The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast Factual Adherence

In this way, the apparent difficulty in making one’s policy preferences fit with one’s factual attitudes is redolent of Americans’ struggle to have their policy preferences fit with each other—what Converse (1964) famously described as poor “constraint.”

To avoid the possibility of unintended panel conditioning, we excluded any Turk worker which had been participated in a prior study.

The choice of the OLS model, and the specific measures for agreement, ideology, and correction, were chosen to be consistent with Nyhan and Jason (2010).

This relationship persisted if we compare respondents along the partisan scale. This result is described in Sect. A.14.1 on p. xxvi.

Of course, the attitudinal consequence of this fact remains at a respondent’s discretion, but functional democratic competence would seem to require that voters adopt a common set of basic political facts.

Three articles were taken from study 3: the original Bush WMD article, the piece by Speaker Paul Ryan criticizing President Obama’s policy toward abortion, and Secretary Hillary Clinton claim that twice as many Americans were employed in solar than in the oil industry. Three novel mock articles were also provided: Senator Sanders claiming that the EPA had found fracking was responsible for polluting water supplies, Donald Trump claiming that his tax cut plan would grow federal tax receipts, and Trump claiming that the true unemployment rate was actually higher than 30%. These mock articles can be read in Sect. A.9, which can be found in the appendix on p. xvi. The items can be read in Table 11 on p. xxiii.

For this study, President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Senator Sanders are deemed liberal speakers, and President Trump and President Bush are deemed conservative speakers.

For instance, the national representative panel who adopted the correction that the flu vaccines did not induce flu infections (Nyhan et al. 2015) or the national representative panel who accepted the correction that the MMR vaccines did not cause autism (Nyhan et al. 2014).

Coppock and McClellan (2017) report an extensive test of the Lucid sample, comparing it to Turk, the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, and the American National Election Study’s (ANES) face to face and online samples. Treating the ANES face-to-face sample as the “gold standard”, the Lucid sample is more psychologically similar to the ANES than the Turk sample on the Big-5 personality battery, and better matches the political knowledge and conservatism in the ANES. Coppock and McClellan also test the Lucid sample’s ability to recover treatment effects in canonical social psychology experiments. Both Lucid and Turk samples recover the same framing effect observed the General Social Survey (a massive face-to-face survey instrument), improving the appetite for public spending when it is described as “assistance to the poor” or “caring for the poor” rather than “welfare.” Both Lucid and Turk feature the same framing effect underpinning prospect theory [(the famous Tversky and Kahneman (1983) finding which shows risk tolerance is affected by framing possible outcomes as gains or losses.] Both Lucid and Turk recover indistinguishable experimental effects as observed in Hiscox (2006) in framing attitudes about free trade. Most importantly for this study, the one failed replication was on rumor corrections in the aforementioned Berinsky paper (2017), where Lucid respondents were unusually resistant to corrective information. This suggests that the Lucid sample is at least a comparably demanding sample in which to test factual adherence.

In brief—a weak correction might inadvertently advertise the weakness of the corrective case, or a strong correction might have more obvious factual implications, and therefore inspire more forceful counterargument.

These respondents were recruited on Mechanical Turk.

As a robustness check—there was no significant relationship between ideology and perceived accordance, for any of the tested pairs.

Contra our evidence in “Does Counterargument Explain Our Pattern of Findings?” section.