nach oben

The Review of International Organizations

Erschienen in:

01.09.2009

How U.S. decision-makers assessed their control of multilateral organizations, 1957–1982

verfasst von: Timothy J. McKeown

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 3/2009

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Although quantitative studies have identified relationships between the interests of powerful, wealthy states and the lending patterns of international financial institutions, they do not illuminate influence processes that give rise to these patterns. Three closely held internal assessments by the U.S. government of its influence over decisions in various international organizations are now declassified; they provide information about internal processes unlikely to be obtained through interviews of current officials or observation of public behavior. Their findings overlap to some degree academic research on this phenomenon, but also reveal hitherto unsuspected facets of U.S. diplomacy as well as candid internal assessments of U.S. successes and failures.

Vorheriger Artikel Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly

Nächster Artikel The International Energy Agency after 35 years: Reform needs and institutional adaptability

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Randall W. Stone, Informal governance: International organizations and the limits of U.S. power. Paper presented to Duke University Center for International Studies seminar on global governance and democracy, 2 October 2008, 23.

Although learning can be modeled rationalistically (as, for example, in approaches that build upon Bayes’ Rule), other theories and their supporting empirical findings are at least as compelling. “Many of the same cognitive limits that constrain rationality also constrain learning” (Levinthal and March 1993: 96).

United States Bureau of the Budget, Controllability of Multilateral Organization Activities, A study by the Bureau of the Budget staff (Jim Fowler), 1/15/57, Harry S Truman Library, John Ohly Papers, Box 97, Channels & Sources—General.

Walt Rostow, A New Legislative Structure for Foreign Aid, John F. Kennedy Library, 31 January 1961, National Security Files, Box 325, W Rostow, Foreign Aid II.

Sprinkel to Regan, 12 March 1981; Consultation draft (16 September) prepared by Treasury [prior draft circulated to State, AID and OMB on 20 August 1981]. Library of Congress, Donald Regan papers, Box 157, folder 9.

The 35 cases were selected from a larger pool of 70 that included cases where U.S. objectives were not a high priority.

The organizations were WHO, FAO, IBRD, UNTA, UNRRA for Palestine Refugees, Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration, UN Refugee Emergency Fund, and NATO.

Unless specifically identified otherwise, all quotations in this section are from the 1957 Bureau of the Budget study.

Treasury consultation draft. The table was prepared as follows: “The individual windows of the MDBs are … compared in terms of their relative performance against each other in meeting these objectives. For this purpose, various numerical measures were used, to some extent chosen arbitrarily to indicate several kinds of impact. The results of this comparison … must therefore be treated with a large measure of caution.”

Consultative draft, 58. The text reads “inherit,” but “inherent” was probably intended.

Consultative draft, 59.

Ibid.

Ibid., 52.

At least one U.S. decision-maker saw it this way. Eric Johnston to Harold E Stassen, 19 June 1953, U.S. National Archives, Record Group 469, Office of the Director, Subject Files, Box 21, Finance—Investments.

I have found only one clear-cut instance in which a U.S. official sought to use an international organization as a venue for inculcating foreign delegates with appropriate views: the attempt of General George Marshall during World War II to use ongoing meetings between U.S. and Latin American military officers in Inter-American defense programs to emphasize social activities involving Latin American military officers in order to reduce tensions over the failure of the U.S. to deliver military hardware requested by these allies and to “educate the Latins quietly on the realities of U.S. production” (Child 1980, 42).

Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(1), 3–32.CrossRef

Andersen, T. B., Harr, T., & Tarp, F. (2006). On U.S. politics and IMF lending. European Economic Review, 50(7), 1843–1862.CrossRef

Babb, S. (2003). The IMF in sociological perspective: A tale of organizational slippage. Studies in Comparative International Development, 38(2), 3–27.CrossRef

Babb, S. (2007). Embeddedness, inflation, and international regimes: The IMF in the early postwar period. American Journal of Sociology, 113(1), 128–164.

