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The Review of International Organizations

Erschienen in:

09.03.2019

Regional cooperation through the lenses of states: Why do states nurture regional integration?

verfasst von: Diana Panke

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 2/2020

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Abstract

Regional organizations (ROs) have been created across the globe. In the period between 1945 and 2015, there is a total of 76 ROs, which on average are equipped with competencies in around 11 different policy areas. There are two trends. First, both the number of ROs states have joined increases sharply over time as do the number of policy competencies states delegate to ROs. Second, not all states are equally inclined to nurture regional integration. To shed light on these patterns, this paper adopts a state-centered perspective. Based on rationalist international relations and regional cooperation theories, it develops hypotheses on state motives to join ROs and to delegate policy competencies to them. The analysis reveals several interesting insights: First, powerful states are proponents for regional integration. They join ROs, as they can be used as arenas or means to further national interests. Second, trade is also an important incentive. The stronger the trade interests of states are, the more ROs they become members of and the more policy competencies they equip their ROs with. Third, authoritarian states are less inclined to nurture regional integration and join ROs, since they might place limitations on governmental leeway in the future.

Vorheriger Artikel The more things change, the more they stay the same: Developing countries’ unity at the nexus of trade and environmental policy

Nächster Artikel Do citizens evaluate international cooperation based on information about procedural and outcome quality?

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Thus ROs are a sub-group of IOs, and are not identical with preferential trade agreements per se, whilst regional trade agreements, such as EFTA or NAFTA, are also ROs (c.f. Dür et al. 2014).

These are the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

Prominent earlier exceptions include Nye (1965), Haas (1970), Schmitter (1970).

Some ROs are legal predecessors and successors (SADCC and SADC) and others formally coexist as separate legal entities (EC, ECC, EURATOM, EU). We treat all ROs that have common institutions, membership and a common aquis comunautaire as one entity (for instance, the EU in our database EU encompasses the EEC, EC, ECSC, EURATOM etc.). Similarly, we treat all predecessors/successors as one RO (e.g. SADCC and SADC are one RO, OAU and AU are one RO)

Internal and external competencies are coded separately, as it makes a substantive difference whether an RO has internal and/or external policy competencies in a specific policy area. If a RO has, for instance, the internal competence for humanitarian crisis management, this allows the RO to become active vis-à-vis one or several of its member states, while the external competence for humanitarian crisis management allows the RO to become active vis-à-vis non-member states, typically states in its neighborhood or the near abroad. Empirically, it is not the case that all ROs equipped with a specific internal competence are also equipped with the corresponding external competence (or vice-versa).

For instance, terms such as external, foreign, international, with international organizations, with regional organizations, global, third states, other states, with regimes, specific IOs (UN etc.), alien, exogenous, overseas, extraneous, world, world-wide, intercontinental, universal, or transcontinental in combination with a policy competency is indicative of an external policy competency. Conversely, phrases including between member states /members, within, internal, local, member states, domestic, resident, native, national, endogenous, inland, home, the contracting parties, or intraregional signify an internal policy competency. Ambiguous terms, such as in the region, abroad, transnational, or multinational cannot be automatically used as indicators for either internal or external policy competencies. Our coding guide, therefore, requested the coders to check the context in which the competency was mentioned. For instance, if an RO treaty mentions regional cooperation in the realm of economy, it would be coded as internal if the full article or paragraph alludes to the RO member states, while it would be coded as external if the full article or paragraph alludes to the broader geographic region, such as Oceania or the African continent.

The policy areas Trade and Economy, Environment, Good Governance, Security and Defense as well as Technology, Infrastructure and Science are broad in character and capture the ability of the ROs to act in these fields through 17 specific competencies each. Compared to that the policy fields Agriculture, Finance, Health, and Migration are less broad and entail 14 specific competencies respectively. In between are the areas of Development (15) and Energy policy (16 specific competencies).

Each specific competency consists of several logically related buzzwords, linguistic, culturally sensitive synonyms, and alternative spellings, in English, French, Spanish and Russian. For instance, the specific competency “arms” in the policy area Security and Defense entails the buzzwords “arms”, “firearms” and “weapons”; in the policy field Good Governance the specific competency “fundamental rights” consists of the buzzwords “fundamental rights” and “basic rights”, which describe identical or very similar concepts, but are usually used in different contexts. Within the policy area Trade and Economy one specific competency is “trade,” which entails the buzzwords “trade” and “commerce”; finally, the specific competency “defense” includes the spellings “defense” and “defence.”

