory barriers, difficulties in accessing the grid and the socio-cultural acceptance of renewable energy technologies (see del Río and Unruh 2006). We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
 
2
To our knowledge, Rathmann (2006) and some case studies carried out in the context of the EU-funded INTERACT project are the only papers that consider a different instrument in this regard (feed-in tariffs).
 
3
The reason behind this choice might be related to the fact that, in their respective contexts, both instruments are very similar: in theory they both lead to a cost-efficient compliance with a target/quota (emissions target in the case of emissions trading and RES-E quota in the case of TGCs). TGCs are a market-based instrument, which leads to the issuance of certificates, which can be considered a counterpart of permits in an emissions trading context. Also, TGC schemes seemed to be the “fashion” instrument and the EU Commission itself seemed to be in favour of an EU-wide TGC scheme in the late 1990s.
 
4
See Wiser et al (2005) for an analysis of the functioning of this system in the US context.
 
5
For example, if an emissions trading scheme coexists with an obligation on electricity suppliers to buy renewable electricity, then both instruments will lead to greater electricity prices for consumers and to lower emissions for electricity generators.
 
6
So, for example, electricity generators are directly affected by the EU ETS, while electricity consumers are indirectly affected as they face higher electricity prices as a consequence of the abatement costs incurred by the generators (op. cit).
 
7
The units contained in a TGC consist of renewable watt hours, while the units traded via TEPs represent CO2 emissions. However, it could be theoretically possible (although difficult) to calculate the CO2 emissions avoided by the deployment of RES-E as a result of the implementation of a RES-E support scheme (TGCs). This would make both currencies tradable because they would represent equivalent units (CO2 emissions).
 
8
For example, biomass-heat and cofiring can be cost-competitive in certain countries.
 
9
An exception to this limited incentive seem to be the project-based Kyoto mechanisms and, particularly, the Clean Development Mechanism. More than 130 registered projects were based on renewable energy out of a total of 228 registered CDM projects till July 2006.
 
10
The increase in the costs of fossil fuel sources as a result of the CO2 quota may not be sufficient for technologies requiring large initial investments (such as RES-E) to penetrate the market, because some renewable energy sources are still so expensive that increasing the costs of conventional power would still not make them competitive unless there was a very high CO2 emission price. Reinaud (2003) calculates this price on the range 30–200 €/tCO2.
 
11
As observed by Sorrell (2003a, p.16), this is equivalent to assuming that the non-CO2 value of renewables is fully met by the renewable energy targets and that any further increase is solely of benefit in terms of CO2.
 
12
We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
 
13
The explicit reference to the EU is justified because virtually all the studies on interactions we know of focus on this region. This calls for an extension to other areas (i.e., the US).
 
14
This author defines “consumer price” or “consumer costs” as the addition of the wholesale electricity price and the average unitary cost of RES-E support policy (i.e., the TGC price).
 
15
For instance, assume that Spain bought TGCs from France in a hypothetical EU-wide TGC market. This purchase would neither contribute to the improvement of employment levels in Spain nor to reduce local pollution or to increase the diversification of energy supply in Spain.
 
16
However, there might be a problem with this major assumption. If grandfathered TEPs were treated as an opportunity cost, this would lead to the same electricity price increase as auction because the increase in production costs for electricity by companies would be the same with both permit allocation methods. This is so because the use of grandfathered permits entails an opportunity cost which should be considered when setting electricity prices.
 
17
In other words, if CO2 costs were internalised in the electricity price, TGCs would then represent the additional costs of RES-E deployment, excluding the CO2 emissions reduction.
 
18
We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
 
19
The three countries are part of the same physical electricity market, there are no barriers to imports/exports of electricity between countries, all countries are assumed to have committed themselves to national GHG reduction targets, the short-run marginal cost of RES-E generation is assumed to be sufficiently low that this production can always be sold at the market and electricity demand is price-inelastic (Morthorst 2003a). Although all the data in the model are arbitrary, the author stresses that care has been taken to make cost curves and other key parameters as close as possible to the observed reality.
 
20
For example, in the case of the ambitious country (C), the planned increase in RES-E production would lead to a reduction in domestic CO2 emissions of 1.66 MtCO2 using the country specific emissions-coefficient. Thus, the initial TEP quota for country C is reduced by this amount compared to the non-coordinated situation. In other words, coordination allows country C to get the full value of the contribution of RES-E deployment to national CO2 emissions reduction.
 
