nach oben

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Erschienen in:

01.01.2013 | Original Research

Asset write-offs discretion and accruals management in Taiwan: the role of corporate governance

verfasst von: Chia-Ling Chao, Shwu-Min Horng

Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | Ausgabe 1/2013

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Using a sample of Taiwan’s public firms, this paper examines whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings targets and how corporate governance mechanisms react to such opportunistic behavior. We develop a set of simultaneous equations that capture executives’ incentives to manage earnings through write-offs and accrual management. These incentives include the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants, “big bath,” income smoothing, and changes in senior management. The empirical results show that firms with larger discretionary write-offs also have lower discretionary accruals. In addition, we find that these earnings management tools are endogenous, suggesting that discretionary write-offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation and that their magnitudes are determined jointly. These findings contrast sharply with the tenor of discussion in the U.S. literature concerning the potential for using asset write-offs and discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings, which documents that managers use their discretion over accruals to signal economic realities rather than to obfuscate. Moreover, the results reveal that the empirical association between discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals is more pronounced in weakly governed firms, suggesting that a strong governance setting is likely to constrain management’s discretionary behavior. The above implications are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variables definitions.

Vorheriger Artikel The role of industry classification in estimating discretionary accruals

Nächster Artikel Auditor size, tenure, and bank loan pricing

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

The FASC does not allow increases in goodwill values and subsequent reversals of previously recognized impairment losses for goodwill. However, for long-lived assets other than goodwill, the impairment losses can be reversed if market conditions have improved, but only to the extent that the book value of the asset after the reversal may not exceed the asset’s book value before the impairment loss was recognized, less a required provision for depreciation or amortization. As of December 31, 2007, few companies (less than 6% of public firms) have recognized the restoration of previously recognized impairment losses.

Although the measurement of discretionary accruals plays a central role in a wide body of accounting literature, Rees et al. (1996) is one of the few studies to examine accounting policy choices jointly (i.e., abnormal accruals in the year of the asset write-off) in the context of the accrual management literature. Following Rees et al., Yen and Chao (2009) investigate the association between the entire amount of asset impairment losses and discretionary accruals. However, both studies do not test for the existence of endogeneity. Examples of other studies are Barton (2001) and Huang et al. (2009), who document that managers use financial derivatives and discretionary accruals as partial substitutes for earnings management.

The big bath hypothesis suggests that in periods when performance is poor, management may take the opportunity to report other discretionary bad news. That is, if a manager cannot manipulate earnings to reach a “target” level, he/she will attempt to decrease current earnings in favor of increasing future earnings and, therefore, future bonuses.

The income smoothing hypothesis posits that firms may manage earnings to reduce fluctuations around some level considered normal for the firm. Specifically, when earnings are unusually high, firms are likely to choose income-reducing accruals; when earnings are unusually low, they are likely to take income-increasing accruals.

IFRS include standards issued by the current standard-setting body (the IASB) and the standards issued by its predecessor (the International Accounting Standards Committee, IASC), some of which the IASB has amended. More than 100 countries now require or permit the use of IFRS, or are converging with the IASB’s standards.

Several methods have been proposed in the literature for separating operating accruals into normal (nondiscretionary) and abnormal (discretionary) components (see later sections and Kothari et al. 2005, for a review of these models). In these models, parameters are estimated for normal accrual activity by regressing an accounting accrual measure on proxies for normal business activity. These estimated normal accrual parameters and the event-period data are then combined to generate unexpected accrual activity.

An ideal economic factor would include managers’ expectations of the asset(s)’ future performance, as this is vital to evaluating asset impairment. Given that these expectations are generally unobservable, we follow prior research (in particular, Francis et al. 1996; Riedl 2004) and choose alternative proxies likely to reflect managers’ expectations to some extent.

Following Godfrey and Koh (2009), we include LOSS _it as an additional explanatory variable in the write-off decision analysis.

