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The Origins of Prestige Goods as Honest Signals of Skill and Knowledge

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Abstract

This work addresses the emergence of prestige goods, which appear with fully modern Homo sapiens but at different times in different regions. I theorize that such goods came into existence to signal the level of skill held by their owners, in order to gain deference benefits from learning individuals in exchange for access. A game theoretic model demonstrates that a signaling strategy can invade a non-signaling population and can be evolutionarily stable under a set of reasonable parameter values. Increasing competition levels were likely the selective force driving the adoption of this novel strategy. Two changes in the social context in which prestige processes operate are tentatively identified as leading to increased levels of competition for prestige: (1) increasing group sizes and (2) increasing complexity or size of the existing cultural repertoire. Implications for prestige goods’ later use in social and political competition are discussed.

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Notes

  1. A related issue is whether the production of any kind of item not directly related to a “utilitarian” function may constitute a signal, though not one of skill. Decorative items, for example, even if made of local material and requiring no great skills to produce, could nonetheless function as signals of the extra time an individual has above and beyond that spent engaged in making a living. Alternatively, it may not be correct to consider items as signals in themselves if their main function is to enhance or draw attention to other features, such as cosmetics or material decorations worn on the body that draw attention to physical indicators or indices of symmetry, fertility, youth, etc. Further discussion of this point is given elsewhere (Plourde 2006, 2009).

  2. The use of a single parameter to represent both the costs paid by admirers, which may take may different forms, and the benefit from such deference to the signaler, is meant to capture the fact that the transaction is a transfer from the learner to the signaler/teacher, and follows models of costly signaling by offspring to parents, where the transfer of resources from the parent to the offspring is in a common currency, although the cost of the signal for the offspring is distinct.

  3. Gintis et al. (2001) used an n-person framework to examine a similar costly signaling scenario. Results of their model suggested that there was no significant difference between the results of dyadic and n-person setups. However, I feel it necessary to confirm these findings when sampling from the deme occurs with replacement after each round of interaction, a variation that essentially makes it more difficult for a signaling strategy to invade a non-signaling population.

  4. Here again I am specifically referring to goods whose primary function is to signal to learning individuals, who desire access to a highly skilled model and are willing to be deferent to that person in exchange. Such goods should be distinct from other kinds of physical items used as signals, specifically ones used to signal to mates and allies the amount extra time (general success levels), or items used to attract attention to salient physical qualities. It seems likely, however, that prestige goods could have derived from these. So for instance, the earliest forms of decorative items, such as beads, may not have begun as prestige goods, but when made of an exotic material or made in a particularly complex way, they would be taking on a signal content now aimed at learning individuals.

  5. By the term “egalitarian” I specifically refer to an absence of formalized leadership positions or social ranking: it is likely the case that status differences have always existed in human societies—by age, sex, and level of skill—and prestige differences do exist in contemporary egalitarian societies.

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Acknowledgments

This research was conducted under a US National Science Foundation International Research Fellowship (No. 0402116). My thinking and arguments on this topic have benefited from discussions with and advice from many colleagues and advisors. In particular, many thanks to Robert Boyd for his guidance in developing the model, Anne Kandler for illuminating mathematical difficulties, Claudia Glatz for editing, and to the manuscript reviewers for their helpful and insightful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. AHRC Centre for the Evolution of Cultural Diversity, Institute of Archaeology, University College London, 31-34 Gordon Square, London, WC1H 0PY, UK

    Aimée M. Plourde

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Correspondence to Aimée M. Plourde.

Appendices

Appendix 1

To consider the effect of relatedness between rare Honest Signaling and Responding types on the invasion criterion for the Honest Signaling and Responding strategy HS+HR into the Non-Signaling, Non-Responding (NS+NR) population, assume that there is a probability r that an HS+HR type meets itself and (1 − r) probability that it meets a common NS+NR type. Therefore, we can say that the probability for an individual to be paired with her own type is [r + (1 − r)q] and the probability of being paired with the other type is [(1 − r)(1 − q)], where q represents the frequency of her own type. For the purposes of simplification, let H represent the HS+HR strategy combination and N represent the NS+NR combination. To evaluate the relative fitnesses of the two types, we multiply the fitness of each type against itself and against the other type with the probability of meeting whichever type.

$$V_{SR} \left( {H\left| H \right.} \right)\left( {probH} \right) + V_{SR} \left( {H\left| N \right.} \right)\left( {probN} \right) >V_{SR} \left( {N\left| H \right.} \right)\left( {probH} \right) + V_{SR} \left( {N\left| N \right.} \right)\left( {probN} \right)$$

In the invading scenario, we can assume q = 0 for the invading type HS+HR, while for the common type NS+NR, the probability of being paired with her own type is 1, and the probability of being paired with the rare type is 0.

