Institutions and Bribery in an Authoritarian State

Scholars have suggested that corruption could serve as a substitute for property-protecting institutions in developing countries, but very few empirical studies have been conducted to test this theory. Most existing studies on the determinants of corruption are cross-national, rely on perception-based measures, and focus on economic development, regime type, and market structure as explanatory variables. Little is known about why corruption occurs in an authoritarian state at the micro level. We theorize bribery as a bargaining process between a firm and a rent-maximizing public official, and we assume that graft-paying firms face different sets of rules and regulations, which govern firms' costs and benefits of bribing. We test the hypothesis that firms' bribes are determined by the rigor of their internal auditing control and the quality of property-protecting institutions. We use entertainment and travel costs directly observed in a large-scale firm-level survey in China as a proxy for corruption. Our study implies that firms operating in a weak property rights regime rely on political connections as a substitute for formal legal protection. The findings shed light on the literature on property rights, corruption, and East Asian development.