We use the cross-sectional approach, rather than the time-series approach, to measure discretionary accruals. The cross-sectional approach has an advantage in that it controls for the effects of changing industry-wide economic conditions (Teoh et al. 1998a, b). Further, prior research (e.g., Bartov et al. 2001) documents that the cross-sectional approach outperforms its time-series counterpart in detecting earnings management. The assumption underlying the former is that firms in the same industry have a similar operating cycle; the latter assumes that the length of a firm’s operating cycle does not change over the estimation and event period (Bartov et al. 2001). The results (not reported) show that our sample firms are not much different from the average firm in their respective industry. Thus, the fact that our model coefficients estimated from cross-sectional regressions are the same for all firms in the industry should not represent a serious problem.

Prior studies (e.g., Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; Shumway 2001; Zmijewski 1984) have developed several models using somewhat overlapping sets of financial ratios to estimate a firm’s risk of bankruptcy. Although these statistical models have been widely used in bankruptcy prediction, option pricing models (e.g., the approach developed by Black and Scholes 1973 and Merton 1974) have gained in popularity. As various studies (e.g., Gharghori et al. 2006; Hillegeist et al. 2004; Patel and Pereira 2007; Vassalou and Xing 2004) document, the option pricing bankruptcy risk measures outperform those based on traditional statistical models.

Mensah (1984) indicates that users of bankruptcy prediction models need to recognize that such models may require redevelopment from time to time to take into account changes in the economic environment that may affect the financial condition of firms examined. Most academic research on predicting financial distress has been conducted on U.S. firms. However, extant research documents that Altman’s Z-score remains valid in principle for predicting the bankruptcy of Japanese companies (e.g., Xu and Zhang 2009) and Chinese companies (e.g., Wang and Campbell 2010). Given that Taiwan may share some economic growth patterns with Japan and China due to geographic location, cultural resemblance, and similar economic-development strategies (Holz 2005), we adopt Altman’s model to determine the bankruptcy risk for our sample firms.

Altman’s (1968) model is the most well known and often used in practice for predicting financial distress (in particular, bankruptcy). Specifically, Altman’s Z-score = 1.2 × Working Capital/Total Assets + 1.4 × Retained Earnings/Total Assets + 3.3 × Earnings before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets + 0.6 × Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities + 0.999 × Sales/Total Assets. A firm with a higher Z-score is considered to have a lower probability of corporate failure.

A proxy for management compensation could also be included in the analysis. However, prior research (e.g., Healy 1985) indicates that the details of the bonus calculations vary across plans. Managers’ incentives to report higher earnings in a given year may vary with these details. Because it is difficult to get enough details about compensation arrangements, more general proxies for BBATH _it and SMOOTH _it are used in the analyses.

SMOOTH _it is the proxy for “income smoothing” reporting, which is set equal to SM_ROA _it or SM_DIS _it. Specifically, SM_ROA _it is equal to the difference between firm i’s earnings (measured before discretionary write-offs and DCA_ROA _it) for year t and earnings for year t − 1, divided by total assets at the end of t − 1, when this change is either above the median of nonzero positive values or below the median of nonzero negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; SM_DIS _it is equal to the difference between firm i’s earnings (measured before discretionary write-offs and DCA_DIS _it) for year t and earnings for year t − 1, divided by total assets at the end of t − 1, when this change is either above the median of nonzero positive values or below the median of nonzero negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise.

All of our sample firms have elected supervisors, but only 1% of the sample observations have set up audit committees. Therefore, we do not include audit committees as a governance factor.

The unit-weighting approach is widely used in the corporate governance literature. Some researchers refer to the sum of raw item values across components as unit weights, while others use the term to refer to summing standardized values (Bobko et al. 2007). We adopt this latter definition (i.e., the values for each governance attribute are converted into z-scores before applying equal weights) because the variance of the raw item values can have a substantial influence on the effective weight of an individual governance variable in the composite measure.

An alternative would be to use principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the summary governance measure. PCA automatically generates weights so that the composite measure will explain much of the variance in the group of corporate governance characteristics and, therefore, does not require the ex ante determination of the weights (Florackis and Ozkan 2009). However, compared to factor analytic procedures, the unit-weighting approach of constructing variables has been proved to exhibit less variance and greater generalizability (i.e., values are less sample-specific) (Emerson et al. 2009). In addition, prior research demonstrates that average z-scores correlate highly with different weighting schemes, such as factor analysis, and that using the average z-score is considered a better approach than summing the raw item values for a total score in the presence of missing data (see McKnight et al. 2007). Accordingly, we use unit weights to construct GOV _it following the recommendations of Grice and Harris (1998), who document that the unit-weighting approach exhibits high consistency across independent samples and retains many of the desirable attributes of regression-based factor scores while being less subject to the problems associated with using the same data to estimate the coefficients.

