A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility

doi:10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume 113, Issue 2, December 2003, Pages 182-198

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1 Get rights and content

Abstract

In a decentralized marriage market there are different types of men and women. Agents sequentially search for mating partners and meet bilaterally in a random fashion. Upon meeting, the paired agents complete mating if both agree, and separate and continue searching otherwise. The polarization of interests between men and women appears as in Gale–Shapley marriage problems; as agents of one sex become more selective about their mates, agents of the other sex lose. As search costs disappear, the set of equilibrium outcomes in a search model reduces to the set of stable matchings in a corresponding Gale–Shapley marriage problem.

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A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility

Abstract

Econom. Lett.

Rev. Econom. Dyn.

A theory of marriagePart I

J. Polit. Economy

Two-sided search, marriages and matchmakers

Internat. Econom. Rev.

Marriage and Class

Quart. J. Econom.

Long-term partnership formationmarriage and employment

Econom. J.

Transplants and implantsthe economics of self-improvement

Internat. Econom. Rev.

College admissions and the stability of marriage

Amer. Math. Monthly