Abstract
Marriage for same-sex couples was only permitted in a limited number of states prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. We exploit panel variation across states prior to the Supreme Court decision to investigate the effect of marriage laws on demand for mortgage credit. Identification relies on the fact that states permitted same-sex marriage at different points in time, often through court order whereby the outcome and timing of ruling was unknown. We estimate that states permitting same-sex marriage experienced a 6–16% increase in same-sex mortgage applications after the policy was implemented. Federal recognition of marriage is associated with a stronger effect than state same-sex marriage prior to the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act, but the effect of state-recognized marriage is also stronger than anti-discrimination policies in housing. Our findings provide important insight not only to the housing choices of same-sex households but the impact of marriage on all households.
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Notes
We excluded the last three months of 2014 because applications are not reported under HMDA until they are acted upon. Consequently, some applications submitted toward the end of one calendar year may not be reported until the following year. Between 2004 and 2013, on average 73 percent of applications submitted in December were not acted on until the following calendar year and therefore not reported in the year the application was submitted. Comparable figures for November and October are 31 and 15 percent, respectively.
Homes purchased with cash or with mortgages originated by some small and rural lenders are not covered by HMDA; nevertheless, HMDA provides the most comprehensive demographic information of housing market activity.
Same-sex households are identified in the American Community Survey as households where a husband, wife or unmarried partner reported the same-sex as the reference person.
The FHA microdata set does include marital status but FHA mortgages represents only a share of the mortgage market. We did not limit our analysis to a segment that may not be representative of the entire mortgage market.
Housing values are estimated by adjusting the median value of owner-occupied homes in the 2006–2010 ACS by the state-level repeat-sales house price index (HPI) created by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
According to the Census Bureau, the length of time from authorization to completion of new single-family privately owned residential buildings between 2004 and 2014 ranges between 6.7 and 8.9 months, with multi-family buildings ranging between 12 and 16.7 months.
Because the dependent variable is logged, estimated effects are discussed as percentage changes based on the exponeniated values of the coefficients (i.e., %Δ = (e^β − 1) × 100). To avoid dropping observations with no applications in a given month, we add one to all application counts before taking the natural log in this and all subsequent models.
In the case of California in 2008, the indicator is on for only 5 months and no lagged indicators are included.
The persistence of the estimated effect is further confirmed by a supplementary model (not shown) that includes the number of months since the implementation of same-sex marriage as a variable in addition to the binary policy indicator. The estimated coefficient on the interaction with same-sex applicants is positive but not statistically significant while the estimated coefficient on original policy variable is not substantially changed.
Results from the falsification test are provided upon request.
We model the effect of overturning DOMA as occurring in September 2013 even though the Supreme Court ruling was June 26. The IRS did not issue guidance on federal taxation until August 29 and the Department of Defense did not issue guidance on veterans’ benefits until September 3.
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Acknowledgements
The opinions expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the Administration. The authors thank Richard K. Green, Silda Nikaj, and William Reeder for invaluable comments and suggestions. Any omissions and errors belong solely to the authors.
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Miller, J.J., Park, K.A. Same-sex marriage laws and demand for mortgage credit. Rev Econ Household 16, 229–254 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-016-9356-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-016-9356-7