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Counterpossibles

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Abstract

The paper clarifies and defends the orthodox view that counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true against recent criticisms. It argues that apparent counterexamples to orthodoxy result from uncritical reliance on a fallible heuristic used in the processing of conditionals. A comparison is developed between such counterpossibles and vacuously true universal generalizations.

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Acknowledgments

This paper is based on my 2015 Beth Lecture in Amsterdam. For a much fuller version of the argument and acknowledgements see Williamson (201Y). Two referees gave useful comments.

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  1. New College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3BN, UK

    Timothy Williamson

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  1. Timothy Williamson
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Correspondence to Timothy Williamson.

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Williamson, T. Counterpossibles. Topoi 37, 357–368 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9424-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9424-x

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