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The Effect of Time-on-Market and Location on Search Costs and Anchoring: The Case of Single-Family Properties

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Abstract

Regarding single-family residential properties purchased for investment (non-owner occupied) we examine whether out-of-state buyers pay more than in-state buyers. We focus on the effects of search costs and anchoring. We use data on 2,828 Las Vegas non-owner occupied (investor) residences, 40% of which are purchased by non-local investors. We find that the location of the property affects the empirical results. Specifically, search cost and anchoring effects that appear significant when the location of the property is ignored disappear when location is introduced as an independent variable.

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Notes

  1. Miller, Sklarz and Ordway report that prices were $50–75 per square foot of lot space in Honolulu compared to $1,500–4,000 per square foot in Tokyo.

  2. We include these occupancy variables in the model below. The reader should be aware that the occupancy status refers to the property at time of sale. All properties purchased were converted to investor properties. That is, the variable for owner occupancy refers to a property that was owner-occupied at time of sale to a buyer who subsequently used it as an investor property.

  3. Both the GLVAR and CCAO data include the date of the sale. We exclude observations for which the recorded sales dates differ by more than 8 days. We use the GLVAR sale date to measure time on the market.

  4. Here we only show the price differential for the year 2000. In the empirical tests we include the price differential for the year in which the property was sold.

  5. Thus the index measures the absolute difference between a property’s characteristic and the average in the sample multiplied by the value of that characteristic from the OLS hedonic equation. We do not report the equation used to estimate the Haurin measure but it is a straightforward OLS hedonic equation.

  6. The log version of PRICEDIF variable is created by dividing the log of the out-of-state price by the log of the in-state price. Also, we add the value “one” to FIRE and GAR so that we can create the log transformation of these variables. Because the log of the square foot variables (house and lot) and the log of their squares would be perfectly correlated we create the transformation by squaring the log of the un-squared values. Finally, in this and subsequent tests the inclusion of some variables in the log version were nearly perfectly correlated with others and were, therefore, omitted in the log–linear version.

  7. We tested the linear model on two halves of the sample, upper and lower. The sample split with an equal number of properties in each half at approximately $165,000. In neither regression were search costs important while anchoring was significant only in the lower one-half sample (coefficient = 19.87, t-statistic = 3.53).

  8. We omit from the zip code list those that are the two suburban neighborhoods.

  9. The two suburban locations consist of relatively high-priced properties. For this reason there appeared, in our initial tests a high degree of multicollinearity. Several tests revealed that the best solution to this problem was a restriction of the sample to properties between $40,000 and $700,000.

  10. An unobserved variable that may affect TOM is “seller motivation.” This variable has been proxied in other studies by the list price/selling price relationship. Unfortunately our database does not include an original list price. While having such information may help explain the TOM equation it is unlikely to affect the search cost/anchoring variables in the price equation.

  11. An anonymous referee suggested testing the model by splitting the sample at the average TOM (44 days) to test the stability of the search cost/anchoring effects. Doing so showed no change in the results for the less than 44 days sub-sample. The upper portion of the sample produced no results because of multicollinearity.

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Correspondence to Terrence M. Clauretie.

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Clauretie, T.M., Thistle, P.D. The Effect of Time-on-Market and Location on Search Costs and Anchoring: The Case of Single-Family Properties. J Real Estate Finan Econ 35, 181–196 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9034-x

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