21
For instance, Johnstone (2002, p. 31) argues that, while this does not need integration of the two regimes, it should involve coordination with respect to the setting of objectives.
 
22
As pointed out by Rathmann (2006, p. 2) “the interaction between additional RES-E and the CO2 price would not exist if emission reductions by RES-E were taken into account ex-ante in the National Allocation Plans. Reducing allowance allocations accordingly would prevent emissions reductions achieved by RES-E impacting upon the CO2 market”.
 
23
A TGC importing country would also be a TEP importing country when CO2 credits are attached to TGCs.
 
24
As noted by the author, the more targets, mechanisms, sectors and areas there are, the more complex it is to regulate and to obtain synergies between the different mechanisms and targets (op. cit., p. 13). This situation is particularly relevant in the European case, where there is a common allowance market but not a common RES-E market and where there are often bottlenecks in the electricity network which lead to smaller markets with different electricity prices.
 
25
Skytte (2006, p. 10) also observes this “size” effect when he points out that if a single Member State makes a national change in its regulation target, for example a national increase in a RES-E quota, it has little effect on the common international prices if the corresponding national sector is small compared to the total market.
 
26
This adaptation of Balmorel results in a one period static model with investment (Fistrup (2002, p. 40). The markets for electricity, TEPs and TGCs are assumed to be perfectly competitive in order to model determination of prices as an optimisation problem. The electricity prices derived will be the true marginal production cost whereas the TEP and TGC prices will represent shadow prices.
 
27
As expected, the TEP price drops as the RES-E share increases.
 
28
MARKAL is an optimising linear-programming model generator with perfect foresight. The model satisfies an exogenously specified demand for energy through a complex combination of energy conversion modules, energy distribution chains and fuel-supply systems under a large number of constraints. The objective function used in this study is the negative sum of consumer and producer surplus, which is discounted over the entire modelling period (1999–2023) to present-day value (Unger and Ahlgren, 2005). In contrast to the aforementioned theoretical studies, electricity demand is assumed to be price-elastic.
 
29
CO2 emissions in the Nordic countries are model results. This illustrates a case where the TEP market in the Nordic countries is connected to a larger European market. Accordingly, electricity prices, TEP and TGC prices are shadow prices obtained from model runs.
 
30
Recall that, according to Jensen and Skytte (2002, 2003) either an increase or a reduction could be expected.
 
31
Nevertheless, as stressed by the authors, in reality CO2 policy in the Nordic countries will most probably be coordinated with an EU-wide scheme for TEPs, i.e., a wider geographical market than assumed here. In that case, TGC schemes within the Nordic countries would have significantly less impact on the price development for TEPs than suggested in this analysis.
 
32
Such proposal was finally rejected. Therefore, no implementation of a TGC scheme took place in Denmark. In contrast, a TEP market for the electricity sector started operation in 2001 and ended in 2003.
 
33
The higher electricity price is due to the substitution of less-clean technologies and to the fact that cleaner technologies are more expensive.
 
34
There are several cheaper options to reduce CO2 emissions in the electricity sector, including energy efficiency improvements of conventional power plants and fuel switching to primary energy carriers with lower CO2-content per energy output (e.g., a switch from hard coal to gas)(Huber and Morthorst 2003). These options would be used first to reduce emissions. Therefore, an increase in the RES-E target will not affect the actual emissions level (although the increase in RES-E deployment will reduce the pressure on the emissions target). This is so because if RES-E deployment is increased in an ETS, RES-E will substitute other (more cost-effective) abatement technologies.
 
35
That paper was written in 2001, at a time when the implementation of the EU ETS was not envisaged.
 
36
The most important shortcoming is the lack of integration between national markets. Key indicators in this respect are the absence of price convergence across the EU and the low level of cross-border trade” (European Commission 2005).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The interaction between emissions trading and renewable electricity support schemes. An overview of the literature
verfasst von
Pablo del Río González
Publikationsdatum
01.10.2007
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change / Ausgabe 8/2007
Print ISSN: 1381-2386
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-1596
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-006-9069-y

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