Skip to main content
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations 3/2012

01.09.2012

How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts

verfasst von: Julia Gray, Jonathan B. Slapin

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 3/2012

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Limited data on regional and preferential trade agreements prevent social scientists from testing some of the international cooperation literature’s most important claims. Expert surveys—a technique that is widely used in the field of comparative politics but thus far underutilized in international relations—allow us to capture many aspects of trade agreements for which data would otherwise be unavailable. They also provide us with a means of comparing agreements across regions and issue areas. We present a new dataset of expert opinion on the world’s regional trade organizations. Our survey covers 24 dimensions of 40 different regional agreements—including the perceived effectiveness of trade liberalization, the degree to which dispute settlement mechanisms are easy to use, and the political and international influence of the agreement. Bayesian factor analysis allows us to extract a principal dimension of effectiveness.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
This is the well known problem of selection bias; see Heckman (1976), Vreeland (2003) and von Stein (2005) for applications.
 
2
“SADC countries fail to meet customs union, currency targets,” PANA, 4 September 2009.
 
3
Author interview, Buenos Aires, July 2009.
 
4
“Mercosur Limps Slowly Along,” Mario Osava, Interpress Service, 3 January 2008.
 
5
Many other researchers have embarked on similar efforts with intergovernmental organizations more generally; see Koremenos ongoing Boehmer et al. (2004), Volgy et al. (2008), Bondanella (2009).
 
6
The descriptive statistics for salience are similar; we list all summary statistics in an Online Appendix available at this journal’s webpage.
 
7
The Online Appendix contains the correlation matrix.
 
8
This does assume that missing observations are ignorable. In other words, they are missing at random. Conditional upon the model, all observations are equally likely to be missing. Of course, this may be a strong assumption. An alternative approach would be to model the patterns of missingness and run a multiple imputation model prior to running the factor analysis.
 
