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Public Choice
Erschienen in: Public Choice 1-2/2021

23.04.2020

Culture, institutions and democratization*

verfasst von: Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Gerard Roland

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 1-2/2021

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Abstract

We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially more challenging collective action problems, countries with individualistic cultures are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with collectivist cultures. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic cultures and average polity scores and durations of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of democracy emphasized in the literature. We provide evidence that countries with collectivist cultures also are more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy to autocracy.
Vorheriger Artikel Disruptive innovation and R&D ownership structures
Nächster Artikel Kornai on the affinity of systems: Is China today an illiberal capitalist system or a communist dictatorship?

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Fußnoten
1
This point is reiterated in his remarks at the occasion of the symposium for his 90th birthday; see Kornai (2018).
 
2
Kornai has been a keen observer of such tendencies in the post-socialist world. Kornai (2016) describes in detail the changes made by Orban to Hungary’s political and economic system. Kornai (2015) draws a distinction between autocracy and dictatorship, wherein the former lies between democracy and dictatorship, a distinction usually not made.
 
3
More recently, some scholars have claimed to have found a direct link between genetic endowments and political behavior, such as political participation and ideology (Fowler et al. 2008; Hatemi and McDermott 2012). Those studies focus, however, on individual political behavior and individual political psychology, not on how average genetic endowments affect a collectivity or a country’s culture. That difference is very important. The individual approach postulates a direct connection between an individual’s genetic endowment and that individual’s psychology or political behavior. In contrast, we use the correlation between cultural traits and genetic distance to address the potential endogeneity of culture.
 
4
Persson and Tabellini (2009) specified a theoretical model and showed empirical support for a theory of positive feedback between the capital stock of democratic experience and economic development. Persson (2005) showed that the form of democracy mattered for income growth: the introduction of parliamentary democracy with proportional electoral rules produced the most growth-promoting policies.
 
5
Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) found that transitory negative income shocks related to drought have a positive effect on democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa.
 
6
Grosjean and Senik (2011) found no link between income and support for democracy in the context of transition countries.
 
7
See also Putnam et al. (1994) on how a strong culture of civil engagement affects the quality of government.
 
8
A large empirical literature shows that culture has a very strong inertia, from research showing the long-run effects of cultural differences between groups of early US settlers (see Fischer 1989; Grosjean 2014) to research showing the persistence of culture of ancestors’ countries of origin among US immigrants (see, e.g., Guiso et al. 2006; Tabellini 2008; Algan and Cahuc 2010).
 
9
On predatory states, see Vahabi (2016a, b). On differences between autocratic regimes, see the distinction made by McGuire and Olson (1996) on roving bandits versus stationary bandits.
 
10
See Tullock (1974) on the costs and benefits of revolts.
 
11
This part of the model should not be interpreted too literally. In many regime changes, some of the elite spearhead revolutions, coups and abrupt regime changes in the name of the people. Popular support for regime change is nevertheless critical for its success.
 
12
See Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) for a fuller discussion of the cross-cultural differences between individualism and collectivism and their implications for economic and institutional behavior. Note also that liberal ideologies that defend democracy are based on individualist values.
 
13
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) consider a model where the rich change the regime by a coup, and we do not incorporate that feature in this model so as not to introduce complications on an issue that has already been covered in the literature.
 
14
Polity V is still in development as we write this paper.
 
15
The most current version of the data is available at http://​www.​geert-hofstede.​com/​. The timing of this and other variables is provided in “Appendix Table 9”.
 
16
Schwartz’s cultural dimensions of intellectual and affective autonomy correlate positively with individualism while the dimension of embeddedness correlates negatively with individualism. These cultural dimensions are also interpreted in a very similar way as Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism index.
 
17
The study use 9 pathogens: leishmanias, trypanosomes, malaria, schistosomes, filariae, dengue, typhus, leprosy and tuberculosis.
 
18
One could argue that higher pathogen prevalence should be correlated with a more centralized form of government given the externalities from disease transmission. However, centralization of government is not directly related to the type of political regime.
 
19
Using a smaller sample of countries, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) test overidentifying restrictions for the blood distance and other genetic instrumental variables with arguably more direct effects on individualism and collectivism and find that one cannot reject the null of correct exclusion restrictions.
 
20
A potential disadvantage of blood type distance as an instrumental variable is that it could be an instrument for other cultural variables, which may also be argued to affect political regime choice. Having two plausible instruments is nevertheless an advantage in empirical analysis because one can use formal tests of the exclusion restriction.
 
21
Power distance measures the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. Uncertainty avoidance measures a society's tolerance for ambiguity. Masculinity measures a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success. Cultures with high long-term orientation scores are characterized by emphasis on persistence (perseverance), ordering relationships by status, the possibility of having many truths (depending on time and context), thrift, and having a sense of shame.
 
22
When introducing shares of other religions (results not shown), the share of Muslims remains strongly negatively significant and is the only strongly robust variable. The share of Jews is typically positively associated to democracy. Given that Jews are a minority in all countries except Israel, the most natural interpretation is that Jews, who have been persecuted in the past, have migrated to the more stable democratic countries in the world.
 
23
Acemoglu et al. (2008) claim that income has no effect on democracy and that the comovement between these two variables is determined by institutions (the rule of law) that affect both democracy and successful economic development.
 
24
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) provide a more detailed discussion of this econometric problem.
 
25
Results are similar when we use consider measures of output for earlier periods. See “Appendix Table 10”.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Culture, institutions and democratization*
verfasst von
Yuriy Gorodnichenko
Gerard Roland
Publikationsdatum
23.04.2020
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 1-2/2021
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00811-8

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