Barro, R. J., & Lee, J.-W. (2005). IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects? Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1245–1269.CrossRef

Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bearce, D. H., & Bondanella, S. (2007). Intergovernmental organizations, socialization, and member-state interest convergence. International Organization, 61(4), 703–733.CrossRef

Brysk, A. (1995). “Hearts and minds”—Bringing symbolic politics back in. Polity, 27(4), 559–585.CrossRef

Checkel, J. T. (1998). Review: The constructivist turn in international relations theory. World Politics, 50(2), 324–348.

Checkel, J. T. (2001). Why comply? Social learning and European identity change. International Organization, 55(3), 553–588.CrossRef

Child, J. (1980). Unequal alliance: The inter-American military system, 1938–1978. Boulder, CO.: Westview.

Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A garbage can model of organizational choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1–25.CrossRef

Cox, R. W., & Jacobson, H. K. (1973). The anatomy of influence: Decision making in international organization. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.

Crawford, N. (2002). Argument and change in world politics: Ethics, decolonization, and humanitarian intervention. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

DiBacco, T. V. (1965). Return to dollar diplomacy? American business reaction to the Eisenhower foreign aid program, 1953–1961. Ph. D. diss., History, The American University.

Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. (2004). The causes and consequences of IMF conditionality. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 40(3), 26–54.

Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2007). Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of U.S. interests on international monetary fund conditions. Journal of Law & Economics, 50(1), 105–124.CrossRef

Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2008). Does U.S. aid buy UN General Assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis. Public Choice, 136(1–2), 139–164.CrossRef

Etzioni, A. (1965). Organizational control structures. In J. G. March (Ed.), Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally, 650–677.

Finnemore, M. (1993). International organizations as teachers of norms—The united nations educational scientific and cultural organization and science policy. International Organization, 47(4), 565–597.CrossRef

Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917.CrossRef

Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). Taking stock: The constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 391–416.CrossRef

Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2006). World Bank independence: A model and statistical analysis of U.S. influence. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 224–240.CrossRef

Foot, R., MacFarlane, S. N., & Mastanduno, M. (2003). Introduction. In R. Foot, S. N. MacFarlane & M. Mastanduno (Eds.), U.S. hegemony and international organizations: The United States and multilateral institutions. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.

Gould, E. R. (2003). Money talks: Supplementary financiers and International Monetary Fund conditionality. International Organization, 57(3), 551–586.CrossRef

Gould, E. R. (2006). Money talks: The International Monetary Fund, conditionality and supplementary financiers. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Griesdorf, M. J. (2008). Norms as a rhetorical competition: Soviet-American confrontations over Cuba, 1970–85. Cold War History, 8(3), 299–326.CrossRef

Hooghe, L. (2005). Several roads lead to international norms, but few via international socialization: A case study of the European Commission. International Organization, 59(4), 861–898.CrossRef

Johnston, A. I. (2001). Treating, international institutions as social environments. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4), 487–515.CrossRef

Kapur, D., Lewis, J. P., & Webb, R. (1997). The World Bank: Its first half century. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (1990). The United States and multilateral institutions: Patterns of changing instrumentality and influence. In M. P. Karns & K. A. Mingst (Eds.), The United States and multilateral institutions: A framework for analysis. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Kaufman, B. I. (1982). Trade and aid: Eisenhower’s foreign economic policy, 1953–1961. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony. Boston: Little, Brown.

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1974). Transgovernmental relations and international organizations. World Politics, 27(1), 39–62.CrossRef

Kilby, C. (2006). Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank. Review of International Organization, 1, 173–195.CrossRef

Klotz, A. (1995). Norms in international politics: The struggle against apartheid. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Krebs, R. R., & Jackson, P. T. (2007). Twisting tongues and twisting arms: The power of political rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations, 13, 36–67.CrossRef

Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy, 114(5), 905–930.CrossRef

Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 95–112.CrossRef

Lohmann, L., et al. (2006). Carbon trading: A critical conversation on climate change, privatisation and power. Development dialogue September, no.48. http://www.dhf.uu.se. Accessed on 23 April 2007.

