Abstract
If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish sensitivity to the facts.
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Notes
I am grateful to Jonathan Adler for this point.
References
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Jonathan Adler, Jonathan Kvanvig, Wayne Riggs, John Greco, and Duncan Prichard for useful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
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Elgin, C. Understanding and the facts. Philos Stud 132, 33–42 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9054-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9054-z