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A survey on the security of cyber-physical systems

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Abstract

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are integrations of computation, communication, control and physical processes. Typical examples where CPSs are deployed include smart grids, civil infrastructure, medical devices and manufacturing. Security is one of the most important issues that should be investigated in CPSs and hence has received much attention in recent years. This paper surveys recent results in this area and mainly focusses on three important categories: attack detection, attack design and secure estimation and control. We also discuss several future research directions including risk assessment, modeling of attacks and attacks design, counter-attack strategy and testbed and validation.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China

    Guangyu Wu, Jian Sun & Jie Chen

  2. Key Laboratory of Intelligent Control and Decision of Complex Systems, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China

    Guangyu Wu, Jian Sun & Jie Chen

Authors
  1. Guangyu Wu
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  2. Jian Sun
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  3. Jie Chen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jian Sun.

Additional information

This work was supported in part by the Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61321002, 61120106010, 61522303, U1509215), the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University (No. NCET-13-0045), and the Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project.

Guangyu WU received the B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees from Xi’an University of Technology in 2010 and 2014, respectively. Currently, he was a Ph.D. candidate at the School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology. His research interests include security of CPSs and networked control systems.

Jian SUN received his Ph.D. degree from the Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2007. From April 2008 to October 2009, he was a visiting research fellow in University of Glamorgan, U.K. He is currently a professor in the School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology. His current research interests include security of CPSs, networked control systems, time-delay systems, and robust control.

Jie CHEN received the B.Sc., M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in Control Theory and Control Engineering from the Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China, in 1986, 1993 and 2000, respectively. He is currently a professor with the School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology. His research interest covers complex system multi-objective optimization and decision, constrained nonlinear control, and optimization methods.

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Wu, G., Sun, J. & Chen, J. A survey on the security of cyber-physical systems. Control Theory Technol. 14, 2–10 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11768-016-5123-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11768-016-5123-9

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