Law-and-economics: why Gordon Tullock prefers Napoleon Bonaparte over the Duke of Wellington; and why he may end up on St. Helena

Parisi (2004) provides a concise outline of the scholarship in this area. Coase (1960) is credited with the earliest statement of the efficiency of the common law hypothesis. Major contributions are Ehrlich and Posner (1974), Rubin (1977) and Posner (1994). Priest (1977) extended Rubin’s analysis. Tullock (1988, 1997) presents his opposition to the mainstream view.

Shughart (2004) provides a thorough analysis of the cases and events occurring during this time period.

See Fleck and Hanssen (2013), Shughart (2004) and Shughart and Tollison (1998) for additional analyses of these issues.

In 2006, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America changed its name to the American Association for Justice (Rubin and Shepherd 2013).

We, Therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved (Kurland and Lerner 1987, Vol. 1: 10).

In the Fort Hill Address of 1831, John Calhoun openly and unambiguously identified himself with the nullification cause. In that speech, he proclaimed that the right of state interposition was ‘the fundamental principle of our system’ and that the federal government must accept that right in order to keep the Constitution and the Union secure. By embracing the concept of state imposition, Calhoun dismissed the 1803 ruling in Marbury v. Madison, a ruling that claimed the power of constitutional interpretation exclusively for the judicial branch.

I have never thought the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others. I have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice. I have not viewed it in an important light 1. because I conceive that in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr. Wilson, the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted. 2 because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude (Kurland and Lerner 1987, Vol. 1: 477).

“Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference” (Kurland and Lerner 1987, Vol. 1: 457).

I freely own that I have never seen in the Constitution as it now stands those serious dangers which have alarmed many respectable Citizens. Accordingly whilst it remained unratified, and it was necessary to unite the States in some one plan, I opposed all previous alterations as calculated to throw the States into dangerous contentions, and to furnish the secret enemies of the Union with an opportunity of promoting its dissolution. Circumstances are now changed: The Constitution is established on the ratifications of eleven States and a very great majority of the people of America; and amendments, if pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper mode, will be not only safe, but may serve the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning opponents, and of providing additional guards in favour of liberty (Kurland and Lerner 1987, Vol. 1: 478).

For a recent example, see Zywicki (2008).