9
We should note that the relatively small number of observations make more complicated procedures, such as hierarchical item-response models, infeasible. Moreover, we have found that running models with more dimensions tends to ask too much of the data.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Alter, K., Helfer, L., & Guerzovich, M. F. (2009). Islands of effective international adjudication: Constructing an intellectual property rule of law in the Andean community. American Journal of International Law, 103(1), 1–47.CrossRef Alter, K., Helfer, L., & Guerzovich, M. F. (2009). Islands of effective international adjudication: Constructing an intellectual property rule of law in the Andean community. American Journal of International Law, 103(1), 1–47.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Anderson, S. P., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Nontariff barriers and trade liberalization. Economic Inquiry, 41(1), 80–97.CrossRef Anderson, S. P., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Nontariff barriers and trade liberalization. Economic Inquiry, 41(1), 80–97.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Baccini, L., & Dür, A. (2012). The new regionalism and policy interdependence. British Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 57–79.CrossRef Baccini, L., & Dür, A. (2012). The new regionalism and policy interdependence. British Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 57–79.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Baccini, L., Duer, A., Elsig, M., & Milewicz, K. (2011). The design of preferential trade agreements. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report: Preferential trade agreements and the WTO: A new era (in press). Baccini, L., Duer, A., Elsig, M., & Milewicz, K. (2011). The design of preferential trade agreements. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report: Preferential trade agreements and the WTO: A new era (in press).
Zurück zum Zitat Balassa, B. (1961). The theory of economic integration. Homewood: Irwin. Balassa, B. (1961). The theory of economic integration. Homewood: Irwin.
Zurück zum Zitat Bearce, D. H., & Omori, S. (2005). How do commercial institutions promote peace? Journal of Peace Research, 42(6), 659–678.CrossRef Bearce, D. H., & Omori, S. (2005). How do commercial institutions promote peace? Journal of Peace Research, 42(6), 659–678.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge. Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge.
Zurück zum Zitat Bhagwati, J., Greenaway, D., & Panagariya, A. (1998). Trading preferentially: Theory and policy. The Economic Journal, 108(449), 1128–1148.CrossRef Bhagwati, J., Greenaway, D., & Panagariya, A. (1998). Trading preferentially: Theory and policy. The Economic Journal, 108(449), 1128–1148.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., & Nordstrom, T. (2004). Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? World Politics, 57(1), 1–38.CrossRef Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., & Nordstrom, T. (2004). Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? World Politics, 57(1), 1–38.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bondanella, S. (2009). Intergovernmental organizations and the determinants of member state interest convergence. PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh. Bondanella, S. (2009). Intergovernmental organizations and the determinants of member state interest convergence. PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh.
Zurück zum Zitat Busch, M., & Pelc, K. (2010). The politics of judicial economy at the World Trade Organization. International Organization, 64(2), 257–280.CrossRef Busch, M., & Pelc, K. (2010). The politics of judicial economy at the World Trade Organization. International Organization, 64(2), 257–280.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Busch, M. L., Reinhardt, E., & Schaffer, G. (2009). Does legal capacity matter? A survey of WTO members. World Trade Review, 8(4), 559–577.CrossRef Busch, M. L., Reinhardt, E., & Schaffer, G. (2009). Does legal capacity matter? A survey of WTO members. World Trade Review, 8(4), 559–577.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chase, K. A. (2003). Economic interests and regional trading arrangements: The case of NAFTA. International Organization, 57(1), 137–174.CrossRef Chase, K. A. (2003). Economic interests and regional trading arrangements: The case of NAFTA. International Organization, 57(1), 137–174.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Clinton, J., Jackman, S., & Rivers, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of roll call data. American Political Science Review, 98(2), 355–70.CrossRef Clinton, J., Jackman, S., & Rivers, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of roll call data. American Political Science Review, 98(2), 355–70.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Drezner, D. (1999). The sanctions paradox: Economic statecraft and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Drezner, D. (1999). The sanctions paradox: Economic statecraft and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Elsig, M. (2010). The World Trade Organization at work: Performance in a member-driven milieu. Review of International Organizations, 5(3), 345–363.CrossRef Elsig, M. (2010). The World Trade Organization at work: Performance in a member-driven milieu. Review of International Organizations, 5(3), 345–363.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S., & Rubin, D. B. (2004). Bayesian data analysis. New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC. Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S., & Rubin, D. B. (2004). Bayesian data analysis. New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Zurück zum Zitat Goldstein, J., & Martin, L. (2000). Legalization, trade liberalization, and domestic politics: A cautionary note. International Organization, 51(3), 603–632.CrossRef Goldstein, J., & Martin, L. (2000). Legalization, trade liberalization, and domestic politics: A cautionary note. International Organization, 51(3), 603–632.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Grigorescu, A. (2010). The spread of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms across intergovernmental organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 54(3), 643–667.CrossRef Grigorescu, A. (2010). The spread of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms across intergovernmental organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 54(3), 643–667.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, A. (1995). The politics of free-trade agreements. American Economic Review, 85(4), 667–690. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, A. (1995). The politics of free-trade agreements. American Economic Review, 85(4), 667–690.
