The impact of experience on prices and profits in experimental duopoly markets☆
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Cited by (18)
On the malleability of fairness ideals: Spillover effects in partial and impartial allocation tasks
2018, Journal of Economic PsychologyCitation Excerpt :Harrison, McKee, and Rutstrom (1987) find in an experiment on market power that experienced subjects are much more effective in becoming monopolists than inexperienced ones. Benson and Faminow (1988) notice that when experiments are conducted with inexperienced subjects, collusion is rarely detected. The opposite holds when experienced subjects are recruited.
Tie-breaking rules and divisibility in experimental duopoly markets
2008, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationCitation Excerpt :For instance, prior posted-offer experiments focused on factors such as the number of sellers (see Davis et al., 2002), the amount of information provided to sellers (Brown-Kruse et al., 1994), the role of subject experience (Alger, 1987; Benson and Faminow, 1988; Friedman and Hoggatt, 1980), mergers (Davis and Holt, 1994), and so on.7 Some of these studies involve duopoly markets as well (e.g., Davis et al., 2002; Friedman and Hoggatt, 1980; Alger, 1987; Benson and Faminow, 1988). To the best of our knowledge, there are few studies focusing on the effect of tie-breaking rules and divisibility.
Two are few and four are many: Number effects in experimental oligopolies
2004, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationCitation Excerpt :What is the impact of experience on market outcomes in experiments? While there is no evidence on this reported for Cournot markets, Benson and Faminow (1988) show that, in posted-price markets with differentiated products, experience plays a significant role in achieving equilibria predicted by tacit collusion. Even though the sessions with experienced subjects were scheduled one month after the initial sessions, experience significantly increased prices.
Cooperation in symmetric duopolies with demand inertia
2000, International Journal of Industrial OrganizationOligopoly experimentation of learning with simulated markets
1998, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationMarket entry: An experimental investigation
1995, Journal of Socio-Economics
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Senior authorship is not assigned. These market experiments were funded by the Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics at Montana State University and the Political Economy Research Center of Bozeman, Montana. We wish to thank Myles Watts and Terry Anderson for their support in obtaining funding and facilities, Ann Hudecek for assistance in data entry and analysis, Roger Lloyd, Paul Siebrasse, Russell Tronstad and Rick Judd for their assistance in supervising the experimental markets, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and criticisms.