Lyne, M. M., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. N. Nielson & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and agency in international organizations. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

McKeown, T. J. (2009). The big influence of big allies: Transgovernmental relations as a tool of statecraft. In H. V. Milner & A. Moravcsik (Eds.), Power, interdependence, and nonstate actors in world politics (pp. 204–222). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. The American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363.CrossRef

Milner, H. V. (2006). Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. N. Nielson & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and agency in international organizations. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Momani, B. (2005). Recruiting and diversifying IMF technocrats. Global Society, 19(2), 176–187.CrossRef

Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.

Pierson, P. (2007). The costs of marginalization—Qualitative methods in the study of American politics. Comparative Political Studies, 40(2), 145–169.CrossRef

Popielarz, P. A., & Neal, Z. P. (2007). The niche as a theoretical tool. Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 65–84.CrossRef

Putnam, R. D. (1989). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.CrossRef

Risse, T. (2000). “Let’s argue!”: Communicative action in world politics. International Organization, 54(1), 1–39.CrossRef

Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (1999). Power and Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge University Press.

Rodrik, D. (1996). Why is there multilateral lending? In M. Bruno & B. Pleskovic (Eds.), Annual World Bank conference on development economics, 1995. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

Rostow, W. (1985). Eisenhower, Kennedy, and foreign aid. Austin, TX.

Selznick, P. (1949). TVA and the grass roots: A study in the sociology of formal organization. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Snidal, D. (2008). Commentary on the special issue. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(2), 326–333.CrossRef

Snyder, R. C., Bruck, H. W., & Sapin, B. (1954). Decision-making as an approach to the study of international politics. Princeton: Foreign Policy Analysis Project, Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton University.

Staw, B. M., & Szwajkowski, E. (1975). The scarcity-munificence component of organizational environments and the commission of illegal acts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 20(3), 345–354.CrossRef

Steinberg, R. H. (2002). In the shadow of law or power? Consensus-based bargaining and outcomes in the GATT/WTO. International Organization, 56(2), 339–374.CrossRef

Stone, R. W. (2002). Lending credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the post-communist transition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stone, R. W. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending to Africa. American Political Science Review, 98(4), 577–591.CrossRef

Stone, R. W. (2008). The scope of IMF conditionality. International Organization, 62(4), 589–620.CrossRef

Swedberg, R. (1986). The doctrine of economic neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank. Journal of Peace Research, 23(4), 377–390.CrossRef

Thacker, S. C. (1999). The high politics of IMF lending. World Politics, 52(1), 38–75.

Thompson, A. (2009). Rational design in motion: Uncertaintyand flexibility in the global climate regime. European Journal of International Relations.

United States Department of the Treasury. (1982). United States participation in the multilateral development banks in the 1980s. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. February.

Voeten, E. (2001). Outside options and the logic of Security Council action. American Political Science Review, 95(4), 845–858.

Voeten, E. (2004). Resisting the lonely superpower: Responses of states in the United Nations to U.S. dominance. Journal of Politics, 66(3), 729–754.

Vreeland, J. R. (2002). The effect of IMF programs on labor. World Development, 30(1), 121–139.CrossRef

Vreeland, J. R. (2003). Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected cases. International Political Science Review, 24(3), 321–343.CrossRef

White, J. (1967). Pledged to development: A study of international consortia and the strategy of aid. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Wolpin, M. D. (1972). Military Aid and counterrevolution in the third world. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.

Woods, N. (2003). The United States and the international financial institutions: Power and influence within the World Bank and the IMF. In R. Foot, S. N. MacFarlane & M. Mastanduno (Eds.), US Hegemony and International Organisations. New York: Oxford University Press.

Woods, N. (2004). Groupthink: The IMF, the World Bank and decision making regarding the 1994 Mexican crisis. In B. Reinalda & B. Verbeek (Eds.), Decision making within international organizations. London: Routledge.

Woods, N. (2006). The Globalizers—The IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Titel: How U.S. decision-makers assessed their control of multilateral organizations, 1957–1982
verfasst von: Timothy J. McKeown
Publikationsdatum: 01.09.2009
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 3/2009
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9059-4

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3/2009

The International Energy Agency after 35 years: Reform needs and institutional adaptability

Open economy politics: A critical review

Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly

Tim Stephens. 2009. International Courts and Environmental Protection (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)

Catherine Weaver. 2008. Hypocrisy trap: The World Bank and the poverty of reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press)