Zurück zum Zitat Gutner, T., & Thompson, A. (2010). The politics of IO performance: A framework. Review of International Organizations, 3(5), 227–248. Gutner, T., & Thompson, A. (2010). The politics of IO performance: A framework. Review of International Organizations, 3(5), 227–248.
Zurück zum Zitat Haftel, Y. Z. (2007). Designing for peace: Regional integration arrangements, institutional variation and militarized interstate disputes. International Organization, 61(1), 217–237.CrossRef Haftel, Y. Z. (2007). Designing for peace: Regional integration arrangements, institutional variation and militarized interstate disputes. International Organization, 61(1), 217–237.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Haftel, Y. Z. (in press). Regional economic institutions and conflict mitigation: Design, implementation, and the promise of peace. University of Michigan Press. Haftel, Y. Z. (in press). Regional economic institutions and conflict mitigation: Design, implementation, and the promise of peace. University of Michigan Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Heckman, J. (1976). The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5(4), 475–492. Heckman, J. (1976). The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5(4), 475–492.
Zurück zum Zitat Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. (2002). Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? Comparative Political Studies, 35, 965–989.CrossRef Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. (2002). Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? Comparative Political Studies, 35, 965–989.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kahler, M., Burton, E. H., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network analysis for international relations. International Organization, 63, 559–592.CrossRef Kahler, M., Burton, E. H., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network analysis for international relations. International Organization, 63, 559–592.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Keohane, R. O., Moravcsik, A., & Slaughter, A.-M. (2000). Legalized dispute resolution: Interstate and transnational. International Organization, 54(3), 457–488.CrossRef Keohane, R. O., Moravcsik, A., & Slaughter, A.-M. (2000). Legalized dispute resolution: Interstate and transnational. International Organization, 54(3), 457–488.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kim, M. (2010). Bringing trade liberalization back into trade agreements: Explaining the variation in U.S. preferential trade agreements. Working paper. Kim, M. (2010). Bringing trade liberalization back into trade agreements: Explaining the variation in U.S. preferential trade agreements. Working paper.
Zurück zum Zitat Kim, S. Y., & Hicks, R. (2008). Commitment, signaling, or flexibility? The effectiveness of PTAs in the Asia-Pacific. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Politcal Economy Society, University of Pennsylvania, Philadephia, PA, 12 November 2008. Kim, S. Y., & Hicks, R. (2008). Commitment, signaling, or flexibility? The effectiveness of PTAs in the Asia-Pacific. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Politcal Economy Society, University of Pennsylvania, Philadephia, PA, 12 November 2008.
Zurück zum Zitat King, G. (2001). Proper nouns and methodological propriety: Pooling dyads in international relations data. International Organization, 55(2), 497–507.CrossRef King, G. (2001). Proper nouns and methodological propriety: Pooling dyads in international relations data. International Organization, 55(2), 497–507.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. International Organization, 55(4), 761–700.CrossRef Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. International Organization, 55(4), 761–700.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kratochwil, F., & Ruggie, J. G. (1986). A state of the art on an art of the state. International Organization, 40, 753–775.CrossRef Kratochwil, F., & Ruggie, J. G. (1986). A state of the art on an art of the state. International Organization, 40, 753–775.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Laver, M. (1998). Party policy in Britain 1997: Results from an expert survey. Political Studies, 46(2), 336–347.CrossRef Laver, M. (1998). Party policy in Britain 1997: Results from an expert survey. Political Studies, 46(2), 336–347.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mansfield, E. D., & Busch, M. L. (1995). The political economy of nontariff barriers: A cross-national analysis. International Organization, 49(4), 723–749.CrossRef Mansfield, E. D., & Busch, M. L. (1995). The political economy of nontariff barriers: A cross-national analysis. International Organization, 49(4), 723–749.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mansfield, E. D., & Milner, H. V. (1999). The new wave of regionalism. International Organization, 53(3), 589–627.CrossRef Mansfield, E. D., & Milner, H. V. (1999). The new wave of regionalism. International Organization, 53(3), 589–627.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2008). Democracy, veto players and the depth of regional integration. The World Economy, 31(1), 67–96.CrossRef Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2008). Democracy, veto players and the depth of regional integration. The World Economy, 31(1), 67–96.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mansfield, E. D., & Reinhardt, E. (2008). International institutions and the volatility of international trade. International Organization, 62(4), 621–652.CrossRef Mansfield, E. D., & Reinhardt, E. (2008). International institutions and the volatility of international trade. International Organization, 62(4), 621–652.