The lexicographic equal-loss solution

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(91)90004-B

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume 22, Issue 2, October 1991, Pages 151-161

https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90004-B Get rights and content

Abstract

We introduce a new solution for Nash's bargaining problem, called the lexicographic equal-loss solution. This solution is a lexicographic extension of the equal-loss solution, which equalizes across agents the losses from the ideal point, to satisfy Pareto optimality. An axiomatic characterization is presented by using the following five axioms: Pareto optimality, anonymity, translation invariance, weak monotocinity, and independence of alternatives other than the ideal point.

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The lexicographic equal-loss solution

Abstract

Econom. Lett.

J. Econom. Theory

Lexicographic egalitarian solution and uncertainty in the disagreement point

Z. Op. Res.

The lexicographic egalitarian solution

Cahiers du C.E.R.O.

Lexicographic monotone path solutions

OR Spektrum

Individual monotonicity and lexicographic maxmin solution

Econometrica

Individual monotonicity and lexicographic maxmin solution

Econometrica

Individual monotonicity and lexicographic maxmin solution

Erratum