$$\begin{array}{*{20}c}{\left[ {\underbrace {\left[ {p\left( {b - c} \right)} \right]}_{V_s \left( {HS\left| {HR} \right.} \right)} + \underbrace {\left[ {p\left( {s - b} \right)} \right]}_{V_R \left( {HR\left| {HS} \right.} \right)}} \right]\underbrace {\left[ {r + \left( {1 - r} \right)q} \right]}_{Pq} + \left[ {\underbrace {\left( { - pc} \right)}_{V_S \left( {HS\left| {NR} \right.} \right)} + \underbrace 0_{V_R \left( {HR\left| {NS} \right.} \right)}} \right]\left[ {\underbrace {\left( {1 - r} \right)\left( {1 - q} \right)}_{R\left( {1 - q} \right)}} \right] >\left[ {\underbrace {\left[ 0 \right]}_{V_s \left( {NS\left| {HR} \right.} \right)} + \underbrace {\left[ 0 \right]}_{V_R \left( {NR\left| {HS} \right.} \right)}} \right]\left[ 0 \right] + \left[ {\underbrace {\left( 0 \right)}_{V_S \left( {NS\left| {NR} \right.} \right)} + \underbrace 0_{V_R \left( {NR\left| {NS} \right.} \right)}} \right]\left[ 1 \right]} \\{\left[ {p\left( {b - c} \right) + p\left( {s - b} \right)} \right]\left[ {r + \left( {1 - r} \right)0} \right] + \left( { - pc} \right)\left[ {\left( {1 - r} \right)\left( {1 - 0} \right)} \right] >0} \\{\left[ {pb - pc + ps - pb} \right]\left[ r \right] + \left( { - pc} \right)\left[ {\left( {1 - r} \right)} \right] >0} \\{\left( {ps - pc} \right)r + \left( { - pc} \right)\left( {1 - r} \right) >0} \\{rps - rpc - pc + rpc >0} \\{rps - pc >0} \\{rps >pc} \\{rs >c} \\{rs - c >0} \\\end{array} $$

Therefore, the honest signaling and responding strategy H can invade a non-signaling and responding population when the skills gained from paying prestige to highly skilled signalers multiplied by the degree of relatedness is larger than the cost to the responder of paying the cost of prestige deference.

Appendix 2

To examine how rates of change between unskilled (L) and highly skilled (H) states might influence p (the frequency of highly skilled individuals in the population) over time, we modify the model slightly to incorporate these rates into our calculations. When individuals are chosen at random from the population to form interacting pairs, it follows that the likelihood of choosing two of the same type or one of each are as given below:

p 2 :

probability of 2 highly skilled individuals being drawn from the population

2p(1 − p):

probability that a skilled and an unskilled individual will be drawn

(1 − p)2 :

probability that 2 unskilled individuals will be drawn

Following the interaction of individuals within their pairing, let the probability of changing from unskilled to highly skilled Pr(L → H) = α, where 0 < α < 1, the probability of changing from high to low skilled Pr(H → L) = 0, and the probability of remaining highly skilled if already highly skilled Pr(H → H) = 1. Thus the proportion of highly skilled individuals following the first round of interaction, p', can be given by the following expression:

$$\begin{array}{*{20}c} {p\prime = {\underbrace {p{\left[ {P{\left( {H \to H} \right)}} \right]}}_{{\Pr self = H * \Pr remainingH}}} + {\underbrace {p{\left( {1 - p} \right)}{\left[ {P{\left( {L \to H} \right)}} \right]}}_{{\Pr partner = H * \Pr becomingH}}}} \\ { = p{\left( 1 \right)} + p{\left( {1 - p} \right)}\alpha } \\ { = p + p{\left( {1 - p} \right)}\alpha } \\ \end{array} $$

At this point individuals are returned to the total population. Before they are re-sampled into pairs for the next round of interaction, we assume a certain amount of “mutation” in the population from a highly skilled to unskilled state, which we will term μ. Following this change, the proportion of highly skilled individuals in the total population, p'', is determined in the following calculation:

$$\matrix {p\prime \prime = p\prime \left( {1 - \mu } \right)} \\ { = \left[ {p + p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha } \right]\left[ {1 - \mu } \right]} \\ {or} \\ { = p\left( {1 - \mu } \right) + \left[ {p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha \left( {1 - \mu } \right)} \right]} \\ { = p - \mu p + p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha \left( {1 - \mu } \right)} \\ { = \underbrace {\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha \left( {1 - \mu } \right)}_{freqH} - \mu } \ $$

Now we can examine the question of whether it is possible for the frequency of highly skilled individuals to reach an equilibrium, such that the population does not over time reach a point where all members are highly skilled, thus reducing the utility of learning and therefore of signaling the possession of a high degree of skill. Let \(\hat p\) = the frequency of highly skilled individuals in the population at equilibrium, when there is no change in the proportion of highly skilled individuals at p'' and p. Solving for \({\hat p}\) gives the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} & \matrix {p\prime \prime = p} \\ {\left[ {p + p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha } \right]\left[ {1 - \mu } \right] = p} \\ {p + p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha - \mu p - \mu p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha = p} \\ {p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha - \mu p - \mu p\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha = 0 * } \\ {\left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha - \mu - \mu \left( {1 - p} \right)\alpha = 0} \\ {\left( {1 - p} \right)\left( {\alpha - \alpha \mu } \right) - \mu = 0} \\ {\left( {1 - p} \right)\left( {\alpha - \alpha \mu } \right) = \mu } \\ {\left( {1 - p} \right) = \frac{\mu }{{\left( {\alpha - \alpha \mu } \right)}}} \\ {\left( {1 - \hat p} \right) = \frac{\mu }{{\alpha \left( {1 - \mu } \right)}}} \ \\ & \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad * \;{\text{Assuming that p}} \ne 0 \\ \end{aligned} $$

It is thus demonstrated that such an equilibrium can exist, when the proportion of unskilled individuals is equal to the rate at which highly skilled individuals “mutate” to unskilled individuals divided by the rate at which unskilled individuals become skilled multiplied by one minus the mutation rate.

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Plourde, A.M. The Origins of Prestige Goods as Honest Signals of Skill and Knowledge. Hum Nat 19, 374–388 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-008-9050-4

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