Abstract
This paper attempts to take the first steps toward developing a theory of non-governmental organizations (NGO)–state relations under dictatorship. Drawing on evidence from East Asia, the author argues that dictatorships typically employ one of two strategies in attempting to govern NGOs. First, some dictatorships follow a corporatist strategy, in which business associations, development, and social welfare organizations are co-opted into the state and controlled through a variety of strategies. Second, other dictatorships pursue an exclusionary strategy in which NGOs are marginalized and replaced with state institutions. Variation in the strategy chosen may be explained by differing levels of elite competition and the type of development strategy. Single-party states tend to regulate elite conflicts better and thus often choose corporatist strategies. In personalist regimes dictators tend to fear the organizational and mobilizational potential of NGOs and thus tend to pursue exclusionary strategies. This choice, however, is conditioned by the development strategy employed, as socialist development strategies reduce the incentives to allow NGOs.
Résumé
Cet article essaie de tracer les premières étapes vers le développement d’une théorie sur les relations ONG-état sous une dictature. Apportant des preuves de l’Asie de l’Est, l’auteur prétend que les dictatures utilisent typiquement une ou deux stratégies pour tenter de gouverner les ONG. Premièrement, certaines dictatures suivent une stratégie corporatiste, dans laquelle les associations d’affaires, les organisations de développement et d’assistance sociale sont intégrées dans l’état et contrôlées grâce à une variété d’artifices. Deuxièmement, d’autres dictatures poursuivent une stratégie d’exclusion dans laquelle les ONG sont marginalisées et remplacées par des institutions de l’état. Une variation de la stratégie retenue peut s’expliquer par un différant de compétition d’élite et de type de stratégie de développement. Les états à parti unique ont tendance à mieux réguler les conflits d’élite donc à souvent choisir la stratégie corporatiste. Dans les régimes personnalistes les dictateurs craignent le potentiel d’organisation et de mobilisation des ONG et donc poursuivent des stratégies d’exclusion. Ce choix, cependant, est conditionné par la stratégie de développement utilisée, comme les stratégies socialistes de développement réduisent les motivations pour accepter les ONG.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel unternimmt erste Schritte, eine Theorie über die Beziehungen zwischen NGOs und Staat unter einer Diktatur zu entwickeln. Auf Beweismaterial aus Ostasien stützend, behauptet der Autor, dass Diktaturen in ihrem Bestreben NGOs zu beeinflussen, typischerweise eine von zwei Strategien anwenden. Manche Diktaturen verfolgen eine korporatistische Strategie, in der Unternehmensverbände, Entwicklungs- und Wohlfahrtsorganisationen in den Staat kooptiert und durch eine Vielfalt von Strategien kontrolliert werden. Andere Diktaturen verfolgen eine Strategie des Ausschlusses, bei der NGOs an den Rand gedrängt und von anderen staatlichen Institutionen ersetzt werden. Variationen in der gewählten Strategie können mit verschiedenen Stufen des Konkurrenzkampf innerhalb der Elite und dem Typ Entwicklungsstrategie erklärt werden. Staaten mit Einparteiensystem tendieren dazu, Konflikte der Elite besser zu regulieren und wählen deshalb oft korporatistische Strategien. In personenbezogenen Regimen neigen die Diktatoren dazu, das organisatorische und mobilisierende Potential von NGOs zu fürchten, und verfolgen deshalb Strategien des Ausschlusses. Die Wahl hängt allerdings von der angewandten Entwicklungsstrategie ab, da sozialistische Entwicklungstrategien die Anreize, NGOs zu erlauben, reduzieren.
