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Intuitive knowledge

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Abstract

In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? A natural idea about perception is that a perception makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you sensorily aware of the concrete objects it is about. The analogous idea about intuition is that an intuition makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you intellectually aware of the abstract objects it is about. I expand both ideas into fuller accounts of perceptual and intuitive knowledge, explain the main challenge to this sort of account of intuitive knowledge (i.e. the challenge of making sense of intellectual awareness), and develop a response to it.

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Notes

  1. The quote is from Rule 9 (Descartes 1985, p. 33).

  2. Recent discussions of such comparisons include Bealer (1998), Bengson (2010), BonJour (1998), Chudnoff (2011a, b), Huemer (2001), Parsons (1980, 2007), Sosa (2007, 2009), and Tieszen (1989, 2005).

  3. Many deny the existence of abstract objects. And some deny that intuitions are about abstract objects; see, for example, Goldman (2007). The reasons for these denials are often epistemological. In this paper I assume that there are abstract objects and that our intuitions are, at least largely, about them. These assumptions are appropriate since one of my aims is to show that even given them, we can still develop a reasonable explanation of intuitive knowledge.

  4. I am interested in exploring an analogy between what it is in virtue of which some intuitions make beliefs based on them amount to knowledge and what it is in virtue of which some perceptions make beliefs based on them amount to knowledge. Sometimes I will use the expression “the analogy between intuitive and perceptual knowledge,” where this might suggest I am picking out surface similarities, such as the fact that both are non-inferential. Throughout, however, I am concerned with explanation.

  5. Perception is a success state: perceiving is veridical and non-hallucinatory.

  6. O’Shaughnessy (2002, p. 319).

  7. Russell (1992, 1997) and Husserl (1950) are early proponents of similar views. More recent proponents of similar views include McDowell (1982) and Fumerton (2006).

  8. Johnston (2006, pp. 282, 289).

  9. I discuss additional positive evidence one might produce in favor of (PK) in Chudnoff (forthcoming).

  10. Cf. Goldman (1976). Some philosophers deny that fake barn cases are Gettier cases. For a recent discussion see Lycan (2006). Whether they are or not does not affect the views of perceptual and intuitive knowledge I discuss here.

  11. I defend the view that P might obtain in virtue of Q even though Q does not entail P in Chudnoff (ms). I focus on the significance this view has for thinking about Gettier cases and the nature of perceptual knowledge in Chudnoff (forthcoming).

  12. The literatures on sensory awareness, perceptual content, and truth-making are individually large and collectively vast. A sample of sympathetic works might include: Dretske (1969) and Johnston (2006) on sensory awareness; Siegel (2005, 2011) on perceptual content; Armstrong (2004), Mulligan et al. (1984), and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005) on truth-making.

  13. Mulligan et al. (1984) and Johnston (2006) are the only discussions I am aware of that directly address this issue. They come down in favor of the view that we can be sensorily aware of truth-makers.

  14. I discuss this issue further in Chudnoff (2011b).

  15. Strawson (1979, pp. 103–104) in the reprint in Dancy (1988).

  16. Child (1996, p. 141).

  17. Strawson and Child think the necessity is conceptual. I remain neutral.

  18. The case of disjunctivism is the trickiest. Child seems to me to make a good case for thinking that the causal theory and disjunctivism are compatible, however.

  19. Cf. Benacerraf (1973) and Field (1989).

  20. Martin and Deutscher (1966). One might reject the causal view and still accept a becausal view. See the lectures on memory in Malcolm (1975).

