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Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities

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Abstract

This paper aims at testing whether there exist spending interactions between French municipalities by estimating a dynamic panel data model. Our results suggest that there are some interactions between neighbouring municipalities as regards primary and investment expenditures. A positive relationship between municipalities’ wage bill and unemployment rates is likely to stress a rise of temporary employment in those municipalities that suffer from social troubles. Further, the estimation results show that these interdependences also exist between cities whose mayors have the same partisan affiliation. Finally, our results confirm the opportunistic behaviour of local governments, which increase all categories of public spending in pre-electoral periods

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Political Science Department, University of Montreal, CP6128 succ. centre-ville, Montreal, H3C 3J7, Canada

    Martial Foucault

  2. European University Institute, RSCAS, Florence, Italy

    Martial Foucault

  3. University of Fribourg (Switzerland), CRESUF, Boulevard de Perolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland

    Thierry Madies

  4. CREM, CNRS, 14032, Caen Cedex, France

    Thierry Madies

  5. EQUIPPE-University of Lille 1, Bâtiment SH2, 59655, Villeneuve d’Ascq, France

    Sonia Paty

  6. INRA-CESAER, 26 bd Docteur Petitjean, BP 87999, 21079, Dijon Cedex, France

    Sonia Paty

Authors
  1. Martial Foucault
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  2. Thierry Madies
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  3. Sonia Paty
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Correspondence to Martial Foucault.

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Foucault, M., Madies, T. & Paty, S. Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities. Public Choice 137, 57–80 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9312-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9312-z

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