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Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations

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Abstract

We use a sequential voluntary contribution game to compare the relative impact of a first-mover’s non-binding announcement versus binding commitment on cooperation. We find that a non-binding announcement and a binding commitment increase individual contributions to a similar extent. Since announced contributions systematically exceed commitments, in sessions with a non-binding announcement, second-movers tend to contribute more to the group activity than in sessions with a binding commitment. Yet, second-movers appear to be more motivated towards achieving a social optimum when the first-mover uses commitment. We also find that a non-binding announcement has a higher impact on individual propensity to cooperate than the ex post contribution of the first-mover. However, the failure to make announced contributions decreases cooperation even though the first-mover is reassigned in every period.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Economics Department, University of Warwick, Gibbet Hill Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK

    Ganna Pogrebna

  2. Department of Psychology, Columbia University, 406 Schermerhorn Hall, New York, NY, 10027, USA

    David H. Krantz

  3. Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and Innovation Management, School of Business and Economics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Strasse 1, 10178, Berlin, Germany

    Christian Schade

  4. Faculty of Economic Sciences, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073, Göttingen, Germany

    Claudia Keser

Authors
  1. Ganna Pogrebna
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  2. David H. Krantz
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  3. Christian Schade
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  4. Claudia Keser
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Correspondence to Ganna Pogrebna.

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Pogrebna, G., Krantz, D.H., Schade, C. et al. Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations. Theory Decis 71, 473–502 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9248-5

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