Abstract
The governing bodies of the telecommunications industry instituted a major shift from rate of return to price cap regulation in an effort to foster competition and improve efficiency. This paper focuses on the local exchange market and examines the price markup before and after the implementation of price cap regulation to measure the effects of the change on consumer welfare. The average price markup increased slightly after price cap regulation; however, the average price decreased, indicating that consumers benefited without firms losing from the regulatory shift.
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Eckenrod, S.B. Incentive regulation in local telecommunications: The effects on price markups. J Regul Econ 30, 217–231 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-0012-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-0012-7