Business Groups in Taiwan, published annually by the China Credit Information Service, provides demographic information on the top 100 business groups in Taiwan in terms of asset, sales, employees, group age, background of top management teams, and inter-company relationship within a group.

In contrast with prior U.S.-based research on asset impairment, Taiwan’s relevant studies (e.g., Chao 2007; Young and Wu 2009) find that write-off firms are more highly leveraged than non-write-off firms.

Untabulated results show that the Heckman first-stage probit estimation in Eq. 2 used to compute MILL _it has a pseudo R ² of 21%, and that MB _it (p-value < 0.01), ∆ROA _it (p-value < 0.05), LOSS _it (p-value < 0.01), and SIZE _it (p-value < 0.01) appear to explain significantly the decision to write-down assets. Specifically, the coefficients of the independent variables in the probit estimation are qualitatively similar to the second-stage tests in Eq. 3 as reported in column 3 of Table 5. We also examined several variations of the first-stage probit model, altering several independent variables. In general, the results reported in this paper for the first-stage estimation and the second-stage tests are robust to alternative specifications.

Altman EI (1968) Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. J Financ 23(4):589–609CrossRef

Anderson R, Reeb D (2004) Board composition: balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Adm Sci Q 49(2):209–237

Ashbaugh H, LaFond R, Mayhew BW (2003) Do nonaudit services compromise auditor independence? Further evidence. Acc Rev 78(3):611–639CrossRef

Barclay MJ, Holderness CG (1991) Negotiated block trades and corporate control. J Financ 46(3):861–878CrossRef

Barton J (2001) Does the use of financial derivatives affect earnings management decisions? Acc Rev 76(1):1–26CrossRef

Bartov E, Gul FA, Tsui JSL (2001) Discretionary accruals models and audit qualifications. J Acc Econ 30(3):421–452CrossRef

Beatty A, Weber J (2006) Accounting discretion in fair value estimates: an examination of SFAS 142 goodwill impairments. J Acc Res 44(2):257–288CrossRef

Becker CL, DeFond ML, Jiambalvo J, Subramanyam KR (1998) The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemp Acc Res 15(1):4–24CrossRef

Bedard J, Chtourou SM, Courteau L (2004) The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Audit J Pract Theory 23(2):13–35CrossRef

Beneish MD (1998) Discussion of “are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic?” Rev Acc Stud 3(1/2):209–221

Bertrand M, Mullainathan S (2001) Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are. Q J Econ 116(3):901–932CrossRef

Bethel JE, Liebeskind JP, Opler T (1998) Block share purchases and corporate performance. J Financ 53(2):605–634CrossRef

Black F, Scholes M (1973) The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. J Polit Econ 81(3):637–654CrossRef

Bobko P, Roth PL, Buster MA (2007) The usefulness of unit weights in creating composite scores. Organ Res Methods 10(4):689–709CrossRef

Butler M, Leone AJ, Willenborg M (2004) An empirical analysis of auditor reporting and its association with abnormal accruals. J Acc Econ 37(2):139–165CrossRef

Chandra U, Ettredge ML, Stone MS (2006) Enron-era disclosure of off-balance-sheet entities. Acc Hriz 20(3):231–252CrossRef

Chao C (2007) An examination of SFAS No. 35: adoption timing motives, write-off characteristics, and market reaction. Int J Acc Stud (Special Issue):77–120

Chen KY, Lin K, Zhou J (2005) Audit quality and earnings management for Taiwan IPO firms. Manag Audit J 20(1):86–104CrossRef

Chin C, Chen Y, Kleinman G, Lee P (2009) Corporate ownership structure and innovation: evidence from Taiwan’s electronics industry. J Acc Aud Financ 24(1):145–175

Chou J (2005) Financial accountants need new thinking to accommodate international trends (part 1). Event Trend 177:24–28

Christensen TE (2007) Discussion of “another look at GAAP versus the street: an empirical assessment of measurement error bias”. Rev Acc Stud 12(2/3):305–321CrossRef

