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A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions

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Abstract

Iterative Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions are auctions in which: bidders can express bids in successive rounds until a stopping rule is held; there are multiple units of each item; and bids are bundles of items. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a nonparametric method for measuring the relative efficiency of a set of homogeneous units. In this work, we present an algorithm for solving an iterative multi-unit combinatorial auction in which the auctioneer computes at each round a linear anonymous price for each item by using a DEA model and pushes bidders to express bids according to them. A computational study is carried out in order to check the performance of the proposed design.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centro de Investigación Operativa, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, Elche, Spain

    Juan Aparicio, Mercedes Landete, Juan Francisco Monge & Inmaculada Sirvent

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  1. Juan Aparicio
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  2. Mercedes Landete
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  3. Juan Francisco Monge
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  4. Inmaculada Sirvent
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Correspondence to Mercedes Landete.

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Aparicio, J., Landete, M., Monge, J.F. et al. A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions. TOP 16, 319–344 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0053-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0053-4

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