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Erschienen in: Public Choice 3-4/2020

10.09.2019

Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state

verfasst von: Mehrdad Vahabi

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2020

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Abstract

Economists have adopted two broad perspectives on the state: contractual (i.e., provider of public goods and services) and predatory (coercive and extractive). By a predatory state, we mean a state that promotes the private interests of dominant groups within the state (such as politicians, the army and bureaucrats) or influential private groups with strong lobbying powers. Neo-institutional economists support an extended version of the contractual perspective in which the state is not simply a ‘benevolent dictator’ but may itself be composed of predators. However, it considers predation as only a means to promote protection. By contrast, a predatory vision of the state argues that while protection and predation are two faces of the same coin, a predatory state protects only to promote its predation on the private sector. This symposium explores how a predatory approach to the state can shed light on all types of state, from liberal democratic to authoritarian and failed ones, both in the past and present.

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Fußnoten
1
Hirschman (1970, 1978) emphasized the incompleteness of limiting the description of predation as a relationship between predator and prey. For example, he provided many excerpts from Montesquieu, Sir James Stuart Mill and Adam Smith in which they defined money, notes, bills of exchange, stocks of companies, ships, all commodities and merchandises as ‘movable assets’ capable of fleeing from tyranny’s control. He (1978, p. 98) also cited Turgot regarding the role of the emigration of persons in addition to capital in enhancing democracy. For a detailed discussion of that point, see Vahabi (2016a, b).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state
verfasst von
Mehrdad Vahabi
Publikationsdatum
10.09.2019
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2020
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00715-2

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