Political business cycles in the parliamentary system☆
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Cited by (56)
Dissolution risk and legislative effort of politicians
2022, Electoral StudiesCitation Excerpt :Theoretical studies modeled dissolution decision in various ways, such as a renewable American option with interacting waiting and stopping values (Keppo et al., 2008), coalition bargaining (Lupia and Strøm, 1995), or a financial option pricing model (Kato and Inui, 2013). Empirical studies have also investigated strategic timing of snap elections with respect to business cycles (Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Beckman and Schleiter, 2020; Cargill and Hutchinson, 1991; Chowdhury, 1993; Ito and Park, 1988; Kayser, 2005; Lächler, 1982), or have looked at electoral benefits that arise from the timing of snap elections (Schleiter and Tavits, 2016).5 While much is known about the strategic timing of dissolution, what has received less attention is the consequences that arise from the uncertain timing of dissolution.
Political cycles in physician employment: A case of Japanese local public hospitals
2018, Social Science and MedicineCitation Excerpt :In addition, the Japanese local electoral system enables us to exclude the potential endogeneity of election timing. Though the election year can be determined endogenously if the incumbent calls an election when the timing is favorable (Ito and Park, 1988), most elections in Japanese municipalities are held at the termination of a term, and are thus “scheduled”. The term of all mayors, four years, is stipulated by national law, and we can therefore safely argue that the election timing of Japanese municipalities are exogenous.
Governmentally amplified output volatility
2016, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its ApplicationsThe election timing advantage: Empirical fact or fiction?
2012, Electoral StudiesCitation Excerpt :Others have focused on the extent to which incumbent governments are able to manipulate the economy to create the ideal economic conditions for an opportunistic election call, or whether incumbent governments simply try to predict and ride the economic waves. Using the same data as Ito and Park (1988), Hutchinson and Cargill (1991) found only moderate support for the ability of Japanese governments to opportunistically time elections with strong economic conditions. Chowdhury (1993) applied these arguments about manipulation and surfing to India, finding some evidence in support of surfing but none for manipulation.
Early Election Calling and Satisfaction with Democracy
2023, Government and OppositionElectoral Cycles in Government Policy Making: Strategic Timing of Austerity Reform Measures in Western Europe
2021, British Journal of Political Science
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Most of reseach for this note was carried out when the first author was a visiting Associate Professor at Harvard University, teaching the Japanese Economy course, and the second author was a student in the class. The senior thesis of the second author formed the basis for some parts of this note. The authors are grateful to support given to this project by the Department of Economics, Harvard University. Discussions with David E. Bloom, Christopher Cavanough, Barry Eichengreen, Hidehiko Ichimura, Christopher Sims, and Neil Wallace have been very helpful.