Conger JA, Finegold D, Lawler EE III (1998) Appraising boardroom performance. Harv Bus Rev 76(1):136–148

Core JE, Holthausen RW, Larcker DF (1999) Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. J Financ Econ 51(3):371–406CrossRef

Cornett MM, Marcus AJ, Tehranian H (2008) Corporate governance, pay-for-performance: the impact of earnings management. J Financ Econ 87(2):357–373CrossRef

Davidson R, Goodwin-Steward J, Kent P (2005) Internal governance structures and earnings management. Acc Financ 45(2):241–267CrossRef

Davila A, Penalva F (2006) Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation. Rev Acc Stud 11(4):463–493CrossRef

Dechow PM, Sloan RG, Sweeney AP (1995) Detecting earnings management. Acc Rev 70(2):193–225

Dechow PM, Sloan RG, Sweeney AP (1996) Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemp Acc Res 13(1):1–36CrossRef

DeFond ML, Hann RN, Hu X (2005) Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors? J Acc Res 43(2):153–193CrossRef

Ebrahim A (2007) Earnings management and board activity: an additional evidence. Rev Acc Financ 6(1):42–58CrossRef

Elliott JA, Shaw WH (1988) Write-offs as accounting procedures to manage perceptions. J Acc Res 26(Supplement):91–119CrossRef

Emerson K, Orr PJ, Keyes DL, McKnight KM (2009) Environmental conflict resolution: evaluating performance outcomes and contributing factors. Confl Resolut Q 27(1):27–64CrossRef

Fan DKK, So RW, Yeh JJ (2006) Analyst earnings forecasts for publicly traded insurance companies. Rev Quant Financ Acc 26(2):105–136CrossRef

Fields TD, Lys TZ, Vincent L (2001) Empirical research on accounting choice. J Acc Econ 31(1–3):255–307CrossRef

Financial Accounting Standards Committee (FASC) (2004) Accounting treatment of asset impairment. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards, No. 35. FASC, Taipei, Taiwan

Florackis C, Ozkan A (2009) The impact of managerial entrenchment on agency costs: an empirical investigation using UK panel data. Eur Financ Manag 15(3):497–528CrossRef

Francis J, Hanna JD, Vincent L (1996) Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs. J Acc Res 34(Supplement):117–134CrossRef

Frankel R, Lee CMC (1998) Accounting valuation, market expectation, and cross-sectional stock returns. J Acc Econ 25(3):283–319CrossRef

Gharghori P, Chan H, Faff R (2006) Investigating the performance of alternative default-risk models: option-based versus accounting-based approaches. Aust J Manag 31(2):207–234CrossRef

Godfrey JM, Koh P (2009) Goodwill impairment as a reflection of investment opportunities. Acc Financ 49(1):117–140CrossRef

Grice JW, Harris RJ (1998) A comparison of regression and loading weights for the computation of factor scores. Multivar Behav Res 33(2):221–247CrossRef

Guler L (2007) Goodwill impairment charges under SFAS 142: role of executives’ incentives and corporate governance. Working Paper, Texas A & M University

Hausman JA (1978) Specification tests in econometrics. Econom 46(6):1251–1271CrossRef

Healy PM (1985) The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. J Acc Econ 7(1/3):85–107CrossRef

Heckman JJ (1979) Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econom 47(1):153–161CrossRef

Herbohn K, Ragunathan V (2008) Auditor reporting and earnings management: some additional evidence. Acc Financ 48(4):575–601

Hillegeist SA, Keating EK, Cram DP, Lundstedt KG (2004) Assessing the probability of bankruptcy. Rev Acc Stud 9(1):5–34CrossRef

Holderness CG, Sheehan DP (1988) The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: an exploratory analysis. J Financ Econ 20:317–346CrossRef

Holthausen RW, Watts RL (2001) The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting. J Acc Econ 31(1–3):3–75CrossRef

Holz CA (2005) China’s economic growth 1978–2025: what we know today about China’s economic growth tomorrow? Working Paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Huang P, Zhang Y, Deis DR, Moffitt JS (2009) Do artificial income smoothing and real income smoothing contribute to firm value equivalently? J Bank Financ 33(2):224–233CrossRef