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Steenbergen, M. R., & Bakker, R. (2007). Crossvalidating data on party positioning on European integration. Electoral Studies, 26(1), 23–38.CrossRef Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Steenbergen, M. R., & Bakker, R. (2007). Crossvalidating data on party positioning on European integration. Electoral Studies, 26(1), 23–38.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mastenbroek, E. (2005). EU compliance: Still a ‘black hole’? Journal of European Public Policy, 12(6), 103–1120.CrossRef Mastenbroek, E. (2005). EU compliance: Still a ‘black hole’? Journal of European Public Policy, 12(6), 103–1120.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat McCall Smith, J. (2000). The politics of dispute settlement design: Explaining legalism in regional trade pacts. International Organization, 54(1), 137–180.CrossRef McCall Smith, J. (2000). The politics of dispute settlement design: Explaining legalism in regional trade pacts. International Organization, 54(1), 137–180.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Milner, H., & Büthe, T. (2008). The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: Increasing FDI through international trade agreements. American Journal of Political Science, 52(4), 741–762.CrossRef Milner, H., & Büthe, T. (2008). The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: Increasing FDI through international trade agreements. American Journal of Political Science, 52(4), 741–762.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (2005). Rule of three, let it be? When more really is better. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22, 293–310.CrossRef Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (2005). Rule of three, let it be? When more really is better. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22, 293–310.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Pomfret, R. (2007). Is regionalism an increasing feature of the world econonmy? The World Economy, 30(6), 923–947.CrossRef Pomfret, R. (2007). Is regionalism an increasing feature of the world econonmy? The World Economy, 30(6), 923–947.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Quinn, K. M. (2004). Bayesian factor analysis for mixed ordinal and continuous responses. Political Analysis, 12(4), 338–353.CrossRef Quinn, K. M. (2004). Bayesian factor analysis for mixed ordinal and continuous responses. Political Analysis, 12(4), 338–353.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Simmons, B. (2000a). International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review, 94(4), 819–835.CrossRef Simmons, B. (2000a). International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review, 94(4), 819–835.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Simmons, B. (2000b). The legalization of international monetary affairs. International Organization, 54(3), 573–602.CrossRef Simmons, B. (2000b). The legalization of international monetary affairs. International Organization, 54(3), 573–602.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Steenbergen, M. R., & Marks, G. (2007). Evaluating expert surveys. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 347–366.CrossRef Steenbergen, M. R., & Marks, G. (2007). Evaluating expert surveys. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 347–366.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. International Organization, 61(4), 821–840.CrossRef Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. International Organization, 61(4), 821–840.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Treier, S., & Jackman, S. (2008). Democracy as a latent variable. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 201–217.CrossRef Treier, S., & Jackman, S. (2008). Democracy as a latent variable. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 201–217.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Vaubel, R., Dreher, A., & Soylu, U. (2007). Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis. Public Choice, 133, 275–295.CrossRef Vaubel, R., Dreher, A., & Soylu, U. (2007). Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis. Public Choice, 133, 275–295.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Volgy, T. J., Grant, K. A., Fausett, E., & Rodgers, S. (2008). Identifying formal intergovernmental organizations. Journal of Peace Research, 45(6), 837–850.CrossRef Volgy, T. J., Grant, K. A., Fausett, E., & Rodgers, S. (2008). Identifying formal intergovernmental organizations. Journal of Peace Research, 45(6), 837–850.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat von Stein, J. (2005). Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. American Political Science Review, 99, 611–622. von Stein, J. (2005). Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. American Political Science Review, 99, 611–622.
Zurück zum Zitat Vreeland, J. R. (2003). The IMF and economic development. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Vreeland, J. R. (2003). The IMF and economic development. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Whalley, J. (2008). Recent regional agreements: Why so many, why so much variance in form, why coming so fast, and where are they headed? World Economy, 31(4), 517–532.CrossRef Whalley, J. (2008). Recent regional agreements: Why so many, why so much variance in form, why coming so fast, and where are they headed? World Economy, 31(4), 517–532.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Whitefield, S., Vachudova, M. A., Steenbergen, M. R., Rohrschneider, R., Marks, G., Loveless, M. P., et al. (2007). Do expert surveys produce consistent estimates of party stances on European integration? Comparing expert surveys in the difficult case of Central and Eastern Europe. Electoral Studies, 26, 50–61.CrossRef Whitefield, S., Vachudova, M. A., Steenbergen, M. R., Rohrschneider, R., Marks, G., Loveless, M. P., et al. (2007). Do expert surveys produce consistent estimates of party stances on European integration? Comparing expert surveys in the difficult case of Central and Eastern Europe. Electoral Studies, 26, 50–61.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts
verfasst von
Julia Gray
Jonathan B. Slapin
Publikationsdatum
01.09.2012
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 3/2012
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9138-1

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3/2012

The Review of International Organizations 3/2012 Zur Ausgabe