  21. For discussion of these issues see the papers in Kriegel and Williford (2006).

  22. Cf. Kim (1974) and Ruben (1992, p. 223).

  23. Cf. Achinstein (1985, pp. 228–237) and Ruben (1992, p. 218).

  24. Cf. Achinstein (1985, pp. 228–237) and Ruben (1992, p. 219).

  25. Cf. Owen (1992, pp. 71–81).

  26. Cf. Owen (1992, pp. 71–81).

  27. Cf. Ruben (1992, p. 221).

  28. Inwagen (1990).

  29. Markosian (1998) argues that they do not.

  30. The obvious inspiration is moral particularism. See, for example, Dancy (2004).

  31. There is disagreement about the nature of this attitude. Some think that it is a doxastic attitude or disposition, such as belief or having an inclination to believe (Williamson 2008). Others think it is a sui generis attitude, such as having something intellectually seem to be the case; Bealer (1998) and Huemer (2001).

  32. See Husserl (2001, especially pp. 281–304). The exact analysis of Husserl’s notion of foundation is controversial. See Smith and Künne (1982), Fine (1995), Correia (2004) for discussion. Husserl’s view that intuitions are founded on perceptions, imaginations, and thoughts was standard among those in the phenomenological tradition. See, for example, Lévinas (1995). More recently, Parsons (1980, 2007) and Tieszen (1989, 2005) have developed views of intuition that draw on Husserl’s.

  33. In this paper I focus on part-hood, a many-one relation elements in a plurality—some thoughts, perceptions, and imaginings—bear to a unity—an intuitive appearance. Constitution is a relation between two unities—a sum of thoughts, perceptions, and imaginings and an intuitive appearance. I focus on this relation elsewhere; Chudnoff (2011b).

  34. The argument in this paragraph is similar to arguments in favor of the view that perceptual experiences have mental paint, qualia, or sensational properties; see, e.g., Block (1996), Peacocke (1983). In those arguments two perceptual experiences representing that p are supposed to differ phenomenally. My argument, however, is compatible with the view that phenomenology supervenes on intentional content, since in the case I am considering it can be the intentional contents of the thoughts, perceptions, and imaginings that make the phenomenal difference between the two intuitive appearances.

  35. The standard proof of (2) uses mathematical induction. Nothing like that is going on when you “see” that (2) is true. One might wonder whether there is a less secure but still reasonable sort of inference that occurs, such as an inference to the best explanation. This is implausible. In “seeing” that (2) is true, do you really compare it to alternative explanations of the data represented by the figure? No. But if not, then this is a bad inference to the best explanation.

  36. There are various arguments one might press against it. One might argue, for example, that intuitive appearances often outlast the reflections that give rise to them. Or one might argue that some intuitive appearances are immediate and do not involve reflection. I do not have the space here to respond to these and other arguments against the Husserlian view; but see Chudnoff (2011a, b).

  37. One might worry that clause (2) is problematic because it imports the assumption that Smith’s intuitive appearance makes him aware of addition. But (ExplA) is a partial explanation of the fact that Smith’s visual representation is part of his intuitive appearance, not an argument that his intuitive appearance makes him aware of addition.

  38. It is gaining acceptance; see, for example, Nolan (1997), Brogaard and Salerno (2007), Kment (2006a, b), and Salerno and Brogaard (2007).

  39. I am also assuming that Smith’s intuitive appearance is not over-determined.

  40. Once again, the assumption of no over-determination is in place.

  41. See Williamson (2000).

  42. The notion of knowledge that derives wholly from intuition parallels that of knowledge that derives wholly from perception; see the discussion of this in Sect. 1. For discussion of the role of background conceptual knowledge in intuitive knowledge broadly construed see Ludwig (2007).

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Acknowledgments

I presented earlier versions of this paper at a meeting of the Arché Methodology Workshop at St. Andrews, and a conference associated with the Descartes Lectures at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science. The Q&A sessions on both occasions were instructive, and I thank those in attendance for their participation. I thank John Bengson, Ed Erwin, Uriah Kriegel, Kirk Ludwig, Susanna Siegel, Ernie Sosa, and Anand Vaidya for additional helpful comments and discussion.

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    Elijah Chudnoff

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Chudnoff, E. Intuitive knowledge. Philos Stud 162, 359–378 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9770-x

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