The full list of specific policy competencies in each of the 11 policy fields is available upon request.

More details on the process of coding are available upon request.

France and the United Kingdom were each in five ROs, while Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States were a member of four ROs.

The empirical variation between ROs is considerable. Some ROs do not have any policy competencies when they are created. For instance, the founding treaty of the CE from 1959 only specifies its institutional design and membership rules, and policy competencies are only introduced in the subsequent treaty from 2011. ROs with a rather narrow policy scope in 2015 include the MRU (2), CACM (2), LCBC (4) or NATO (4). ROs with broad policy scopes include the EU (21), APEC (20), the EAEU (20), SICA (18), or PIF (18); c.f. Table 3 in the appendix.

France has now delegated a combined total of 47 policy areas to all of its ROs. However, in 1995, the Scandinavian states (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) turn into the countries that have equipped their ROs with the highest number of policy areas (79, 79, and 78 respectively), followed by France (71) and Germany (70).

By 2005, several states have equipped their ROs with more than 80 policy competencies, for instance Canada (98), Denmark (94 competencies), Sweden and Finland (90 areas in all of their respective ROs), or the U.S. (87).

These are Peru (100), Kenya (104), Uzbekistan (107), Tajikistan (112), Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan (124 each), preceded only by Russia (149). While these countries turned into ‘champions of regional cooperation’ in the last ten years of observation, a much longer earlier period is characterized by different champignons of regional cooperation: namely powerful, democratic countries, with significant trade exposure (e.g. Germany, France, Canada, the U.S., the UK).

BATNA is the abbreviation of “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement”.

The findings remain robust if the time lag is increased to 5 years, see appendix.

Furthermore in a study of 28 regional economic organizations (1980s until late 2000s) Haftel also finds a positive link between trade and (specific) RO competencies, arguing that under certain conditions “higher levels of regional trade are associated with greater regional institutionalization and economic scope”(Haftel 2013).

The number of ROs states join increases sharply over time, as do the number of policy competencies states delegate to ROs. While the average number of ROs a state was a member of is 0.04 in 1945, this figure has increased incrementally to 1.43 in 1975 and rises sharply after the mid 1990ies to an average of 4.61 RO memberships per state in 2015. Hence, multiple RO memberships became the norm, and not the exception. RO policy scopes have increased over time as well. In 1945 there were two ROs, which on average had competencies in 6.5 policy areas, in 1955 the number of ROs rose to eleven and their average policy scope was 4.9. Ten years later, states created a total of 20 ROs, which covered 5.4 policy areas on average. In 1975, the average RO had a policy scope of 6.4 and of 7.3 in 1985, in which a total of 33 ROs were present. In 1995, states had equipped the 50 ROs with competencies in 8.7 policy areas, which turned into 60 ROs with an average policy scope of 10.40 in 2005 and into 11.3 different policy areas for an average RO in 2015, in which a total of 71 ROs existed

For instance, in terms of RO memberships, European states were at the forefront from the 1950ies onwards, and only after 2005 did Russia become the state with the most RO memberships. By 2015, regionalism took off in the Eurasian region, as Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan both joined 10 ROs, followed by Azerbaijan and Tajikistan with 9 RO memberships each, and Uzbekistan with 8 RO memberships. Over time, multiple RO membership became widespread, and by 2015 only one country had joined not more than one RO (the Maldives), and only three had not joined an RO at all (Israel, North Korea, Timor-Leste). In the same year, 20 countries held two RO memberships, 24 states had three, 45 states were members of four ROs, 38 countries held five RO memberships, 32 were in six ROs, 15 states had seven RO memberships, while seven countries were members of eight ROs, five states were in nine, two in ten, and one state even held eleven RO memberships.

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Titel: Regional cooperation through the lenses of states: Why do states nurture regional integration?
verfasst von: Diana Panke
Publikationsdatum: 09.03.2019
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 2/2020
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09348-y

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