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01.04.2014

Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition

verfasst von: John E. Jackson

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 1-2/2014

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Abstract

The Davis-Hinich multidimensional model of electoral competition is the foundation for a very broad set of models in economics, political science, public choice and political economy. This essay reviews some of these models and how they build on and extend the original Davis-Hinich model. It also presents a new extension that makes individual preferences endogenous to the electoral process. The essay concludes with a discussion of the positive and normative implications of endogenous preferences and then returns to the basic theme of the central importance of the early Davis-Hinich papers.

Vorheriger Artikel Can democracy induce development? A constitutional perspective

Nächster Artikel Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition

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Bowen (1943) presents a graphical version of a similar model of local school expenditures decided by referendums but did not discuss or show convergence to the median preference, nor did he present any empirical results from his model.

Formally, their marginal utilities for any move away from the point of medians must be equal but oppositely signed for each individual in a pair.

Implicit in their example is the third dimension of private consumption, which is net income after taxes for both security and education. The “new” dimension in their example puts a much greater weight on the value of private consumption relative to the value of either security or education.

Bartels, however, attributes the relationship between attitudes and partisanship to a partisan bias in opinions rather than to partisanship as a source of information. Sanders et al. do not use a Bayesian framework but show with experimental evidence that changes in party positions are associated with changes in respondents’ preferences.

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The time variable is defined as (Year−1975)/100 so that the value for the intercept in the macro model, B ₀₂, corresponds to the intercept in the individual model, B ₀₁.

These p-values are based on a one-tailed test of the null that α _1k+α _2k=1 as the only concern is the possibility that the sum is less than one given that the sum should not exceed one.

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Titel: Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition
verfasst von: John E. Jackson
Publikationsdatum: 01.04.2014
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Public Choice / Ausgabe 1-2/2014
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0037-7

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