Resumen
El presente trabajo trata de dar los primeros pasos hacia la formulación de una teoría de las relaciones entre las ONG y el estado bajo un régimen dictatorial. Partiendo de pruebas procedentes de Asia oriental, el autor argumenta que las dictaduras suelen emplear una de dos estrategias al intentar gestionar las ONG: en primer lugar, algunas dictaduras siguen una estrategia corporativista, en la que las asociaciones empresariales, las organizaciones de desarrollo y de servicios sociales pertenecen al estado y se controlan mediante estrategias variadas. Por otro lado, otras dictaduras persiguen una estrategia exclusivista, que margina a las ONG, sustituyéndolas por instituciones estatales. La variación en la estrategia elegida puede explicarse por los distintos niveles de la competición entre elites y el tipo de estrategia de desarrollo. Los estados de partido único tienden a regular mejor los conflictos entre las elites y por ello eligen a menudo estrategias corporativistas. En los regímenes personalistas, los dictadores suelen temer el potencial organizativo y movilizativo de las ONG y por tanto tienden a buscar estrategias exclusivistas. Esta elección, no obstante, está condicionada por la estrategia de desarrollo empleada, ya que las estrategias de desarrollo socialistas reducen los incentivos para permitir a las ONG.
摘要
本论文旨在对专制统治下的国家与非政府组织的关系进行初步的理论研究。引用来自东亚的例证,作者着重讨论了专政政府采取的用以对非政府组织进行管理的两种典型政策。首先,部分专制政府采用社团主义政策,将商业团体、开发机构和社会福利组织收编为政府所用,并通过一系列政策对其进行控制。其次,其余专政政府通过排他政策,对非政府组织进行排斥并使用政府机构取代其地位。专政政府对于不同政策的选择,原因在于其精英竞争水平以及发展策略类型有所不同。一党专政的政府通常能更好地管理精英冲突,因此倾向于选择社团主义的策略。在个人型体制内,独裁者常常会为非政府组织在组织力和动员力方面的潜力而担忧,因此倾向于采取排它策略。然而,这种选择受到所采取的发展战略的制约,因为社会主义发展战略减弱了允许非政府组织存在的动机。
ملخص
هذا البحث يحاول إتخاذ الخطوات الأولى نحو وضع نظرية حول علاقات المنظمات الغير حكومية والدولة في عهد الديكتاتورية. بالاعتماد على أدلة من شرق آسيا ، و المؤلف جادل بأن الديكتاتوريات عادة ما تستخدم إحدى إستراتيجيتين في محاولة للتحكم في المنظمات الغير الحكومية. أولاً ، بعض الديكتاتوريات تتبع إستراتيجية القواعد المؤسسية ، التي فيها رابطات الأعمال التجارية ، والتنمية ومنظمات الرعاية الاجتماعية التي إختارت المشاركة في الدولة و السيطرة عليها من خلال مجموعة متنوعة من الإستراتيجيات. ثانية ، الديكتاتوريات الأخرى تتبع إستراتيجية إستبعاد المنظمات الغير حكومية التي يتم تهميشها وإستبدالها مع مؤسسات الدولة. التباين في اختيار إستراتيجية يمكن تفسيره بواسطه مستويات مختلفة من المنافسة الراقية ونوع من استراتيجية التنمية. تميل دول الحزب الواحد لتنظيم الصراعات الراقية أفضل ، وبالتالي غالبا ما تختار إستراتيجيات مؤسسية. الحكام المستبدين في النظم الشخصية يميلون إلى الخوف من الإحتمال التنظيمي والتعبوي للمنظمات غير الحكومية ، وبالتالي يميلون إلى إتباع استراتيجيات استبعادية. هذا الاختيار ، مع ذلك ، مشروط من جانب استراتيجية التنمية المتبع بها ، وإستراتيجيات التنمية الاشتراكية تقلل الحوافز لتمكين المنظمات غير الحكومية.
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Notes
Suharto’s regime escapes easy classification as a personalistic regime. As I will show in the case study, it has elements of a military dictatorship but more importantly of a single part state. These variations in the degree of elite cohesion, as will be shown, have influenced NGO policy under Suharto.
Information on de-registered NGOs is not readily available. Reportedly, many of these NGOs are fly-by-night NGOs that exist primarily to raise funds for their operators. Several advocacy NGOs, however, such as the China Development Brief, have been shut down.
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Heurlin, C. Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO–State Relations Under Dictatorship. Voluntas 21, 220–239 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9103-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9103-2