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Journal of Business Economics

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01.07.2013 | Original Paper

Dynamic pricing with strategic customers

verfasst von: Jochen Gönsch, Robert Klein, Michael Neugebauer, Claudius Steinhardt

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Economics | Ausgabe 5/2013

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Abstract

This paper provides an overview of the literature on dynamic pricing with strategic customers. In the past, research on dynamic pricing was mostly concerned with optimally pricing products over time in a market with myopic customers. In recent years, the consideration of strategic customers, who can delay a purchase to take advantage of a future discount, has dramatically increased. This paper’s main contribution is the development of a comprehensive classification scheme to structure the field of research and, based upon this, a systematic overview of all relevant papers. We then present in detail the various aspects considered in the literature together with their motivation from industry and state the major findings of the most relevant papers. Further attention is given to important problem extensions proposed in the literature that have been considered in only a few papers and are usually motivated by specific practical applications. Finally, promising directions for future research are indicated.

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Journal of Business Economics

From January 2013, the Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (ZfB) is published in English under the title Journal of Business Economics (JBE). The Journal of Business Economics (JBE) aims at encouraging theoretical and applied research in the field of business economics and business administration, promoting the exchange of ideas between science and practice.

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Even as recently as 30 years ago there were only a few authors who dealt with the issue of intertemporal price discrimination, which is now regarded as the basis of dynamic pricing (e.g. Stokey 1979, Landsberger and Meilijson 1985, and Wilson 1988).

See the following publications (sorted according to increasing losses of profit): Levin et al. (2009): 7 %, Zhang and Cooper (2008): 11 %, Mersereau and Zhang (2012): 11 %, Aviv and Pazgal (2008): 20 %, Levin et al. (2010): 20 %, Liu and van Ryzin (2008): 20 %, Nair (2007): 30 %, Besanko and Winston (1990): 50 %, and Cho et al. (2009): no details.

Alongside the definition of the term “dynamic pricing” presented as such, there are also a variety of other definitions contained in publications with different objectives and different demands (e.g. Gallego and van Ryzin 1994, p. 999, Kambil and Agrawal 2001, p. 16, Bitran and Caldentey 2003, p. 203, and Biller et al. 2005, p. 312). Dynamic pricing is also often understood to be a branch of revenue management. Reviews of the latter are provided, for example, by McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Tscheulin and Lindenmeier (2003), and Chiang et al. (2007). A comprehensive monograph is provided by Talluri and van Ryzin (2005).

Note that some authors call the strategic customers we investigate “forward-looking consumers” (e.g. Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Swinney 2011, and Li and Zhang 2013). One of the first papers dealing with dynamic pricing with strategic customers by Besanko and Winston (1990), which is titled “Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers”, does not use the term “strategic” at all.

While literature on auctions in general is out of our scope, we consider papers including both auctions and dynamic pricing, either by applying both sales formats simultaneously (e.g. Gallien and Gupta 2007) or comparing them (e.g. Elmaghraby et al. 2009).

See Chapter 7 (Su and Zhang 2009), Chapter 10 (Jerath et al. 2009), Chapter 12 (Aviv et al. 2009a), Chapter 13 (Aviv et al. 2009b), Chapter 14 (Cachon and Swinney 2009b), and Chapter 15 (Liu and van Ryzin 2009).

In a Nash equilibrium, each player believes that the other players will choose the equilibrium strategies, and in equilibrium all players have an incentive to do so. More precisely, no market participant has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its equilibrium decisions: Neither can the seller improve its profit nor can a consumer increase its individual consumer surplus. Each strategy of a risk neutral market participant is a best response to all other strategies in that equilibrium (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1991 and Myerson 1997).

Regarding this phenomenon, see also the seminal papers by Coase (1972) and Stokey (1981) as well as the follow up research from Bulow (1982), Conlisk et al. (1984), Gul et al. (1986), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), Sobel (1991), DeGraba (1995), and from von der Fehr and Kühn (1995).

This is also referred to as the “loss of early-adopter advantages” (e.g. Liu and Zhang 2012).

Another option is used by Su (2007), who uses waiting costs instead of a discount factor to reflect the fact that customers have to forego a product at a certain time when purchasing later on. Gallego et al. (2008) directly attribute a lower valuation to customers in the second period.

To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on problems where only the seller has a time preference.

Note that in Table 3, we consider only information on exogenous aspects. This is because the players usually have so-called beliefs about endogenous values that they do not know, such as the seller’s capacity choice (e.g. Liu and van Ryzin 2008) or future availability. The model is then developed describing the seller’s and the customers’ actions using these beliefs. Then, in a next step, the authors often focus on a rational expectations equilibrium (Muth 1961) that is dubbed a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by Yin et al. (2009) because the beliefs are rational in the sense that they are consistent with the actual outcome that materializes through the events that unfold based on having this particular belief. Moreover, in this equilibrium, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his equilibrium behaviour. Mak (2008) and Yin et al. (2009) do not follow this approach; we go into these papers when considering the relevant information aspect.

Note that Allon and Bassamboo (2011) is not included in our classification, as it is based on exogenous prices. However, the authors describe endogenous pricing as a potential model extension.

Exceptions are Gallego et al. (2008), Bansal and Maglaras (2009), and Borgs et al. (2011). In Borgs et al. (2011), customers need not care about this aspect because the seller announces prices upfront and has to choose prices such that the product does not sell out for any realization of demand. Similarly, the seller in Bansal and Maglaras (2009) communicates prices and availability rates upfront. In Gallego et al. (2008), customers directly base their considerations on a belief about the product’s future availability which is consistent in equilibrium.

See Sect. 4.6 for a discussion of some exceptions, that is, papers considering customers who do not know their individual valuations.

In this context, the problem settings studied by Villas-Boas (2004) and Chen and Zhang (2009) are special. Here, the seller recognizes customers that already bought in a previous period and therefore can, under some conditions, infer their individual valuation.

Analogously to market size, the seller’s and customers’ information on valuations is symmetric in most papers, with the exception of the studies mentioned in Footnote 14 where customers do not care about other customers’ behaviour and therefore ignore their valuations.

Note that there are very few exceptions, that is, some papers where the authors do not directly motivate their extension with specific practical evidence: for example, papers on risk preferences. However, one can easily think of real-world applications for which they are relevant.

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Titel: Dynamic pricing with strategic customers
verfasst von: Jochen Gönsch
Robert Klein
Michael Neugebauer
Claudius Steinhardt
Publikationsdatum: 01.07.2013
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Economics / Ausgabe 5/2013
Print ISSN: 0044-2372
Elektronische ISSN: 1861-8928
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0663-7

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