Anzeige
Erschienen in:
01.04.2015 | Regular Paper
Improved differential fault attack on MICKEY 2.0
Erschienen in: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering | Ausgabe 1/2015
EinloggenAktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
Abstract
In this paper we describe several ideas related to differential fault attack (DFA) on MICKEY 2.0, a stream cipher from eStream hardware profile. Using the standard assumptions for fault attacks, we first show that if the adversary can induce random single bit faults in the internal state of the cipher, then by injecting around \(2^{16.7}\) faults and performing \(2^{32.5}\) computations on an average, it is possible to recover the entire internal state of MICKEY at the beginning of the key-stream generation phase. We further consider the scenario where the fault may affect more than one (at most three) neighboring bits and in that case we require around \(2^{18.4}\) faults on an average to mount the DFA. We further show that if the attacker can solve multivariate equations (say, using SAT solvers) then the attack can be carried out using around \(2^{14.7}\) faults in the single-bit fault model and \(2^{16.06}\) faults for the multiple-bit scenario