Hunt A, Moyer SE, Shevlin T (1996) Managing interacting accounting measures to meet multiple objectives: a study of LIFO firms. J Acc Econ 21(3):339–374CrossRef

International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (1998) Impairment of assets. International Accounting Standards, No. 36. IASB, London

Jaggi B, Leung S (2007) Impact of family dominance on monitoring of earnings management by audit committees: evidence from Hong Kong. J Int Accout Audit Tax 16(1):27–50CrossRef

Jaggi B, Leung S, Gul F (2009) Family control, board independence and earnings management: evidence based on Hong Kong firms. J Acc Public Policy 28(4):281–300

Jensen MC (1993) The modern industrial revolution, exit, and failure of internal control systems. J Financ 48(3):831–880CrossRef

Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976) Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J Financ Econ 3(4):305–360CrossRef

Jones J (1991) Earnings management during import relief investigations. J Acc Res 29(2):193–228CrossRef

Kennedy P (2008) A guide to econometrics, 6th edn. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford

Klein A (2002) Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. J Acc Econ 33(3):375–400CrossRef

Kothari SP, Leone AJ, Wasley CE (2005) Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. J Acc Econ 39(1):163–197CrossRef

Kwak, W, Lee H, Mande V (2009) Institutional ownership and income smoothing by Japanese banks through loan loss provisions. Rev Pac Basin Financ Mark Policies 12(2): 219–243

Lara JMG, Osma BG, Penalva F (2009) Accounting conservatism and corporate governance. Rev Acc Stud 14(1):161–201CrossRef

Levitt A (1998) The numbers game. Remarks delivered at the New York University Center for Law and Business, New York. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt

Maddala GS (1991) A perspective on the use of limited dependent and qualitative variables models in accounting research. Acc Rev 66(4):788–807

McDonald JF, Moffitt RA (1980) The uses of tobit analysis. Rev Econ Stat 62(2):318–321CrossRef

McKnight PE, McKnight KM, Sidani S, Figueredo AJ (2007) Missing data: a gentle introduction. Guilford Press, NY

McNichols M, Wilson GP (1988) Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts. J Acc Res 26(Supplement):1–31CrossRef

Meek GK, Thomas WB (2003) A review of market-based international accounting research. J Int Account Res 3(1):21–42CrossRef

Mensah YM (1984) An examination of the stationarity of multivariate bankruptcy prediction models: a methodological study. J Acc Res 22(1):380–395CrossRef

Merton R (1974) On the pricing of corporate debt: the risky structure of interest rates. J Financ 29(2):449–470

Nelson MW, Elliott JA, Tarpley RL (2002) Evidence from auditors about managers’ and auditors’ earnings management decisions. Acc Rev 77(Supplement):175–202CrossRef

Ohlson JA (1980) Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. J Acc Res 18(1):109–131CrossRef

Patel K, Pereira R (2007) Expected default probabilities in structural models: empirical evidence. J Real Estate Financ Econ 34(1):107–133CrossRef

Peasnell KV, Pope PF, Young S (2005) Board monitoring and earnings management: do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? J Bus Financ Account 32(7/8):1311–1346

Peltier-Rivest D, Swirsky S (2000) Earnings management in healthy firms. Q J Bus Econ 39(4):21–37

Persons OS (2005) The relation between the new corporate governance rules and the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Rev Acc Financ 4(2):125–148CrossRef

Rees L, Gill S, Gore R (1996) An investigation of asset write-downs and concurrent abnormal accruals. J Acc Res 34(Supplement):157–169CrossRef

Richardson SA, Sloan RG, Soliman MT, Tuna I (2005) Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices. J Acc Econ 39(3):437–485CrossRef

Riedl EJ (2004) An examination of long-lived asset impairments. Acc Rev 79(3):823–852CrossRef

Roosenboom P, Goot TV, Mertens G (2003) Earnings management and initial public offerings: evidence from the Netherlands. Int J Acc 38(3):243–266CrossRef

Ruiz-Barbadillo E, Biedma-López E, Gómez-Aguilar N (2007) Managerial dominance and audit committee independence in Spanish corporate governance. J Manag Gov 11(4):311–352CrossRef

