Abstract
Using a pair of national surveys, this article analyzes the individual-level sources of public support for Social Security privatization. Given the inherent risks associated with privatization, we argue that the political trust heuristic affords untapped theoretical leverage in explaining public attitudes toward privatization. We find that, among certain individuals, political trust plays an instrumental role in structuring privatization preferences. Political trust increases support for privatization, but only among liberals. This heterogeneity in trust’s impact is best explained, we argue, by the unbalanced ideological costs imposed by the potential privatization of Social Security. Among liberals, embracing privatization requires the sacrifice of core values, thereby making political trust a potent consideration. Political trust is inconsequential among conservatives because supporting privatization requires no comparable sacrifice for them.
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Notes
To analyze the effects of deliberation on privatization preferences, Barabas (2004) essentially controls for ideology during the propensity score matching portion of his analysis, although no explicit attempt is made to test the effects of ideology on support for privatization.
As it relates to the privatization debate, the word risky can be viewed as a politically loaded term meant to undermine support for privatization. We use the term risky in a broader sense. We define a policy as risky when (1) its outcomes are uncertain and (2) those outcomes could have positive or negative consequences.
The poll was conducted in March of 1999 and was sponsored by National Public Radio, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.
Source: Time Magazine Poll, January 12–13, 2005.
Several previous studies have employed data from the four “Americans Discuss Social Security” surveys conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates (e.g. Barabas 2006; Jerit and Barabas 2006; Cook and Jacobs 2002). These surveys could not be used here because they lack measures of ideological identification.
The post-election wave was in the field from November 3, 2004 through December 20, 2004.
The 2002 PSRA survey was in the field from August 2, 2002 through September 1, 2002.
The exact question wording for this and all other instruments are reported in the Appendix.
The “never” response option was voluntary. Treating such responses as missing data or combining them with “only some of the time” does not alter any of the results to follow.
An alternative hypothesis might predict a negatively signed Political Trust × Conservative interaction. If our measure of political trust is really tapping respondents’ general perceptions of the federal government’s ability to manage large-scale programs and not their faith in this government’s ability to propose good policy changes, then support for privatization should be attenuated among trusting conservatives. If some conservatives really do trust government’s ability to manage large-scale programs like Social Security, then that faith should work to counteract their ideologically based enthusiasm for privatization. As the results in Table 1 make clear, however, there is little empirical evidence in support of this alternative view.
Additional analyses (not shown) find that these results are not sensitive to non-response on the ideology instrument. Respondents who fail to report an ideological identification are statistically indistinguishable from moderates in terms of both direct effects and interactions with trust.
The finding that political trust matters among liberals but not among conservatives cannot be attributed to a lack of variance in conservatives’ political trust or in their support for privatization. Conservatives actually exhibit slightly more variation in political trust than liberals. In 2002 and 2004, the standard deviation in trust for conservatives was 0.22 and 0.20. For liberals, these numbers were 0.20 and 0.19 respectively. Conservatives do not have restricted variance in their privatization preferences either. In 2002 and 2004, the standard deviation in privatization support for conservatives was 0.50 and 0.20. Among liberals, these numbers were virtually identical at 0.48 and 0.19.
To account for the possibility that trustful liberals might simply harbor more positive affect for President Bush and, by extension, his privatization plan, we included presidential approval as a control and reestimated our models. All substantive inferences remain unchanged. This implies that our results are not an artifact of trust serving as an error-filled proxy for approval.
A one-unit shock here is equivalent to comparing minimum and maximum values.
Although relatively few respondents occupy the lowest and highest positions on the trust scale, the observed Trust × Liberal interaction is not driven by those in the sparsely populated extremes of the trust scale. To explore this possibility, we collapsed the two least trusting responses and the two most trusting responses. We then reformed the interactions and reestimated the models. The Trust × Liberal interaction retained its sign and statistical significance in both models.
We define “high-trust” liberals as those who trust government at least most of the time. Despite unified Republican control, the percentage of high-trust liberals is non-trivial in both 2002 and 2004. In 2002, for example, more than one-third of liberals (i.e. 34.3%) claim that they trust government at least most of the time. In 2004, nearly one-third of liberals (i.e. 31.2%) say they trust government at least most of the time.
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Acknowledgments
The authors thank Jason Barabas, Donald Haider-Markel, Jenn Jerit, Jim Kuklinski, and Neil Malhotra for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Appendix
Appendix
Social Security Privatization
2002 PSRA: Would you support or oppose a plan in which people who chose could invest some of their Social Security contributions in the stock market? (Oppose, Support).
2004 NES: A proposal has been made that would allow people to put a portion of their Social Security payroll taxes into personal retirement accounts that would be invested in private stocks and bonds. Do you favor this idea, oppose it, or neither favor nor oppose it? [If favor/oppose] Do you favor or oppose it strongly or not strongly? [If neither favor nor oppose] Do you lean toward favoring it, lean toward opposing it, or don’t you lean either way? (Oppose strongly, Oppose not strongly, Lean toward opposing, Don’t lean either way, Lean toward favoring, Favor not strongly, Favor strongly).
Ideology
2002 PSRA: Would you say your views in most political matters are very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, or very conservative? (Liberal, Moderate, Conservative).
2004 NES: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this? (Liberal, Moderate, Conservative).
Party Identification
2002 PSRA: In politics today, do consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or something else? Do you consider yourself a strong (Republican/Democrat) or not a very strong (Republican/Democrat)? Do you consider yourself closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? (Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent Closer to Democrats, Independent, Independent Closer to Republicans, Weak Republican, Strong Republican).
2004 NES: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong (Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? (Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent Leans Democrat, Independent, Independent Leans Republican, Weak Republican, Strong Republican).
Sex
Indicator variable denoting respondents’ sex.
Age
Respondents’ age in years.
Political Trust
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? (Never (vol.), Only some of the time, Most of the time, Just about always).
Stock
2002 PSRA: Thinking about all of your investments, including retirement savings plans at work, do you currently have money invested in stocks or mutual funds? (No, Yes).
2004 NES: Do you personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock market right now—either in an individual stock or in a mutual fund? (No, Yes).
Income
2002 PSRA: Last year, that is in 2001, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the right category. (Less than $10,000, $10,000 to under $20,000, $20,000 to under $30,000, $30,000 to under $40,000, $40,000 to under $50,000, $50,000 to under $75,000, $75,000 or more).
2004 NES: Please look at the booklet and tell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 2003 before taxes. (Less than $15,000, $15,000 to under $35,000, $35,000 to under $50,000, $50,000 to under $60,000, $60,000 to under $70,000, $70,000 to under $90,000, $90,000 or more).
Education
Respondents’ level of education (8 grades or less, Some high school, High school diploma, Some college, Associates degree, College degree, Advanced degree).
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Rudolph, T.J., Popp, E. Bridging the Ideological Divide: Trust and Support for Social Security Privatization. Polit Behav 31, 331–351 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-008-9078-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-008-9078-5