Sevin S, Schroeder R (2005) Earnings management: evidence for SFAS No. 142 reporting. Manag Audit J 20(1):47–54

Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1986) Large shareholders and corporate control. J Polit Econ 94(3):461–488CrossRef

Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1997) A survey of corporate governance. J Financ 52(2):737–783CrossRef

Shumway T (2001) Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: a simple hazard model. J Bus 74(1):101–124CrossRef

Sponholtz C (2008) The information content of earnings announcements in Denmark. Int J Manag Financ 4(1):4–36

Strong JS, Meyer JR (1987) Asset writedowns: managerial incentives and security returns. J Financ 42(3):643–661CrossRef

Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) (2003) Sample procedures for electing board of directors and supervisors, revised September 2006. TSEC, Taipei, Taiwan

Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) (2006) Regulations governing appointment of independent directors and compliance matters for public companies. TSEC, Taipei, Taiwan

Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) and the GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) (2002) Corporate governance best-practice principles for TSEC/GTSM listed companies, revised December 2006. TSEC and GTSM, Taipei, Taiwan

Teoh SH, Welch I, Wong TJ (1998a) Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings. J Financ 53(6):1935–1974CrossRef

Teoh SH, Wong TJ, Rao GR (1998b) Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic? Rev Acc Stud 3(1/2):175–208CrossRef

Turner LE, Godwin JH (1999) Auditing, earnings management, and international accounting issues at the Securities and Exchange Commission. Acc Horiz 13(3):281–297CrossRef

Vafeas N (1999) Board meeting frequency and firm performance. J Financ Econ 53(1):113–142CrossRef

Vafeas N, Waegelein JF (2007) The association between audit committees, compensation incentives, and corporate audit fees. Rev Quant Financ Acc 28(3):241–255CrossRef

Vassalou M, Xing Y (2004) Default risk in equity returns. J Financ 59(2):831–868CrossRef

Wang Y, Campbell M (2010) Business failure prediction for publicly listed companies in China. J Bus Manag 16(1):75–88

Watts RL, Zimmerman JL (1986) Positive accounting theory. Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs

Wilson GP (1996) Discussion of write-offs: manipulation or impairment. J Acc Res 34(Supplement):171–177CrossRef

Xie B, Davidson WN III, DaDalt PJ (2003) Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. J Corp Financ 9(3):295–316CrossRef

Xu M, Zhang C (2009) Bankruptcy prediction: the case of Japanese listed firms. Rev Acc Stud 14(4):534–558CrossRef

Yeh Y (2005) Do controlling shareholder enhance corporate value? Corp Gov Int Rev 13(2):313–325CrossRef

Yen S, Chao C (2009) Asset write-offs and discretionary accruals. NTU Manag Rev 19(S2):165–194

Yeo GHH, Tan PMS, Ho KM, Chen S (2002) Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of earnings. J Bus Financ Acc 29(7/8):1023–1046CrossRef

Yin QJ, Cheng CSA (2004) Earnings management of profit firms and loss firms in response to tax rate reductions. Rev Acc Financ 3(1):67–92

Young C, Wu S (2009) The determinants and effects on earnings informativeness of asset impairments: the role of corporate governance. Int J Accout Stud 48(1):67–114

Zhong K, Gribbon DW, Zheng X (2007) The effect of monitoring by outside blockholders on earnings management. Q J Bus Econ 46(1):37–60

Zmijewski ME (1984) Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial distress prediction models. J Acc Res 22(Supplement):59–82CrossRef

Zucca LJ, Campbell DR (1992) A closer look at discretionary writedowns of impaired assets. Acc Horiz 6(3):30–41

Titel: Asset write-offs discretion and accruals management in Taiwan: the role of corporate governance
verfasst von: Chia-Ling Chao
Shwu-Min Horng
Publikationsdatum: 01.01.2013
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting / Ausgabe 1/2013
Print ISSN: 0924-865X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7179
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-011-0269-5

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 1/2013

The impact of multi-dimensional corporate transparency on us firms’ credit ratings and cost of capital

Riding the yield curve: a spanning analysis

Are oil, gold and the euro inter-related? Time series and neural network analysis

Stochastic dominance analysis of CTA funds

Is the realized volatility good for option pricing during the recent financial crisis?

The role of industry classification in estimating discretionary accruals